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ABSTRACT 
The determinants of American grand strategy are in flux. Geopolitically, the 
post–Cold War unipolar era in which the United States enjoyed unrivaled power is 
waning on account of China’s rise and Russia’s resurgence. Domestically, intractable 
political polarization and the election of Donald Trump are seen as signals that domestic 
consensuses on American grand strategy are deteriorating. This thesis explores the 
formulation of American grand strategy during periods of past geopolitical upheaval, so 
as to gain an understanding useful for asking better questions about its future. The cases 
examined include the American founding and Washington administrations; the beginning 
of the Cold War and the Truman administration; and the Clinton administration after the 
Cold War. This case study comparison utilized Clausewitzian critical analysis to 
examine if and how the United States has blended different grand-strategy archetypes and 
balanced integration and insulation at home and abroad. This thesis finds that 
the Founders and the Truman administration adhered to an “insulationist” paradigm 
whereby different grand strategy archetypes were blended in order to achieve a 
balance between integration and insulation. By contrast, the Clinton administration 
strained this logic in its pursuit of a grand strategy that emphasized integration and 
eschewed insulation. This thesis concludes with considerations for how the United 
States may craft its grand strategy for the future. 
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For decades, the same tired voices proposed the same failed solutions, pursuing global 
ambitions at the expense of their own people. But only when you take care of your own 
citizens will you find a true basis for cooperation. As President, I have rejected the failed 
approaches of the past, and I am proudly putting America first.1 
––Donald J. Trump 
We must harness that power and rally the free world to meet the challenges facing the 
world today. It falls to the United States to lead the way. No other nation has that 
capacity. No other nation is built on that idea. We have to champion liberty and 
democracy, reclaim our credibility, and look with an unrelenting optimism and 
determination toward our future.2 
––Joseph R. Biden 
 
In the 1967 edition of his book titled, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, British 
theorist Liddell Hart writes that “the realm of grand strategy is for the most part terra 
incognita––still awaiting exploration and understanding.”3 Today, more than two decades 
into the twenty-first century, the first half of Hart’s observation––that grand strategy suffers 
from a lack of intellectual exploration––is likely no longer true, if it ever was. In the United 
States, grand strategy is a popular topic in modern academic, policy, and military circles. 
Many leading universities and most American war colleges offer programs, graduate 
degrees, or courses focused on the exploration and study of grand strategy. Articles and 
books on the topic are frequently published or reviewed in leading academic journals. 
American grand strategy is also the subject of many conferences and panels hosted by 
prominent think tanks and policy institutions. Hence, today one would find it difficult to 
 
1 Donald J. Trump, “Videotaped Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly” (Speech, 
Washington, D.C, September 22, 2020), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/videotaped-remarks-
the-united-nations-general-assembly. 
2 Joseph R. Biden, “Why America Must Lead Again,” Foreign Affairs, April 2020, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again. 
3 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, Second Revised Edition (London: Faber 
& Faber Ltd, 1967), 322. 
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argue that American grand strategy suffers from a lack of exploration. However, the same 
is not true for the second portion of Hart’s observation. 
While its modern study is rather robust and prolific, common understanding or 
agreement as to the future of American grand strategy remains elusive. Ironically, it is 
likely that the United States enjoyed a firmer understanding of its grand strategy when 
Hart’s book was published than it does now. In 1967, the United States was engaged in the 
Cold War and most acknowledge that, while there were differences in opinion as to the 
details of its implementation, the Americans had a largely coherent grand strategy focused 
on containing the Soviet Union.4 By comparison, there is less coherence and agreement on 
American grand strategy today. In fact, much of the above-mentioned exploration and 
discussion on the topic stems from debate regarding the United States’ grand strategy after 
the Cold War. This debate, colloquially known as the “Kennan Sweepstakes,” largely 
revolves around the extent to which the United States should adapt or change its grand 
strategy in response to the altered geopolitical landscape manifested by its Cold War 
victory. While elements of this discussion have been influenced and modified by 
subsequent events such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the United States’ 
wars across the Middle East, the main thrust of the debate concerning the purpose, goals, 
and course of American grand strategy after the Cold War remains unsettled and ongoing.5 
This thesis joins this discussion and is an attempt to conduct an exploration of American 
grand strategy in the past so as to gain an understanding useful for asking better questions 
about its future. 
 
4 Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry 
S. Truman to George W. Bush (New York, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014); William C. Martel, 
Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
5 Barry Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International 
Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 5–53; Eugene Gholz, Darryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Come Home, 
America,” International Security 21, no. 4 (1997): 5–48; Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and 
William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment,” International 
Security 37, no. 3 (2013): 7–51. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Interestingly, grand strategy is a term often invoked in academic, military, and 
policy circles; yet, it remains somewhat ill-defined. Scholars, policymakers, and military 
professionals disagree not only about its definition, but also its legitimacy. Those who 
believe the term is valid and useful generally consider it to be the highest form of national 
strategy and the amalgamation of a state’s resources and various forms of power in the 
long-term pursuance of its interests.6 Some define the term broadly. For example, Hal 
Brands defines grand strategy in his book, What Good is Grand Strategy?, as “the highest 
form of statecraft” and “the intellectual architecture that lends structure to foreign policy.”7 
Paul Kennedy writes that grand strategy is “the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring 
together all the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and 
enhancement of the nation’s long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests.”8 
Additionally, Hart writes that “the role of grand strategy––higher strategy––is to co-
ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or a band of nations, toward the attainment 
of the political object of the war––the goal defined by fundamental policy.”9 Perhaps the 
most elegant definition of grand strategy is offered by John Lewis Gaddis in his book, On 
Grand Strategy. He defines it as “the alignment of potentially unlimited aspirations with 
necessarily limited capabilities.”10 While Brands, Kennedy, Hart, and Gaddis offer rather 
broad conceptions of grand strategy, others are more restrictive in their definition or even 
skeptical of the term. 
 
6 Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. 
Truman to George W. Bush; Stephen D. Biddle, American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment 
(Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2005); Clark Murdock and Kevin Kallmyer, 
“Applied Grand Strategy: Making Tough Choices in an Era of Limits and Constraint,” Orbis 55, no. 4 
(2011): 541–557. 
7 Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. 
Truman to George W. Bush, 1. 
8 Paul M. Kennedy, Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 5. 
9 Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, 322. 
10 John Lewis Gaddis, On Grand Strategy (New York, New York: Penguin Press, an imprint of 
Penguin Random House, 2018), 21. 
4 
Similar to the proponents of grand strategy, those with a more circumscribed 
conception are also diverse in their views. Some, such as Robert Jervis, maintain that grand 
strategy is a useful concept, but believe it becomes a meaningless or harmful notion in the 
absence of a clear and easily identifiable threat.11 In a similar vein, Richard Betts writes 
that “the term ‘grand strategy’ is not worthless,” but has “simply come to be overused and 
the concept overvalued as a standard.”12 Others take a more critical view of the whole idea 
of grand strategy. For example, David Edelstein and Ronald Krebs invoke Betts’ earlier 
work while arguing in Foreign Affairs that grand strategy “is an illusion” and “the country 
would be better off without it.”13 In essence, those critical of the idea of grand strategy 
generally fall into two broad camps. There are those who view grand strategy as a useful 
concept, but think it is often overused and applied inappropriately. The other group largely 
considers grand strategy distracting at best, and harmful to American policy-making at 
worst. Combined, these critiques raise questions about the extent to which the United States 
has successfully formulated grand strategies in the past and how it may do so in the future.  
So, does the United States conduct grand strategy? Most say yes; some point to the United 
States’ founding era as the genesis for an American grand strategy. William Martel, David 
Hendrickson, Karl Walling, and Charles Edel each argue that the origins of the nation’s 
grand strategy go back to the earliest years of the republic.14 These authors point to the 
United States’ founding principles and steady accumulation of power as evidence of an 
effective and coherent grand strategy. Others maintain that American grand strategy truly 
began with the closing of its frontier and the slow turn of the nation’s gaze beyond its 
 
11 Robert Jervis, “U.S. Grand Strategy: Mission Impossible,” Naval War College Review 51, no. 3 
(1998): 22–36. 
12 Richard K. Betts, “The Grandiosity of Grand Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly 42, no. 4 
(October 2, 2019): 20. 
13 David M. Edelstein and Ronald R. Krebs, “Delusions of Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, October 
25, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-10-20/delusions-grand-strategy; Richard K. Betts, 
“Is Strategy an Illusion?,” International Security 25, no. 2 (2000): 5–50. 
14 Martel, Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy; 
David C. Hendrickson, Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2003); Karl Walling, “Old and New Testaments in American Grand Strategy,” in From 
Reflection and Choice: The Political Philosophy of the Federalist Papers and the Ratification Debate, ed. 
Will R. Jordan (Macon: Mercer University Press, 2020); Charles Edel, Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams 
and the Grand Strategy of the Republic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
5 
shores. Those of such views generally highlight Alfred Thayer Mahan and presidents 
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as some principal architects of American grand 
strategy.15 Still others argue it was the beginning of the Cold War which led the United 
States to seriously conduct grand strategy. They highlight the containment strategy the 
United States followed against the Soviet Union as being the first coherent American grand 
strategy.16 Debates about the birth of American grand strategy are, however, not the most 
lively or voluminous in the literature. That distinction belongs to a body of work that 
largely emerged after the Cold War and concerns what American national interests and 
grand strategy should be in the future. 
Most who write on such topics generally concede that the United States at least 
adhered to a largely coherent grand strategy during the Cold War. Where they differ 
significantly is in their analysis of what the United States’ grand strategy should be or 
should have been upon the Cold War’s conclusion. Writing in the journal International 
Security, Barry Posen and Andrew Ross lay out what they view as the four main 
“competing visions for U.S. grand strategy” in the post-Cold War world.17 They list these 
visions as neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy. 
Posen and Ross critique the Clinton administration’s efforts at grand strategy by claiming 
that it represented an indiscriminate mixing of these visions. They assert that American 
grand strategy must largely avoid similar mixing and matching of visions as:  
They contain fundamental disagreements about strategic objectives and 
priorities, the extent to which the United States should be engaged in 
international affairs, the form that engagement should assume, the means 
that should be employed, the degree of autonomy that must be maintained, 
and when and under what conditions military force should be employed.18  
 
15 Philip Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 444–77; 
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 29–55. 
16 Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and Jim Lacey, The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, 
Diplomacy, and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
17 Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.” 
18 Posen and Ross, 52. 
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Other academics and analysts seem to have, at least implicitly, agreed with Posen and 
Ross’s logic as many have published numerous articles, books, and reports advocating for 
each of these various visions of American grand strategy.19 Indeed, there are even other 
competing options for American grand strategy not discussed by Posen and Ross in their 
article. For example, Martel and others believe the United States should follow a grand 
strategy of restraint.20 A similar option that is advocated for by prominent academics such 
as John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and Christopher Layne, is a grand strategy based on 
offshore balancing.21 Additionally, and in contrast to advocates of restraint and offshore 
balancing, there are those who think the United States should largely maintain the general 
direction of its post-Cold War strategy of global engagement and liberal internationalism.22  
Yet, despite a considerable range of declared differences between the grand 
strategies advocated for by academics, policymakers, and politicians, nearly all of them 
can be generally sorted into the four archetypes described by Posen and Ross. For example, 
those who advocate for offshore balancing are essentially arguing for a specific type of 
selective engagement that rests upon certain elements of primacy. In a similar vein, those 
advocating for a continuance of the United States’ current grand strategy of liberal 
 
19 Eric A. Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Robert J. Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” International Security 
23, no. 3 (1998): 79; Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); 
Michael E. Brown et al., America’s Strategic Choices (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000); Charles Kupchan 
and Clifford Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,” International Security 
16, no. 1 (1991): 114–61; William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International 
Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 5–41; Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories 
and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” International Security 21, no. 4 (1997): 49–88. 
20 William C. Martel, “Grand Strategy of ‘Restrainment,’” Orbis 54, no. 3 (January 1, 2010): 356–73; 
Barry Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2014); Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, “Come Home, America.” 
21 John J. Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2018); Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s 
Future Grand Strategy,” International Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 86–124; Stephen Walt, The Hell of Good 
Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy, 1st ed. (New York, NY: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore 
Balancing,” August 14, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-
offshore-balancing. 
22 Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment”; 
Hal Brands, American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 
2018); G. John Ikenberry, A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global 
Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020); Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper, An Open 
World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020). 
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internationalism are making the case for certain types of cooperative security and primacy. 
Interestingly, most all who advocate for any type of grand strategy do so by lambasting 
neo-isolationism. Yet, not all who admonish neo-isolationism or isolationism more broadly 
do so from a wholly different set of assumptions. In fact, many of those who favor a grand 
strategy of restraint or retrenchment share many basic premises about international politics 
and American power with those rare few who sometimes advocate for isolationist grand 
strategies. When considered together, it seems that the variation between these archetypes 
is more important than the variation within them.  
As detailed above, many have written as to which particular grand strategy 
archetype they believe is best suited for the United States. Some base their 
recommendations on various forms of historical analysis and others on political science 
and international relations theory. These authors largely vary by how much involvement in 
the global arena they believe is necessary to maintain American national security and 
secure American national interests. Most point to common evidence of how history has 
proven the validity of their various prescriptions and disproven those of competing visions. 
What is less present in the literature is robust analysis or comparison of how the United 
States may have blended different grand strategy archetypes during different periods of 
intense geopolitical change. In just over 150 years, the United States evolved from a 
collection of British colonies on the east coast of North America, to one of the world’s two 
major superpowers. Over the course of another 50 years, it became the most powerful 
nation on the planet. This record of success suggests that the United States has formulated 
effective grand strategies throughout its history. Given the range of geopolitical 
circumstance in which this ascendance occurred, it is unlikely that the United States relied 
on just a single grand strategy archetype. Hence, disagreements about or advocacy strictly 
for certain grand strategy archetypes are likely simplistic ways to think about grand 
strategy. 
C. CONTEXT 
In some ways, this state of disagreement is a perennial condition. It is perennial in 
the sense that the finer points of American grand strategy have always been debated, often 
8 
hotly. One need only take a cursory glance at early American history to understand that 
disagreements concerning what the modern observer would regard as grand strategy are 
older than the republic itself.23 Another enduring aspect of this debate is its correlation to 
parallel discussions about the extent to which the United States should be integrated and 
involved with the world beyond its shores. As they are inherently related, debate about one 
can usually be considered a proxy for debate about the other. Truthfully, it is a somewhat 
uniquely American debate as the United States, perhaps more than any other major country, 
has historically enjoyed the ability to stand apart and insulate itself from global 
entanglements. In fact, for most of its history the United States attended to its interests and 
maintained its security by limiting its exposure to the wider world. Initially out of fear and 
later out of indifference, the Americans, however much they debated other aspects of grand 
strategy, generally agreed that a United States insulated from the frequent controversies of 
the Old World was one best positioned to maintain its liberty and security. This consensus, 
however, did not last forever.  
Dramatic geopolitical upheavals in the twentieth century saw the United States alter 
the goals and course of its grand strategy and become considerably more integrated abroad. 
The United States first flirted with formal global integration after its participation in World 
War I. Had it been approved by the Senate, President Woodrow Wilson’s ambitious 
project, the League of Nations, would have seen the United States integrated into an 
international institution dedicated to the maintenance of global peace and security.24 After 
a brief return to its non-entanglement tradition during the interwar years of the 1920s and 
1930s, the United States integrated itself into the Grand Alliance in order to defeat Nazi 
Germany and Imperial Japan. Upon achieving victory in World War II, the Americans then 
institutionalized their integration abroad in order to stabilize a devastated world and wage 
the Cold War against the Soviet Union. The United States formally integrated into the 
United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the General Agreement 
 
23 Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 227–339; Paul A. Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers. (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 1963), 70–94; Hendrickson, Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American 
Founding, 104–11. 
24 Kissinger, Diplomacy, 47–55. 
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on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank, and various bi-lateral mutual defense 
treaties. Later, after the Soviet Union’s collapse, the United States continued to expand its 
global integration. In the 1990s, the Americans created and joined the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and expanded NATO 
to states in Eastern Europe. By the turn of the millennia, those crafting American grand 
strategy, however much they debated other aspects of grand strategy, generally agreed that 
a United States integrated with the world was one best positioned to maintain its liberty 
and security. This consensus endures today. 
When considering the purpose, goals, and overall course of American grand 
strategy, the magnitude of this change is stunning. From their revolution until the twentieth 
century, the Americans were largely skeptical of integration abroad as it was considered 
unwise to implicate the nation by “artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes” of Old World 
politics or “the ordinary combinations and collisions of [its] friendships or enmities.”25 
Yet, this preference for insulation gave way to one of integration. In the first fifty years of 
the twentieth century, the United States evolved from a nation whose grand strategy was 
still largely anchored by founding era beliefs in non-entanglement into the hegemonic 
leader of a globe-spanning political, military, and economic alliance dedicated to the 
containment of Soviet communism. The passage of another fifty years saw the United 
States not only triumphant in the Cold War, but also the unrivaled leader of a globally 
integrated liberal world order. What is noteworthy about this move from a grand strategy 
of detached insulation to one of integrated hegemony is the extent to which this progression 
was spurred by notable periods of political uncertainty. Indeed, it seems that the life story 
of the United States could be told as one of ever-expanding integration spurred by the shifts 
and upheavals in domestic and international politics. Moreover, American fear or anger in 
response to such upheavals seem to exert considerable influence on the United States’ 
conception of its national interests and the purpose, goals, and course of its grand strategy. 
 
25 George Washington, “The Farewell Address,” in Washington’s Farewell Address: The View from 
the 20th Century, by Burton I. Kaufman (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), 27. 
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Today, geopolitical realities are again changing. The post-Cold War era in which 
the United States enjoyed unrivaled diplomatic, economic, and military power is fading. 
The world is now witnessing the resurgence of authoritarian great powers, such as China 
and Russia, who are increasingly challenging the United States on many fronts. China, 
whose economic strength is fueling its growth in military power, is taking a more 
aggressive stance in international affairs.26 Russia, while seemingly doomed to a slow 
economic and demographic decline, is playing a weak hand well by attempting to reassert 
itself in its near abroad and by sowing discord in Western democracies.27 These disruptive 
changes are happening while the threats from provocative regional actors, such as Iran and 
North Korea, remain dynamic and evolving. The United States must also contend with the 
enduring threats posed by international terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. Furthermore, 
nebulous threats such as those posed by climate change and pandemics are increasing in 
salience. Though they often receive the most attention from would-be grand strategists, 
changes and threats in the international arena are not the only factors that exercise influence 
on American grand strategy. 
The domestic elements influencing the formulation and execution of American 
grand strategy are also in flux. In political terms, the election of Donald Trump arguably 
represents the most significant event in American domestic politics in a generation as he 
campaigned on challenging the central tenets and direction of the United States’ post-Cold 
War grand strategy. His presidency and its long-term effects on both domestic politics and 
American grand strategy remain to be seen. Though not directly caused by Trump’s 
election, political polarization continues to plague the American political system. This 
political strife complicates any effort to achieve or sustain a consensus on American grand 
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strategy and its component parts, such as defense spending, trade, and alliances.28 
Domestic politics are, however, not the only internal factor that will shape American grand 
strategy in the future. Technological advances continue to affect American life and 
American strategy. For instance, advances in domestic energy production have allowed the 
United States to achieve energy independence and become a net exporter of oil products.29 
Furthermore, changing demographics, cultural mores, and social patterns are also affecting 
longstanding American conceptions of economics, citizenship, and national security.30 
Lastly, the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic has caused considerable economic damage 
in the United States. While the long-term effects of the coronavirus are not immediately 
apparent, the pandemic and its reverberations, both at home and abroad, will influence 
American grand strategy for many years to come. Perhaps more than at any period since 
the end of the Cold War, future conceptions of American grand strategy must account for 
a host of internal factors as much as changes in the geopolitical arena. To craft grand 
strategy based heavily on one, especially in the current domestic and international 
environments, is merely an invitation for it to be undermined by the other. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
All the above considered, this thesis asked a series of related questions intended to 
illuminate the considerations the United States should take into account as it crafts its grand 
strategy in response to the upheaval happening today. The research questions for this thesis 
were the following: 
a. What conditions cause significant changes in American grand strategy? 
b. How should the national interests be defined? How have they been defined in 
similar periods of geopolitical upheaval? 
 
28 Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions, 217–54. 
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c. How have previous American leaders formulated grand strategy during 
periods of intense geopolitical change? 
d. To what extent have competing grand strategy archetypes been balanced 
during such periods? 
e. How has the United States balanced integration and insulation in its 
conception of its national interests and the purpose, goals, and course of its 
grand strategy?  
E. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis examined these questions by conducting a controlled case study 
comparison of similar periods from American history. These periods include: the American 
founding and the presidential administration of George Washington; the beginning of the 
Cold War and the administration of Harry S. Truman; and the period after the Cold War’s 
end and the administration of William J. Clinton. This qualitative research was conducted 
primarily by examining primary and secondary sources. Examined were contemporary 
speeches, papers, reports, and official documents. This work also drew heavily from the 
historical and biographical works of others. It reviewed histories, biographies, books, and 
articles focused in each era. Also considered were applicable works on the topics of grand 
strategy, foreign policy, economics, political science, political theory, and international 
relations. 
The independent variables for this study were instances of substantial geopolitical 
change that affected the United States. The dependent variable was the formulation of 
American grand strategy in response to that change. As changes in the geopolitical 
landscape do not directly causes changes in grand strategy, this thesis also considered and 
examined the proximate intervening variables. The primary intervening variable examined 
in this work was the conception of the American national interests in each case. Grand 
strategy is not aimless or a naturally occurring phenomenon. It is the purposeful 
coordination and direction of a nation’s resources towards some future long-term goal 
within a certain context. Thus, geopolitical change must be appraised in terms of the 
national interest before grand strategy can be formulated. In order to draw conclusions 
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about how changes in geopolitical realities affect American grand strategy, one must also 
consider the intervening conception of the American national interests. 
The historical case study method is appropriate for this project as it analyzes a 
phenomenon––the formulation of American grand strategy––within its historical context, 
and then uses this analysis to better understand how it should be formulated today.31 The 
unifying context in this project was an analysis of the formulation of American grand 
strategy in times of intense geopolitical change. This method is suited to this project as the 
strengths inherent to the case study methodology allow for “detailed consideration of 
contextual factors.”32 Many factors that influence the formulation of grand strategy, such 
as national power, political culture, intensity of threats from hostile powers, and so on can 
be difficult to quantify and measure. The case study comparison method allows one to 
examine these factors and others within their appropriate context, and then compare them 
to other similar cases. Doing so allows one to draw conclusions from a wider variety of 
variables and explore the operation of causal mechanisms across the cases.33 This more 
holistic approach uses data in a “triangulating fashion” in order to draw meaningful 
conclusions and inform subsequent recommendations.34  
The case study method is, however, not without its limitations and potential pitfalls. 
These include case selection bias, single case issues, and level of representativeness or 
independence.35 Issues with selection bias in case study methodology often stem from the 
selection of cases based on the dependent variable and on the availability or accessibility 
of evidence.36 This project accounts for these potential issues by selecting cases on the 
independent variable and the wide availability of data applicable to each historical case. 
As this project compared multiple cases, it naturally avoided issues associated with the 
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single case method. Similarly, because the selected cases are representative of the selected 
independent variable––change in geopolitical landscape––but vary considerably in other 
ways, this project largely avoided issues based on a lack of representativeness or 
independence.  
The selected cases were chosen for both their similarities and differences. These 
cases are similar in that each represents a period in American history where the United 
States was confronted with dramatic changes in the geopolitical landscape. In the founding 
era, having just defeated one of the world’s great powers, the newly constituted United 
States was still emerging as an independent nation in a world full of great powers. In 
contrast, the beginning of the Cold War saw a fully developed United States shed its 
previous isolationism and assume the mantle as one of two global superpowers. Lastly, the 
conclusion of the Cold War left the United States unmatched in global power and the 
world’s sole superpower.  
At the risk of stating the obvious, it must be pointed out that these cases each 
concern American history and grand strategy. Though one could choose to answer this 
research question by examining how other great powers have adapted their grand strategies 
and national interests in response to changing geopolitical and domestic realities, this thesis 
only examined American cases. This is because its intent was to also examine if or how 
and why American grand strategy and national interests have changed in conjunction with 
significant changes in the geopolitical landscape. As the intent of this thesis is to offer 
considerations as to how the United States, with its unique geography, culture, history, and 
economy, should formulate grand strategy, examining cases of other powers would likely 
result in less satisfactory or appropriate conclusions and recommendations. 
These cases were also chosen for how they are different. For example, they are 
separated by considerable periods of time. As such, they represent the United States at 
different stages in its development and level of power. At its founding, the United States 
was weak compared to other great powers. At the onset of the Cold War, it was far more 
powerful but was still rivaled in many ways by the power of the Soviet Union. In contrast, 
the end of the Cold War found the United States unrivaled by almost any measure of power. 
These cases also vary widely in the strategic circumstances from which they emerged. The 
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United States were but mere colonies of Great Britain before their independence. Prior to 
World War II and the Cold War that followed, the United States was a detached country 
with limited global integration. Almost the exact opposite is true of the United States by 
the time the Cold War ended. Finally, the nature and type of threats perceived by the United 
States in these cases are extremely different. The Founders were primarily concerned with 
maintaining the union while avoiding war with the various European imperial powers. 
American leaders largely faced a solitary threat from the Soviet Union at the outset of the 
Cold War. With the Cold War’s end, the United States largely perceived no existential 
threats. The differences manifested in these particular cases allow not only for thorough 
conclusions to be drawn from them, but also sharper considerations for how the United 
States should formulate grand strategy today. 
This thesis drew its conclusions by examining and comparing the formulation of 
American grand strategy in each case. It did so by employing elements of Carl von 
Clausewitz’s critical analysis framework and Art Lykke’s strategy model framework.37 
Clausewitzian critical analysis entails three distinct intellectual activities: “the discovery 
and interpretation of equivocal facts…the tracing of effects back to their causes…[and] the 
investigation and evaluation of means employed.”38 In Clausewitz’s view, this robust 
multi-layered method of inquiry is essential in order to avoid a superficial understanding 
of phenomenon based on “the plain narrative of a historical event.”39 He contends that 
critics often misuse history to justify their theories.40 This can be avoided by evaluating 
not just “the means actually employed, but all possible means.”41 Similarly, one must 
consider “the full extent of everything that has happened, or might have happened.”42 To 
achieve this level of detail in analysis, many factors must be considered. 
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Thus, assessed in each case was the United States’ strategic constraints and 
restraints, as well as its contemporary conception of the national interest. Specifically, the 
thesis examined American grand strategy of each period and its competing alternatives. It 
considered their competing theories of victory, as well as each vision’s suitability, 
feasibility, and acceptability based on the national interest and geopolitical realities. It 
analyzed competing strategies by assessing the ends, ways, means, and risk associated with 
them. Moreover, this thesis also examined the extent to which different grand strategies 
were blended or employed in tandem with one another. Appraised were not only the likely 
reactions to each grand strategic vision from nations friendly, neutral, and hostile to the 
United States, but also the reactions of the American domestic populations to their nation’s 
grand strategy, as well as its alternatives.  
F. CONCLUSION 
This exploration of how the Americans have adapted their grand strategy 
throughout their history represents an understanding of how the United States has 
employed different grand strategy archetypes and balanced integration and insulation––at 
home and abroad––both in its determination of its national interests and in the crafting of 
its overall grand strategy.  
The central theme of this understanding is that familiar debates and discussions 
concerning the tensions between different grand strategy archetypes, isolationism versus 
internationalism, or unilateralism versus multilateralism––are simplistic, incomplete, and 
insufficient schemas for the consideration of American grand strategy. Instead, this 
understanding discusses an “insulationist” paradigm, whereby such schemas are blended, 
balanced, and employed synthetically, that is likely a better basis by which to study, craft, 
and conduct American grand strategy in the future.43  
Explored in Chapter II is how the founding generation established the original mold 
of American grand strategy. Guided by their efforts to secure a fundamental trinity of 
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American national interests, the Founders blended different grand strategy archetypes in 
order to achieve an internal and external balance between integration and insulation. These 
first impressions served as the general foundation for American grand strategy until the 
United States’ entry into World War II.  
In Chapter III, it is shown how the Truman administration recast the Founders’ 
grand strategy to account for the geopolitical upheaval left in the wake of World War II. 
So as to secure a trifecta of essential national interests, the administration blended 
archetypal grand strategies in ways designed to expand the integrative scope of the 
Founders’ grand strategy. Yet, this expansion of integration was matched by corresponding 
forms of insulation that maintained the Founders’ balance between them.  
In contrast, Chapter IV explains how the Clinton administration employed different 
grand strategy archetypes in ways that purposely emphasized integration and eschewed 
insulation after the Cold War. In pursuit of a triad of ephemeral interests, the Clinton 
administration directed American grand strategy on to the strained and unbalanced course 
on which it finds itself today.  
Chapter V concludes this thesis with a brief synopsis and prospectus that 
synthesizes the prior analysis into questions about the insulationist paradigm the United 
States may consider as it crafts its grand strategy for the future. 
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II. FIRST IMPRESSIONS: TOWARD A NEW VIEW OF THE 
FOUNDERS AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1776–1797 
A. INTRODUCTION 
If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off 
when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such 
attitude as well cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously 
respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon 
us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, 
as our interest guided by our justice shall counsel.44 
—George Washington 
It is said that first impressions often last a lifetime; that the context and manner in 
which something is first encountered or experienced shapes and influences perceptions of 
it very far into the future. Most would readily attest to the agency of this phenomenon in 
the lives of individuals and institutions. Yet, it can be argued that such impressions also 
have lasting effects on the lives of nations. After all, nations are themselves but the manifest 
synthetizations of individuals and institutions. While both the individuals and institutions 
of a nation will undoubtedly change and evolve over time, the impressions made by those 
present at its creation often endure and have an abiding influence on successive 
generations. Such is the case for the American Founders from 1776–1797 when 
considering the purpose, goals, and course of American grand strategy. Early America was 
a nascent nation blessed with vast potential, but mired in the perilous task of establishing 
the foundations of its strength. The realization of its full might would require not only 
competent leadership, but also suppleness and pragmatism in the crafting and conduct of 
grand strategy. Created as a new type of nation, the United States required a new type of 
grand strategy. Hence, this chapter will endeavor to show not only that the Founders 
thought deeply about grand strategy, but more importantly that the peculiarity of their 
strategic situations necessitated their balancing of integration and insulation and blending 
of archetypal grand strategies. This blending was intended to create––insulated spheres of 
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integration––from which the Americans could attend to their national interests and grow 
their power. These first impressions proved to be indispensable in the earliest years of the 
republic and cast a long shadow on American strategic thought and practice. 
B. A FUNDAMENTAL TRINITY: AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS 
AND THE FOUNDING ERA 
Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our 
true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public 
good.45 
—Alexander Hamilton  
The effective crafting and conduct of grand strategy requires one to possess a firm 
understanding of one’s national interests. When modern American leaders speak of the 
United States’ national interests, they are generally referring to a broad and diffuse range 
of issues and subjects. In many ways, this might be expected. The modern United States is 
largely considered the most powerful nation on the planet and one should not be faulted in 
thinking it natural that it would have a large set of diverse national interests. However, the 
multitude of modern American national interests, real or imagined, should not obscure the 
reality that the Founders’ views of American national interests were much narrower in 
scope and more fundamental in nature. In fact, the vital national interests in the founding 
era can be expressed in as little as three fundamental goals: liberty, union, and survival as 
an independent country.  
That the Founders’ conceptions of American national interests were narrower when 
compared with those of today becomes apparent when one considers the tremendous 
differences in their respective strategic situations and power. For instance, the modern 
United States is a global superpower that maintains interests in most regions of the world. 
It fields the world’s most powerful military and it leads various regional military alliances 
and security partnerships. The United States is one of the largest countries both in terms of 
population and territory. Furthermore, the enormous American economy is integrated into 
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a global trading and finance network. In comparison, American interests in the founding 
era were not as broad in terms of their geographic spread or political, military, and 
economic integration. While early Americans were certainly not ignorant of world affairs, 
the extent of their geographic interests were largely contained within the Western 
Hemisphere and in particular, North America. Its sole political and military alliance, signed 
with France in 1778, was a marriage of convenience borne of mutual interests which 
quickly faded upon the end of the Revolutionary War. In short order, it became a liability 
for the young nation and was jettisoned at the first real opportunity.46 The actual scope, if 
not ambition, of the Founders’ economic interests were also more circumscribed. Though 
the Founders “conceived of themselves as the leaders of a commercial revolution world 
wide in scope” and largely held the view that future “national grandeur was to be achieved 
through commercial ties,” American global economic integration was limited by the 
dominance of mercantilist economic practices of other nations.47 Hence, one might view 
the narrower scope of American interests in the founding era not necessarily as something 
to be lamented, but instead as being commensurate with the young nation’s limited power 
and influence.  
American national interests in the founding era, aside from being more limited in 
breadth, were also more fundamental in nature. While today a few observers are asking 
questions about its future as free and unified whole, most serious ones do not doubt the 
long-term survival of the United States as an independent country.48 Yet, this confidence 
in American longevity was not as prevalent in the early years of its existence. William 
Weeks writes that “friends and foes alike of the new union harbored expectations of its 
imminent demise.”49 To many at the time, “the newly independent entity seemed too big, 
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to contain too large a diversity of interests, and its people collectively too resistant to the 
strong central authority needed to hold it together.”50 Given these real challenges to 
cohesion, the fundamental American national interests in the founding era were those 
issues on which there was agreement among the many states. These were, respectively: 
liberty, union, and survival as an independent country. These mutual interests had 
centripetal effects on the former colonies and are together the foundation on which the 
Founders crafted American grand strategy and built a nation.  
For the Founders, the pursuance of liberty and the desire to construct a free society 
were what compelled the colonies to seek independence from the British crown. The types 
of liberty the Founders sought in their revolution and aimed to preserve in their subsequent 
union were multifaceted and include civil, political, economic, and geographic liberty. 
Perhaps the most familiar forms of liberty the Founders endeavored to preserve were those 
civil in nature. In essence, these included the prevention of the state from infringing upon 
the rights of both the individual and of the individual states. In securing political liberty, 
the Founders sought to guarantee that they would, as individuals and as states, be able to 
partake in the writing and administration of the laws to which they were subject. The 
Founders also sought economic liberty. As British subjects, the colonies were bound to 
trade and economic policies dictated from London. Upon achieving independence, the 
states still found, much to their frustration, themselves at the mercy of the commercial 
policies of more powerful nations. Achieving ever greater access to commercial markets 
and trade was central to the Founders’ vision of the nation’s economic future and 
prosperity.51 Geographic liberty was also of great concern to the founding generation. 
Under British rule, westward expansion by the colonies was severely restricted. However, 
upon their divorce from the mother country, the Americans would pursue western 
expansion for more than a century. In sum, the Founders had complex and often 
contradictory views on the nature and extent of their liberties. Yet, “that unity would be 
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the basis of their strength” and vehicle for securing their liberty, “Americans well 
understood.”52 
Union was the method by which the Founders would secure and maintain liberty. 
Whereas securing independence, and by extension their liberty, required that the colonies 
unite in order to throw off British rule, preserving both for their posterities required the 
Founders to maintain their union in perpetuity. Karl Walling notes this relationship writing 
that, “while independence was a necessary means to liberty, union of the thirteen states 
was necessary for independence.”53 Similarly, David Hendrickson highlights this 
interdependence, writing that “independence and union hence advanced arm in arm––
mutually dependent, the realization of either unthinkable without the other.”54 Liberty 
without union was unthinkable because the Founders did not consider single colonies able 
to achieve separation from Great Britain. In a similar vein, many Founders did not think 
their liberty or independence, once achieved, would be maintained if the union was to 
dissolve. Many feared internal conflicts, European meddling, or both would eventually lead 
to a loss of liberty. Even those who sought a weaker union or feared an overly powerful 
national government, reservations usually associated with “Anti-Federalists” and later 
“Republicans,” readily admitted the exigency of a continued national union.55 
Union was considered essential in the founding era because it was thought by most 
to offer the best protection of liberty from threats both internal and external to the United 
States. Threats to liberty from within the United States can generally be separated into two 
main categories: those threats emanating from an overly powerful national government and 
those derived from a breakup of the union into separate states or regional confederacies. 
The Founders sought to limit the likelihood of the former by instituting a system in which 
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power was shared by different branches and levels of government.56 The latter, while 
seemingly unthinkable today, was of great concern to the founding generation. Early 
Americans tended to identify with their respective states and regions. There was fear 
among the Founders that regional interests could lead to a breakup of the union and the 
formation of regional confederacies.57 To prevent this it was argued, ultimately 
successfully, that any disintegration of the union would likely lead to conflicts between the 
states, invite European interventions, and ultimately undermine liberty.58  
In essence, disunion was not only an internal threat to liberty, but it could also 
reduce the ability of the Americans to protect themselves from external threats. External 
threats in the founding era largely consisted of those posed by Britain, France, and Spain. 
Union among the states provided the best protection against the predations of these 
European imperial powers. Yet, the Founders sought to prevent not only the encroachment 
of the Europeans, but also the establishment of the warlike European state system in North 
America.59 Hendrickson writes that “this development––inevitably accompanied by 
perennial rivalries and by the standing armies and wars bred by those––would jeopardize 
the fragile growth of republican government on the American continent.”60 Therefore, 
union as a national interest served not only to secure and maintain liberty, but also to ensure 
the survival of a future for the American system of “reflection and choice.”61 
Survival was the mechanism through which the Founders maintained balance 
between liberty and union. As a national interest, it acted both as the link between them 
and as a metric by which to judge them. While being necessary in its own right, survival 
also prevented the Founders from pursuing the logical extremes of either liberty or union. 
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For an example of the operative effect of survival as a national interest, one should consider 
the likely outcome of a founding era grand strategy that overly emphasized either liberty 
or union. Had the Founders overemphasized liberty, either that of individuals or of the 
states, it is likely they would not have been able to maintain a union powerful enough to 
preserve liberty. Similarly, had they tried to implement an overly powerful union at the 
expense of liberty, it is unlikely that the union would have been maintained and, as detailed 
previously, this would eventually lead to a loss of liberty. A pursuit of either of these 
strategies would have made it difficult for the United States to achieve the growth in 
economic and military power to secure its interests in the long term.  
Evidence demonstrating the importance of survival can be witnessed in the strategic 
decisions made regarding slavery. The dilemma facing the Founders was how to reconcile 
the lofty proclamations made in the Declaration of Independence with the necessity to 
maintain union with the slave-holding states. As Hendrickson explains, the Founders were 
“confronted, on the one hand, with the evils of disunion and separate confederacies, and 
on the other with the fact that a refusal to confederate because of slavery would do nothing 
to ameliorate its curses, even northerners hostile to slavery knew they could not make 
emancipation a sine qua non of union, for this was identical with the proposition that there 
should be no union at all.”62 In a similar vein, John Lewis Gaddis writes that “the men of 
1776 feared––Jefferson not least among them––that if they freed the slaves along with the 
country, they’d have no state…so they chose Union now, postponing Emancipation on the 
assumption––infrequently expressed––that the prospects for it would be better in a single 
strong state than in several weaker ones.”63 As the decisions about slavery show, the 
exigencies of survival forced a morally problematic––but strategically necessary––balance 
between liberty and union.  
Taken together, these three fundamental national interests can be considered a kind 
of interdependent trinity in that each required the presence of the other two––albeit, in a 
reduced, imperfect, or potentially dangerous form. Liberty required a limited union and a 
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precarious survival. Union demanded both the immoral denial of liberty to some, as well 
as a survival undermined in the long term by a necessary compromise irreconcilable with 
truths Americans proclaimed to hold as self-evident. Survival necessitated a bounded 
liberty and a union more endowed with the ability to become tyrannical. In sum, the 
fundamental national interests of this “Hercules in the cradle” were interdependent, 
mutually reinforcing, and strategically sound.64 Simple, yet elegant; aspirational, yet 
practical––they guided the Founders as they blended what would seem to be, at least to 
modern ears, grand strategies with contradictory assumptions, fundamental disagreements, 
and above all, incompatible real-world prescriptions. Yet, this is precisely what the 
Founders accomplished as they crafted the grand strategy of the early American republic. 
C. COOPERATIVE SECURITY 
We must all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately.65 
—Benjamin Franklin  
 
As a grand strategy archetype, cooperative security generally entails the close 
integration and coordination of individual states in the provision of their collective security 
and peace. Barry Posen and Stephen Ross write that “the most important distinguishing 
feature of cooperative security is the proposition that peace is effectively indivisible.”66 At 
its core it holds that threats to peace and prosperity in any instance risks undermining the 
security and well-being of all others. In essence, everywhere matters. As such, it is 
dependent on the willing cooperation of states, often via international institutions, to deter 
and thwart aggression which threatens the general peace.67 Grounded by a liberal 
conception of international relations, it stresses the interdependence of nations and the 
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necessity of collective responses to international issues. Given the common perception of 
the Founders as having had an isolationist view on foreign entanglements, one might be 
surprised to find that this chapter makes as one of its central claims the notion that the 
Founders not only pursued a grand strategy of cooperative security, but also that they are 
perhaps some of the most successful executors of a cooperative security grand strategy in 
history.68  
Evidence that the founding generation implemented a cooperative security grand 
strategy is manifested in three main documents of the founding era: The Declaration of 
Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the United States Constitution. These 
famous works are not usually thought of as being strategy documents, let alone affirmation 
that the Founders pursued a cooperative security grand strategy. Yet, when one considers 
the lack of an overwhelming national identity in the founding era and the fact that many 
Americans thought their respective former colonies “of right ought to be free and 
independent states,” these documents, as well as their underlying intentions, should be 
viewed from a grand strategic and cooperative security perspective.69 For example, each 
bound the individual colonies and states to a collective and interdependent conception of 
their liberty and security. In the Declaration of Independence, the Founders famously 
proclaimed that in support of it they would “mutually pledge to each other our lives, our 
fortunes, and our sacred honor.”70 The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution 
created institutions designed to provide for “a firm league of friendship”71 and “a more 
perfect union”72 among the many states for the “common defense, the security of their 
liberties, and their mutual and general welfare,”73 and to “establish justice, ensure domestic 
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tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the 
blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.”74 Each of these documents contain 
explicit pronouncements consistent with the logic and features of a cooperative security 
grand strategy. Yet, language in the founding documents is not in and of itself sufficient to 
prove that the Founders followed a cooperative security grand strategy. One must also 
examine how this language was put into practice in pursuance of the founding era national 
interests. 
As a strategic document the Declaration of Independence served many roles. Aside 
from being a proclamation of liberty and the American worldview, it also served diplomatic 
and informational ends. George Herring notes this multifaceted role writing that “whatever 
place the Declaration has since assumed in the folklore of American nationhood, its 
immediate and urgent purpose was to make clear to Europeans…the colonies’ commitment 
to independence.”75 In essence, the Declaration announced to the world that the colonies 
were united in the pursuance of their collective liberty and security. It also noted that with 
independence came the ability to do “all acts and things which independent states may of 
right do.”76 This can be seen as having both domestic and foreign purposes both of which 
were in line with securing the vital national interests of liberty, union, and survival. In an 
external sense, the Declaration was intended to secure the foreign aid and alliances without 
which the Americans likely could not secure any of their interests. Internally, it cemented 
claims “that Americans constituted, in some sense, a single people…solemnly pledged to 
secure their independence in common.”77 The logical next steps of this new reality were 
the institutionalization of this cooperative security grand strategy in the Articles of 
Confederation and later, the Constitution. 
If the Declaration of Independence announced, perhaps implicitly, that the United 
States was to follow a cooperative security grand strategy, then the Articles of 
 
74 Kesler, “Constitution of the United States,” 542. 
75 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 15. 
76 Jefferson, “The Declaration of Independence,” 532. 
77 Hendrickson, Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding, 125. 
29 
Confederation and the Constitution can be considered the implementation and actualization 
of that strategy. Within limits, each sought to bind the states together in a union so that 
they might preserve their liberty and ensure their continued survival. In their own way each 
sought to put actual meat on the rhetorical bones described in the Declaration. Yet, despite 
a similarity of intentions, the Articles and the Constitution were at least as much different, 
as they were the same. The Articles, completed in 1777 and fully ratified in 1781, were a 
first attempt at constructing a workable union among the states. While nominally adequate 
to secure independence, the Articles of Confederation proved to be largely ineffective at 
most other tasks.78 This was primarily because under the Articles the individual states 
retained significant power over collective decision-making. From a governing perspective, 
Congress under the Articles “could not pass effective laws or enforce its orders. It could 
ask for money but not compel payment; it could enter into treaties but not enforce their 
stipulations; it could provide for raising of armies but not fill the ranks; it could borrow 
money but take no proper measures for repayment; it could advise and recommend but not 
command.”79 From a grand strategy perspective, Congress could not “raise revenue, could 
not bargain effectively, could not assure other nations that any agreement it made would 
actually be observed by the states, could not develop a unified commercial policy to extort 
concessions from other countries, [and] could not maintain an effective military or naval 
force.”80 Perhaps not surprisingly, the Articles of Confederation, hampered by the 
Founders’ fear of a powerful central authority, represented a union too weak to secure the 
national interests. Alas, the continuation of a cooperative security grand strategy required 
the Founders alter their approach not only to maintain their liberty and union, but also to 
ensure their survival and growth as an independent country.  
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In order to secure the national interests and better manage the young nation’s 
diplomatic, economic, and security affairs, the Articles were replaced by the United States 
Constitution. Written in 1787, and officially ratified the following year, the Constitution 
represented a more powerful union with enhanced federal powers. These included the 
power to tax, borrow, and spend; raise and control military forces; contract and enforce 
treaties; and create and enforce federal laws. This transfer of power to the federal 
government was made possible largely by the perceived failures of the Articles of 
Confederation. The Constitution had increased legitimacy in that it derived its authority 
from and applied its laws directly to the people, vice the individual states. In instituting 
courts by which Federal law was applied to citizens vice individual states, the Constitution 
moved beyond basic cooperative security principles manifested in the Articles.81 Its greater 
powers not only allowed for better management of internal relations with and among the 
states, but they also streamlined and consolidated formal relations with the external world. 
Hendrickson notes this improvement, writing that the Constitution established “a 
continental order that partook of the character of both a state and a state system.”82 To the 
chagrin of some, these gains came at the cost of a consolidated administration of the 
nation’s diplomatic, informational, military, and economic affairs. Lastly, and perhaps 
supremely from a cooperative security perspective, the Constitution was a more effective 
vehicle for meeting the demands of a cooperative security grand strategy as it both 
enhanced the interdependent character of the states, and provided a better mechanism for 
collective action in pursuit of the founding era national interests.  
Grand strategies in the cooperative security mold hold at their core the view that 
collective action and interdependence among states is the surest path to peace and 
prosperity. While one can surely debate the validity of this logic, one would find it more 
difficult to argue that the Founders did not subscribe to this perspective when confronting 
the strategic challenges they faced. Indeed, the founding documents of the United States 
represent a manifestation of these very principles. Yet, it is not in these documents alone 
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that one can find evidence that the Founders followed a cooperative security grand strategy. 
One need only consider how they implemented and adapted these works while remaining 
true to the logic of a cooperative security grand strategy. The demands of liberty, union, 
and survival not only required that the Founders realize the ambitious claims written in the 
Declaration of Independence by committing to the Articles of Confederation, but also the 
subsequent abandoning of the Articles in favor of the Constitution. In the end, the execution 
of the Founders’ robust cooperative security grand strategy––guided by requisite 
considerations for the national interests––laid the foundations of American nationhood and 
set her on a proper course for future power and prosperity. 
D. SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT 
A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a 
steady adherence to the Union, we may hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in 
America, and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of 
the world as our interest may dictate.83 
—Alexander Hamilton 
As might be expected, the distinguishing feature of a selective engagement grand 
strategy is that it is selective. In contrast to cooperative security, which holds that 
“everywhere matters,” selective engagement maintains that some things are more 
important than others. This prioritization is a result of the selective engagement view that 
resources are scarce and should only be committed to the most vital of national interests. 
Derived from the balance of power realist school of international relations, selective 
engagement is primarily concerned with the relations between great powers.84 Ever 
conscious of the balance of power, it mostly discounts the importance of less powerful 
states while conceding that they do “matter to the extent that they could energize intense 
great power security competition.”85 Given this relevance to powers great and small, 
selective engagement as a grand strategy archetype should be viewed through a broad lens. 
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So long as it is concerned with influencing the balance of power, a selective engagement 
grand strategy allows for many different kinds of engagement that are selective in their 
application, method, target, timing, or location. Additionally, selective engagement is as 
much about where and how a state chooses not to engage, as it is about the manner and 
location that it does. Indeed, this is how––with a discerning eye on the regional and global 
balance of power––the founding generation conducted a selective engagement grand 
strategy in pursuit of American national interests. 
Whereas a modern American selective engagement grand strategy might entail the 
United States––as a great power––selectively engaging to prevent the rise of a rival, the 
Founders’ selective engagement grand strategy sought to ensure their own ascension. As a 
weak power, the Founders calibrated the manner and object of their engagements as their 
interests required. This calibration can be divided into two primary schemas: the style and 
degree of engagement needed to secure independence and those required to maintain it. In 
both instances, the Founders were not only sensitive to the timing of their engagement, but 
also its object and form. In endeavoring to throw off British rule and secure their 
independence, the Founders solicited engagement with the European balance of power 
system and leveraged it to their advantage. Yet, upon securing their independence the 
Founders sought to insulate the United States from the “frequent controversies” associated 
with the European balance of power system. Being selective in when and how the United 
States would engage with European powers was the central point around which the 
Founders’ selective engagement grand strategy revolved. 
An initial determination made by the Founders in regard to their selective 
engagement grand strategy was the necessity to engage in the balance of power system and 
select a European power with which to secure an alliance. The Founders recognized that 
France would be the most inclined and able to aid the colonies, if only to harm Great 
Britain. The Americans succeeded in contracting two treaties with France: one economic 
and the other a defensive military alliance. For the Americans, the alliance was 
indispensable for the attainment of their independence. Yet, as Alexander DeConde notes, 
“the aim of the French government had been independence for the United States and 
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destruction of English power, with the latter objective foremost.”86 To their credit, the 
Founders fully recognized the limited extent of Franco-American mutual interests and 
planned accordingly. John Jay, acting as an American negotiator in Paris, wrote to Robert 
Livingston that the French “are interested in separating us from Great Britain, and, on that 
point we may, I believe depend upon them, but it is not in their interest that we should 
become a great and formidable people, and therefore they will not help us to become so… 
if we lean on her love of liberty, her affection for America, or her disinterested 
magnanimity, we shall lean on a broken reed, that will sooner or later pierce our hands.”87 
Having enlisted France in the fight for American independence, the Founders understood 
that their mutual interests would likely wane upon securing it and that their strategy would 
need to evolve. 
In negotiating the end of the Revolutionary War, the Founders made astute 
assessments of both French and British interests and contrived shrewd diplomatic 
maneuvers to exploit them to American advantage. Writing to Samuel Cooper in 1782, 
Benjamin Franklin describes how the United States must engage with each power, stating 
that “in my opinion the true political interest of America, consists in observing and 
fulfilling with the greatest exactitude the engagements of our alliance with France; and 
behaving at the same time towards England so as not entirely to extinguish her hopes of a 
reconciliation.”88 Weeks notes this deft political maneuvering in his history of American 
foreign relations, writing that the Americans “accurately judged the interests of the world’s 
two most powerful states and played them off one another flawlessly.”89 In doing so, 
Franklin, Jay, and John Adams were able to extract terms considerably more favorable than 
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might have been expected.90 Yet, despite their apparent skill in engagement with the 
European balance of power system, the Founders’ understood that their interests beyond 
securing their independence would be better served by engaging in ways that insulated the 
young nation from the European powers.  
In effect, this meant a different schema of selective engagement. An enlightened 
conception of selective engagement grand strategy allows one to not only select who one 
engages with, but also the time, place, manner, and form of that engagement. Implied in 
this logic is that one also chooses who, where, and how one will not engage. In essence, 
this is how the Founders recalibrated their selective engagement grand strategy upon 
achieving independence. The above example represents an instance were the Founders 
effectively engaged the balance of power system to solicit French diplomatic and military 
engagement in order to secure American interests. Yet, upon achieving independence the 
Founders largely sought to disengage the United States from the political and military types 
of engagements inherent to the Old World balance of power system. Nevertheless, the 
Founders did not completely eschew the provision of American political and military 
power. Actually, in ratifying the Constitution they instituted the mechanisms by which 
collective political and military power could be generated and wielded.91 The Founders 
acknowledged that the United States may become involved in wars. However, they also 
recognized that the growth of American power in the Western Hemisphere could not be 
secured if it remained wedded to participation in European political and military 
engagements.  
Instead, the Founders focused on the Western Hemisphere and emphasized external 
engagements that were economic and commercial in nature. While this American 
preference for economic engagement and aversion to political connections has roots in the 
“Model Treaty” penned by John Adams in September, 1776, these sentiments are present 
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throughout the founding era.92 In Federalist No. 11, Hamilton notes that the United States’ 
favorable geography and resources would allow it to develop economic and naval power 
capable of deciding “the fate of a [European] campaign on the event of which interests of 
the greatest magnitude were suspended.”93 In short, a vibrant maritime commercial sector 
would enable the Americans to tilt the balance of power in the Gulf of Mexico and West 
Indies as their interests required. Perhaps the most famous example of this penchant for 
selectivity and economic preference is George Washington’s Farewell Address. Largely 
written by Alexander Hamilton but approved by Washington, the address advised 
Americans that “the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending 
our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible.”94 
The selective preference for economic ties but not political ones would be as Weeks writes, 
“a guiding assumption of American foreign relations until the 1940s.”95 
The Founders’ selective engagement grand strategy was fundamentally about 
positioning the United States’ relationship with the global balance of power system in ways 
favorable to American interests. As a result, the varying geostrategic circumstances of the 
founding era required different approaches to selective engagement. In some instances, this 
required more engagement with the balance of power system, while in others a more 
constrained conception of selective engagement was necessary. Walling writes that 
“recognizing that different times and circumstances require different kinds of virtues is a 
sign of political maturity.”96 Indeed, the dexterity with which the Founders crafted their 
selective engagement grand strategy not only demonstrated their political maturity, but also 
their strategic prescience. Later, as the United States became more powerful, American 
leaders would continue to recalibrate the Founders’ original selective engagement grand 
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strategy to account for their own strategic circumstances. American strategic visions, such 
as the Monroe Doctrine or even containment, represent evolved forms of selective 
engagement and have their conceptual roots in the earliest years of the republic. 
E. ISOLATIONISM 
Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand 
upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, 
entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, 
humor, or caprice?97 
—George Washington 
As one might infer from previous sections of this chapter, the Founders were not 
strict isolationists. They did, however, employ robust elements of isolationist grand 
strategy. Aside from the limited forms of engagement and integration discussed previously, 
it remains true that the general thrust of the Founders’ grand strategy was isolationist with 
regard to the Old World. Posen and Ross note that isolationism as a grand strategy 
subscribes to both “a fundamentally realist view of international politics” and a 
“constricted view of U.S. national interests that renders internationalism not only 
unnecessary but counterproductive.”98 This defensive realism and narrow conception of 
the national interest aligns with the similarly narrow and defensive American national 
interests in the founding era. Isolationism is not a grand strategy advisable to all states. 
Indeed, for most, it is arguably not even worth consideration. Yet, given its “detached and 
distant situation,” an isolationist grand strategy has remained an enduring option for the 
United States throughout its history.99 When understood in terms of neutrality in European 
wars, the Founders followed a grand strategy of isolationism not just because they could, 
but because it was necessary to preserve their liberty, maintain their union, and ensure the 
continued survival of the young republic.  
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To properly demonstrate the seeming paradox that the Founders’ grand strategy 
was both isolationist and engaging, one must recall that Americans in the founding era 
largely considered their individual states to be sovereign. As such, their unification under 
the Articles of Confederation, and later under the Constitution, was viewed as an inherently 
internationalist action. In their union, the Founders sought to “take a step beyond the 
balance of power” and “establish an American system based on perpetual peace and free 
trade among the confederating states.”100 It was in attempting to shield this system from 
the vicissitudes of the external world that the Founders’ grand strategy took on an 
isolationist character. Though themes to this effect run throughout the founding era, there 
is perhaps no better exemplar of this notion in practice than the Washington 
administration’s handling of American statecraft during the wars of the French Revolution.  
The outbreak of war between England and revolutionary France in 1793 placed the 
United States in a delicate situation. Technically still allied with France but economically 
dependent on the British, the United States was caught in precisely the type of 
entanglement the Founders feared. On the one hand, many Americans maintained fond 
feelings for the French, both out of appreciation for their assistance in securing American 
independence, but also because many saw in the French revolution the promulgation of 
principles kindred to those held so deeply in the United States. On the other hand, the 
American economic system instituted by Alexander Hamilton “depended entirely upon the 
continuation of commercial relations with Great Britain.”101 To ameliorate this 
predicament, the Washington administration instituted a policy of neutrality, or more 
precisely “a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers.”102 The aim was 
to chart a course by which the United States could avoid being drawn into the war on either 
side. It was in the United States’ interest to have political isolation while maintaining and 
expanding economic integration. In this respect, the isolationist policies of Washington’s 
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administration were largely successful in insulating the United States from a conflagration 
which amounted to an incipient threat to the preservation of American liberty, union, and 
survival.103 
The French Revolutionary Wars were a danger to American interests not just 
because they risked American involvement in an external war for which it was ill-prepared, 
but also because they risked enflaming nascent schisms internal to the American body 
politic. One of Washington’s final acts was to publish his Farewell Address which sought 
to assuage these developing inner tensions. The Address was not, as Eric Nordlinger notes, 
“intended to disguise the facts of America’s weaknesses––its internal divisions, minor 
military capabilities, and encirclement by Europe’s colonial powers.”104 Instead, it 
cautioned Americans not to “forego the advantages” of their “detached and distant 
situation.”105 In effect, Washington was advocating for a grand strategy that was 
isolationist in its character, but practical in its application, because the United States lacked 
the internal cohesion, military might, and strategic depth to involve itself in the affairs of 
others. He recognized that temporary alliances might be necessary in some instances and 
but warned against over-commitment to any foreign country.106 While some, such as 
Alexander DeConde, have dismissed Washington’s Farewell Address as nothing more than 
a “campaign document” that espoused the partisan political views of Hamilton’s Federalist 
party, the strategic rationale of the document is sound.107 To characterize Washington’s 
address as inherently partisan, instead of well-reasoned and based on a cogent assessment 
of American strengths and vulnerabilities, belies the fact that it served as a central guide 
for insulating the United States from European wars for the next century of American 
growth and prosperity.108 
 
103 As noted by Major Ryan Tice USMC at the Naval Postgraduate School in NS4990: The Theory and 
Practice of American Grand Strategy.   
104 Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century, 51. 
105 Washington, “The Farewell Address,” 28. 
106 Stanley M. Elkins and Eric L. McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 489–97. 
107 Deconde, Entangling Alliance: Politics & Diplomacy under George Washington, 469. 
108 Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century, 51. 
39 
Although isolationism is often the grand strategy most associated with the founding 
era, the Founders were not mere isolationists. In fact, a more sophisticated view would 
instead refer to them as ardent insulationists. The Founders were absolutely wary of being 
corrupted or nefariously influenced by those beyond their borders. Many held the view that 
the American system was a superior political and economic phenomenon that, if allowed 
to germinate and grow without outside interference, would serve as an example for the rest 
of the world.109 Hendrickson highlights this view writing that “Americans, it would 
appear, have always believed that what they do for themselves they do for others, 
and…they believed that proposition heartily at the beginning.”110 Yet, for all the Founders’ 
grand aspirations and ostensibly altruistic motives, there were more practical reasons the 
Founders practiced elements of an isolationist grand strategy. The United States in the 
founding era was a weak power in a world full of imperial giants. When the Americans of 
this era looked at the world it seemed fraught with threats to their liberty, union, and 
survival. Many reasoned correctly that the best way to avoid being crushed by these giants 
was to limit the extent of American political involvement with them, while endeavoring to 
trade with them all. That is, at least, until the United States––by way of an insulationist 
grand strategy––could become a giant in its own right. 
F. PRIMACY 
Let the thirteen states, bound together in a strict and indissoluble union, concur in 
erecting one great American system superior to the control of all transatlantic force or 
influence and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new 
world!111 
—Alexander Hamilton 
Heretofore, this chapter has put forth as part of its argument the notion that many 
of the decisions the Founders made in regard to grand strategy were a reflection of the 
United States’ weakness in the founding era; that in order to overcome their weaknesses 
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and secure their interests, the Founders had to “hang together” and pursue a collective 
security grand strategy. As such, one might be surprised to find that this chapter also argues 
that the Founders pursued a grand strategy of primacy which holds “that only a 
preponderance of U.S. power ensures peace.”112 A primacy grand strategy is designed to 
“preserve U.S. supremacy by politically, economically, and militarily outdistancing any 
global challenger.”113 Yet, if the United States was comparatively weak and not a supreme 
power in the founding era, then how would a primacy grand strategy be enacted by the 
Founders? The answer is fundamentally about scale and geography. Given the power and 
reach of the modern United States, a modern primacy strategy would entail the pursuance 
of unparalleled American dominance on a global scale. In contrast, the United States in its 
earliest years was committed to a grand strategy of securing American primacy “east of the 
Mississippi” and laying the foundation for American primacy in the Western Hemisphere.  
Signed in 1783, the Treaty of Paris not only recognized the independence of the 
thirteen colonies, but it also formally ceded to the Americans all British lands in North 
America south of the Canadian border and east of the Mississippi River.114 While these 
terms––deftly extracted from the British by the combined efforts of Benjamin Franklin, 
John Adams, and John Jay––more than doubled the territorial size of the United States and 
represented a boon for Americans looking to expand westward, actual expansion proved to 
be problematic.115 The territory “granted” to the United States in the Treaty of Paris was 
occupied by various Indian tribes who were understandably intent on preventing American 
encroachment into their lands. Furthermore, parts of the land north of the Ohio River were 
still occupied by the British who continued to trade with and support Indian tribes in their 
resistance to American westward expansion.116 Though the Treaty of Paris mandated that 
the British must abandon all outposts on American territory, they remained for two primary 
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reasons. The first stems from the failure of the United States under the Articles of 
Confederation to uphold requirements imposed on it by the Treaty of Paris.117 The second 
reason is more practical and cynical. In essence, the British did not depart because they 
benefitted from a booming fur trade and the Americans could not––militarily or 
diplomatically––force them to leave.118  
Whereas the British maintained a hostile presence north of the Ohio River, the 
Spanish were the main threat to American territory in the south. Spain “had not recognized 
the cession of this land to the United States” and “the year following peace saw the Spanish 
close the lower Mississippi to American navigation.”119 An inability to access the 
Mississippi would significantly hamper the economic prospects for those Americans 
moving into the frontier territories as they would be limited in their ability to trade. Spain 
also encouraged and supported hostile Indians and frontiersman in hopes that settlers 
moving into these areas would decide to abandon their allegiance to the United States so 
that they may gain access to the Mississippi River and New Orleans.120 Failed efforts at 
negotiating with Spain in the form of the Jay-Gardoqui Treaty did little to solve any of 
these issues and its only real accomplishment was the escalation of sectional tensions 
within the United States.121 
The primacy grand strategy employed by the Founders was fundamentally about 
reducing or eliminating these threats to American interests and establishing hegemony in 
greater North America. This strategy was pursued over time in a series of legal, military, 
and diplomatic steps which, by the end of the Washington administration, would see the 
United States as the dominant political, economic, and military power on the eastern 
portion of North America.  
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The Northwest Ordinance, a legal act first passed by the Confederation Congress 
in 1787, was one in a series of laws designed to ensure that the frontier “would be settled 
in an orderly and progressive fashion.”122 That Americans would ultimately expand 
westward from their settlements on the eastern seaboard was not in doubt by the Founders. 
Yet, it was held that expansion should be done in a way that both minimized tensions with 
Indians in the territory and provided for the rights of those moving Westward while 
ensuring their incorporation into the union.123 The Northwest Ordinance was largely 
successful in the latter but failed in the former. It succeeded in that it provided the legal 
framework for new states to “enter the Union as coequals (to states already established), it 
allowed settlers to form their own governments, and established a path to statehood.”124 It 
also included provisions for the establishment of American governmental, educational, and 
religious institutions. These institutions were intended to promote the primacy of the 
American system in the territories and attract the “respectable, law-abiding, and productive 
settlers” that would be needed to transform the untamed frontier into future states.125 In 
sum, the Ordinance established the formal mechanisms by which the United States would 
assert its primacy in the western territories and served as a model for subsequent westward 
expansions. Yet, for all its triumphs as the legal element of a primacy grand strategy, it was 
not entirely successful in every regard.  
The Northwest Ordinance failed in that it did not prevent conflict between the 
settlers and the Indian inhabitants of the territory. Indian refusal to accept a “civilized” way 
of life and settler refusal to respect Indian territorial claims made conflict between them all 
but inevitable. Though the Ordinance contained protections for Indian territorial claims and 
stated that “their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; 
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and in their property, rights and liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in 
just and lawful wars authorized by Congress,” the reality was quite different.126 Despite 
this language and the wishes of some prominent Americans such as George Washington, 
the territory was the scene of near continuous conflict between the Indian tribes and 
settlers.127 In a sense, the Founders’ primacy grand strategy was as much about subjugating 
to American authority the white settlers as it was the submission of the Indian tribes. While 
initial American military efforts to pacify the region were largely unmitigated disasters, a 
systematic campaign headed by General “Mad Anthony” Wayne succeeded in defeating a 
coalition of Indian tribes in August, 1794, at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. The following 
year, Wayne imposed on the Indians the Treaty of Greenville in which they surrendered 
most of their territorial claims in the region.128 In the end, his victory not only 
demonstrated that the United States could enforce its legal doctrine with military power, 
but it also “crippled the hold of Indians and British in the Old Northwest, restoring the 
prestige of the American government and strengthening its hold on the Ohio country.”129 
Aside from securing a measure of American military primacy in the Northwest 
Territory, the victory was also notable for its concomitance with American diplomatic 
successes essential to its primacy grand strategy. While Wayne was conducting his Ohio 
campaign, John Jay and British representatives had been negotiating what would become 
known in the United States as the Jay Treaty. Conducted in the context of a Washington 
administration keen on preventing American involvement in Europe’s great wars, the 
negotiations were primarily concerned with settling a number of outstanding issues 
between the United States and Great Britain. While the treaty’s terms set off a political 
firestorm of opposition in the United States, its provisions were not ill-conceived from a 
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strategic perspective. Jay had secured both limited access to British markets for American 
merchants and British agreement to finally evacuate its forts on American territory. As an 
element of a primacy grand strategy, the treaty can be considered in an even more positive 
light as it not only ended foreign occupation of American lands, but perhaps “most 
importantly, it preserved peace at a time when the Union had neither the economic nor the 
military means to engage in another conflict with Britain.”130  
The ratification of the Jay Treaty fostered some unforeseen yet not altogether 
unfortunate effects. The treaty and its ratification did heighten internal political tensions in 
the United States and led to the formation of the country’s first political parties. However, 
it also led to fortuitous developments in the Founders’ primacy grand strategy. While 
Wayne’s Ohio War and the Jay Treaty had affirmed American primacy north of the Ohio 
River, the south remained threatened by the Spanish. Yet, with the Americans and British 
now bound by a treaty, Spain feared that a joint Anglo-American campaign against Spanish 
America was in the offing. As a result, it moved to placate the Americans by negotiating 
and signing the Treaty of San Lorenzo in October, 1795. Referred to as Pinckney’s Treaty, 
in it the Spanish recognized the southern border claimed by the Americans, granted access 
to the Mississippi River, and pledged to cease supporting hostile Indians and 
frontiersman.131 The treaty was a boon to the United States and the Washington 
administration in that it cost the country nothing, provided significant strategic gains, and 
as a result, eased some of the internal tensions associated with the Jay Treaty.  
In conjunction, the Northwest Ordinance, the Ohio War, and the Jay and Pinckney 
Treaties established a preponderance of American power in eastern North America. As part 
of the Founders’ primacy grand strategy they represent successive legal, military, and 
diplomatic accomplishments which “bound the Northwest and Southwest to a still very 
fragile federal union” and secured a measure of peace and stability within American 
borders.132 The establishment of American primacy over American territory not only 
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bought the United States the space and time it needed to solidify its strength, but also to 
lay the foundations for future expansions of American primacy. Yet, perhaps most 
importantly, its primacy grand strategy greatly reduced or eliminated the most proximate 
threats to the United States’ core national interests and secured a future for expanded 
American dominance.  
G. THE INSULATIONIST PARADIGM: INSULATED SPHERES OF 
INTEGRATION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 
To connect ourselves with the complicated combinations of the interests of 
Europe, would be to relinquish the most precious gift of nature, insulation from the 
power and politics of that continent.133 
—Thomas Jefferson 
Grand strategy is often divided into distinct categories with different underlying 
assumptions, logics, and prescriptions. Many advocate for a particular style of grand 
strategy based on geopolitical requirements, while others do so from the perspective of 
ideology. Often implied in these debates is that one form or mode of grand strategy must 
be chosen and followed at the expense of others. It is sometimes argued that pursuing 
different grand strategies in tandem can lead to counterproductive policies and strategic 
incoherence.134 Yet, the grand strategy practices of the American Founders suggest that 
such views are not necessarily true. The previous sections of this chapter demonstrate that 
the Founders not only employed different forms of grand strategy, but that they did so in 
ways that integrated their seemingly contradictory characteristics into an insulationist 
paradigm. However, this synthetization was not just a serendipitous assembly of grand 
strategies. The Founders blended these archetypal grand strategies in purposeful ways 
designed to construct what this work terms––insulated spheres of integration. 
An insulated sphere of integration can be best understood by explaining its three 
component features. The overall concept will be further developed but defining each 
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component is necessary for clarity. The first component is the notion of a sphere. A sphere 
in this model should be considered to represent a distinct domain bound by described 
characteristics. A sphere could be political, economic, geographic, or any other domain 
with established limits. The second feature of this construct is integration. This is meant to 
imply some form and intensity of connections within and between separate spheres. As 
above, these connections can be diverse in nature and include political, economic, 
diplomatic, and geographic relationships. The last feature of this concept is insulation. 
Insulation should be understood as intentional protections or buffers inside and around 
individual spheres that allow for safe integration both within a sphere and with other 
spheres. Taken together, these three notions manifest spheres that are––internally and 
externally––integrated for benefit but insulated for protection.  
The particular synthetization of grand strategies the Founders achieved under the 
insulationist paradigm can be understood to have created two distinct insulated spheres of 
integration, one internal and one external. The basis of the internal sphere was the 
recognition that some form of cohesiveness was essential for securing common interests. 
The Founders’ internal sphere consisted of the original thirteen states and territories ceded 
in the Treaty of Paris. The boundaries of the Founders’ internal sphere were set by their 
cooperative security and primacy grand strategies. Partial boundaries were naturally 
established by the Founders’ cooperative security grand strategy in that it inherently 
delineated who was cooperating towards common interests. In contrast, the boundaries 
were further solidified by the extent to which the Founders could enact their primacy grand 
strategy. After all, committing to cooperative security is one thing and being able to secure 
it is another. In sum, the Founders’ internal sphere was bound by the interaction between 
the ideals in their cooperative security grand strategy and the reality of their limited power 
and capacity to conduct a primacy grand strategy. 
The cooperative security grand strategy enacted by the Founders functioned as the 
integrating mechanism within their internal sphere. The Declaration of Independence, the 
Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution were successive attempts to achieve greater 
integration among the component parts of the internal sphere. Integration was 
advantageous because it allowed for greater political, economic, and military efficiency. In 
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ratifying the Constitution, the Founders created a stable political order, eliminated trade 
barriers between states, and instituted consolidated structures for employing military 
power. Ultimately, the integration achieved as a result of the Founders’ cooperative 
security grand strategy created an internal sphere that consolidated enough power to 
manage the United States’ national interests.  
Yet, while the internal sphere naturally favored integration, the intent was not to 
achieve a complete or unlimited consolidation. The Founders feared too much integration 
would lead to an overconcentration of power and undermine the national interests. Hence, 
they insulated the internal sphere by designing protections for its component parts. The 
final version of this insulation was the Bill of Rights, the division of powers, and checks 
and balances system built into the Constitution. Power was shared across various levels 
and branches of government, each acting as a check on the other. However, the division of 
government power was not the only form of insulation built into the system. The Founders 
also insulated the internal sphere by creating mechanisms designed to promote flexibility. 
By provisioning methods to alter and expand the internal sphere when required, the 
Founders ensured that it would be durable over time as it was confronted with unforeseen 
challenges. Their intent was to achieve balance between integration and insulation so that 
the United States could realize its vast latent power. 
Achieving this balance between integration and insulation allowed the Founders to 
effectuate their primacy grand strategy. This strategy solidified the internal sphere in two 
important ways. First, with the ratification of the Constitution, federal law and institutions 
achieved primacy over the states with regard to their enumerated national powers and 
responsibilities. This bound states and citizens alike to a more efficient mechanism for 
securing the common national interests. In a sense, the collective United States had to be 
supreme in order to overcome the weaknesses of the individual states. Second, the balance 
between integration and insulation made it possible for the Founders to pursue their “east 
of the Mississippi” primacy grand strategy. Approaching westward expansion as individual 
states not only would have been more difficult, but it would have also likely led to 
unnecessary conflict among the states. Either of these outcomes would have made it more 
challenging, if not impossible for the United States to achieve primacy in the west. Without 
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the powers created by the Constitution it is unlikely that the United States would have been 
able to achieve primacy in any sense. In fact, the Constitution should be seen as the 
necessary component for both strategies and by extension, the Founders’ internal insulated 
sphere of integration. The success of the Founders’ cooperative security and primacy grand 
strategies not only created and framed their internal sphere, but they also established a 
better position from which to manage the relationship with their external insulated sphere 
of integration. 
Whereas the Founders’ internal sphere was limited strictly to the United States, all 
other regions, nations, and empires comprised the external sphere. The external sphere 
encompassed all conceivable spheres––be they political, economic, diplomatic, military, 
etc.––not subsumed within the scope of the Founders’ cooperative security and primacy 
grand strategies. These strategies, and the internal sphere they created, were principally 
about consolidation. In contrast to this favoring of integration over insulation, the 
Founders’ external sphere overwhelmingly prioritized insulation at the expense of 
integration. While at least by some measures the United States was integrated into the wider 
world, the Founders feared that an abundance of integration would undermine the security 
of the United States and prevent it from securing its interests. Hence, they employed 
selective engagement and isolationist grand strategies as a way to insulate their integration 
within their external sphere. 
As a general rule, the Founders’ integrated within their external sphere for their 
economic benefit and isolated from it for their political protection. In ways that were 
necessary to secure American national interests, the Founders did pursue robust integration 
within the external sphere. They achieved integration by implementing a selective 
engagement grand strategy that was intended to leverage the balance of power system in 
ways advantageous to American interests. As detailed above, the Founders were discerning 
in how they chose to engage in international politics. They sought closer integration with 
the balance of power system in securing their independence, but endeavored to disengage 
from it as much as possible as their interests and objectives evolved. One facet of 
engagement that endured throughout the founding era was the Founders desire for 
economic integration. American ports were an essential link in the vast Atlantic trading 
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network. As a consequence, the Founders sought improved and reciprocal trade relations 
with most and trade was at the heart of many treaties the United States signed with foreign 
nations. This prioritization of commercial engagement explains the importance of 
American navigation rights on the Mississippi River and expanded access to the Gulf of 
Mexico and the West Indies. In essence, trade was thought to be beneficial for the nascent 
nation in ways that political and military connections were not. Whereas commercial 
relations were generally beneficial for all parties involved, the Founders recognized that 
other types of connections with the external sphere risked excessive integrations that were 
not conducive to American interests.  
In many ways, the United States of the founding era was inherently insulated. Its 
favorable geography naturally insulated it from the great imperial powers of Europe. In a 
sense, its geographic isolation enabled its political insulation. The United States was 
blessed in that it had the ability to “opt out” of most types of dilemmas that new nations 
are often confronted with. This ability represents the insulating qualities of the Founders’ 
selective engagement grand strategy in the Western Hemisphere as the United States could 
largely choose not only how it wanted to engage, but also how it did not. However, the 
Founders’ selective engagement strategy was not the only, or even primary, way they 
insulated their external sphere. The Founders’ isolationist grand strategy with the Old 
World was their primary method of insulating the United States within the external sphere. 
This strategy was intended to prevent the types of imprudent political and military 
integrations which might involve the country in controversies for which it was ill-prepared 
and might not have survived. The founding generation largely agreed that the United States 
had a unique opportunity to build a new kind of governing system. This work shows that 
it also required a new kind of grand strategy. In order for this new federal republic to 
flourish, it had to develop its “domestic foundations of national power.”135 The Founders’ 
isolationist grand strategy provided both the time and space for American leaders to build 
and develop the institutions that would enable it to further engage within the external 
sphere in the future, albeit at considerably less risk. Together, the Founders’ selective 
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engagement and isolationist grand strategies insulated the apparatuses by which their 
internal sphere achieved some measure of integration with the external sphere. 
Having described the insulationist paradigm, the components and structure of the 
insulated spheres of integration concept, and the particular characteristics of the founding 
era spheres, this section will close by making a few additional observations. A first is a 
recognition that the United States in the founding era was a weak power. As such, it is a 
simple task to delineate neatly the dividing lines between an internal and external insulated 
sphere of integration. However, the weakness of the United States in this era may suggest 
some prudent guidance on how current and future American spheres should ideally be 
constructed. For instance, the Founders had a clear sense of prioritization. Their internal 
and external spheres were constructed to attend to core American national interests in ways 
that emphasized the characteristics of each sphere. The internal sphere favored integration 
and set clear boundaries on what was included within it. In contrast, the external sphere 
heavily favored insulation. Collectively, the Founders maintained a concerted skepticism 
and pessimism with regard to the wider world as they feared its military and economic 
power. As such, they took steps to insulate both the nation and its nascent economy from 
foreign wars and foreign competition.136 A general principle of this insulationist paradigm 
might be that what the United States cannot incorporate into a cooperative security 
construct in which it enjoys primacy, should not be included in the United States’ internal 
sphere. Instead, prudence may suggest that these entities must be positioned within an 
external sphere and approached with a selective engagement or isolationist grand strategy. 
Incorporating into the internal sphere entities over which the United States cannot assert 
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H. CONCLUSION 
If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage 
similar to that of an insulated situation.137 
—Alexander Hamilton 
It is said that first impressions last. They do so because one’s initial conception of 
something unavoidably influences one’s earliest interactions with it. Processes and habits 
are developed which often survive even after those who created them are no longer present. 
Such is the case with the American Founders and the development of American grand 
strategy from 1776–1796. The United States of the founding era was a colossus in waiting. 
Yet, its survival was not guaranteed or even expected by the great powers of the day. To 
realize its inherent capacity, the United States required time, steady leadership, and a 
sensible and adaptable approach to the crafting and implementation of American grand 
strategy. The United States was a new type of nation facing complex strategic 
circumstances that required a new kind of grand strategy. As a result, the Founders blended 
archetypal grand strategies in order to create insulated spheres of integration from which 
they could secure their national interests and avoid or eliminate the pitfalls laid before 
them. Furthermore, it seems that their political revolution also entailed a revolution in the 
formulation and execution of grand strategy. If the foregoing is true, one might wonder 
whether this insulationist paradigm would remain as effective as the United States 
transitioned from a colossus in waiting into a colossus in reality. It is to this question that 
this work turns next. Regardless of the answers, it is clear that the skillful labors of the 
founding generation established the first impressions in American grand strategy and set a 
course on which the United States would not just survive, but would rise to become 
history’s most dominant power. 
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III. THE GREAT RECASTING: THE TRUMAN 
ADMINISTRATION AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 
1945–1953 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. 
If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world. And we shall 
surely endanger the welfare of this nation.138 
—Harry Truman 
First impressions, no matter how profound or significant, cannot survive the 
passage of time entirely intact. Change is inevitable. In the life of a nation it sometimes 
manifests slowly in a slight but unmistakable arc of evolution or, as has often happened 
throughout history, nations can change in what may seem like an instant. Most common, 
however, is that change arrives as a result of some combination of factors. Grand strategy 
changes in much the same way. The effects of enduring patterns, emerging trends, and the 
immediate demands of contemporary events often merge to influence how a nation and its 
grand strategy change over time. This amalgamation of patterns, trends, and events is a 
useful way to explain the epochal transition of American grand strategy that took place 
during the presidential administration of Harry S. Truman. In response to dramatic 
geopolitical changes wrought by World War II, the Truman administration fundamentally 
transformed the United States’ role in international affairs. While this transformation 
required a significantly expanded scale to American grand strategy, it did not necessitate a 
wholly novel foundation. Instead, the administration built upon a history of blending 
archetypal grand strategies to secure American national interests. This chapter will show 
that by adapting enduring patterns in American grand strategy to emergent trends in 
American power, the Truman administration recast the nation’s Insulated Spheres of 
Integration in order to account for substantial changes in the geopolitical environment. 
Whereas the Founders’ grand strategy entailed a commitment to “continental national 
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security,” political isolation, and economic integration as a way to insulate the U.S. from 
threats abroad, the Truman grand strategy represented a commitment to “long-distance 
national security” with forms of both political and economic integration abroad as a way 
to insulate the United States and the Western hemisphere from the threats of Eurasia. This 
refashioning of American grand strategy not only allowed the United States to set a course 
for its eventual triumph over Soviet communism, it radically altered American life at home 
and abroad. 
B. AN ESSENTIAL TRIFECTA ASCENDANT: AMERICAN NATIONAL 
INTERESTS AFTER WORLD WAR II 
Our power position in the world, which has always depended upon the existence 
of a balance in Europe and Asia, is now threatened by a combination between unified 
hemispheres across the seas.139 
—Nicholas Spykman 
It is well known that the role of the United States in global affairs changed 
dramatically after the conclusion of World War II. Yet, when considering its grand 
strategy, care must be taken not to overstate the extent to which the United States’ new 
approach to international affairs entailed an expansion in its most essential national 
interests. Contrary to what is often assumed, the essential American national interests after 
World War II were characterized as much by continuity as by change. These essential 
national interests were, respectively: the survival of the American system, a functioning 
balance of power in Eurasia, and a global order conducive to both. One may note that these 
particular items likely describe American national interests of any era and that, at least in 
some sense, the security and prosperity of the United States have always depended on some 
realization of this essential trifecta. From certain perspectives, this observation is true and 
demonstrates a certain continuity in the essence of the United States’ national interests. 
Yet, for much of its history the tending of this essential trifecta did not require vigorous 
American engagement in global affairs as they were largely secured indirectly by the labors 
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and interactions of other nations. However, such an arrangement did not survive the 
extensive social, technological, and economic changes caused by World War II. Hence, 
perceived expansions in American interests after the war stem at least as much from 
adapting to an altered geopolitical context as they do from a proliferation of American 
equities. Put simply, continuity describes the essence of American national interests after 
World War II, but the manifestation of those interests during the Truman administration 
represents the dramatic change; change that is often hailed as a new expansion of American 
national interests, but should instead be viewed more as a reconception of continuity in 
response to a changed world. 
While this reconception may be understood in a variety of ways, perhaps the most 
useful way is to first briefly consider how the United States tended to its essential national 
interests prior to the Truman administration. For most of the nineteenth century, the United 
States largely adhered to the strategic advice in Washington’s Farewell Address and was 
chiefly focused on building what William C. Martell refers to as the “domestic foundations 
of American power.”140 In truth, the realization of the United States’ essential national 
interests in this era did not require meaningful overseas engagement. Walter Lippman 
attributed this to “the historical accident that in that period Asia was dormant, Europe 
divided, and Britain’s command of the sea unchallenged.”141 The realities of distance, the 
limits of technology, and the dominance of other great powers on Eurasia prevented not 
only the formulation of any serious threat to the United States’ essential national interests, 
but also any sustained American yearning for robust global engagement. However, these 
foundational characteristics of the American strategic outlook began to erode with the 
closing of its western frontier in 1890. The next half-century saw not only a war with Spain 
and the acquisition of its colonies, but also a realization of what was perhaps the founding 
generation’s worst strategic nightmare––American participation in European wars.  
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An ironic aspect of the United States’ eventual entry into World War I is that the 
president who oversaw it––President Woodrow Wilson––was elected and then reelected 
on platforms which endorsed the more traditional American approach to securing the 
nation’s essential interests.142 While the United States’ eventual entry into World War I 
was driven by public outrage over German unrestricted submarine warfare and couched in 
rhetoric about making the world “safe for democracy,” American motives were not wholly 
altruistic.143 After the war, Wilson pursued his famous grand plan for a new global order 
that entailed a more sustainable “community of power” enshrined in the League of 
Nations.144 However, Wilson’s vision was, as John Lewis Gaddis writes, “well beyond 
where his countrymen were ready to go.”145 Despite its involvement in the Great War, 
many in the United States were opposed to an abandonment of traditional American 
approaches to international affairs in favor of Wilson’s ambitious ideas for securing global 
peace. The president’s subsequent failure to compromise during negotiations with 
Republican senators not only ensured that the United States did not join the League of 
Nations, but also that it would not enter more modest security arrangements with France 
and Great Britain.146 Consequently, the United States returned to a pre-war conception of 
its essential national interests, recommitted itself to strategic non-entanglement, and 
acquiesced to a peace that George Kennan later characterized as having “the tragedies of 
the future written into it as by the devil’s own hand.”147  
These future tragedies culminated in the catastrophe that was World War II, an 
event that most influenced how the United States’ essential national interests manifested 
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during the Truman administration. When war broke out in the late 1930s, unhappy 
memories of World War I and the effects of the Great Depression caused many Americans 
to favor an abstention from the fighting.148 It was not until the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor that most Americans came around to the notion “that Wilson had been right: that 
[their] security could be threatened by what happened halfway around the world.”149 For 
some, the attacks settled once and for all the debate as to whether American prosperity and 
security were dependent on events and conditions far beyond its shores. In entering the war 
President Roosevelt intended to ensure the United States would never again cede the 
tending of its essential interests to the whims of fate and circumstance beyond its 
hemisphere. Central to this effort was the notion that the nation must eliminate the types 
of political, military, and economic conditions which made an event like World War II 
likely, if not inevitable. In Roosevelt’s view, this meant casting Wilsonian ideals in a 
realist’s mold to produce a “world conducive to the interests of the United States, a world 
order that would allow it to increase its wealth and power and carry its values to every 
corner of the globe.”150 The central failing of this vision was the assumption of continued 
cooperation with the Soviet Union when, in reality, “the conquest of the Axis Powers 
would open a vacuum into which the victors would flow on a collision course with each 
other.”151 By 1946, Roosevelt’s successor, President Harry Truman, oversaw a dramatic 
cooling of relations with the Soviet Union. Divergent visions of what was required for their 
post-war security, fundamentally opposed ideological schemas, and structural pressures 
stemming from post-war power vacuums all combined to place the United States and the 
Soviet Union in opposition to each other. As such, the Truman-era essential national 
interests are best understood by examining both their general qualities and their contextual 
manifestation in a world characterized by both intense geopolitical change and adversarial 
relations with the Soviet Union.  
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The first element of the United States’ trifecta of essential interests concerns the 
health and survival of its distinct political economy. Maintaining the “American System,” 
which was based on liberty and union at home and had enabled the nation to rise from 
“colony to superpower” in just over a century and a half, was the root essential national 
interest of the Truman administration. A number of rationales explain the necessity of 
maintaining the vibrancy of the American political economy at the outset of the Cold War. 
For instance, World War II brought the United States out of the Great Depression and 
largely resurrected the reputation of capitalism in the eyes of many Americans.152 As a 
result, the Truman administration had considerable incentives to maintain the restored 
productivity of the American economy. Put simply, it needed to ensure that the war boom 
did not devolve into a post-war collapse complete with all the attendant economic and 
political ramifications––both abroad and at home––that would surely follow.153  
The United States maintained the sole industrial economy to survive the war 
relatively intact. Referred to as the “arsenal of democracy” during the war, the American 
economy was the only one capable of functioning as an “arsenal of reconstruction” after 
its conclusion. Given the ideological underpinnings of the Cold War, the vitality of 
American-style democratic capitalism was of particular relevance. In this struggle between 
democratic capitalism and authoritarian socialism, the side that could perform better for its 
adherents would enjoy a decisive long-term advantage. The emergence of the Cold War 
sparked apprehensions about what permanent damage might be inflicted on the American 
system if there was a war with the Soviet Union. Melvyn Leffler notes these fears in his 
study of the Truman administration, writing that American leaders feared “their own 
political economy would be jeopardized if a totalitarian foe became too powerful.”154 The 
Truman team worried that “if such contingencies materialized, domestic freedoms would 
be imperiled because there was no way to separate the economic from the political realms 
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of governmental activity.”155 While the United States was finally prepared to alter its 
approach to global integration in order to directly manage its essential interests, its leaders 
did not want to erode the foundations of its political and economic traditions in the process. 
Traditions which, in the eyes of many American leaders, had been proven superior by the 
United States’ performance during the war. The successful maintenance of American 
political and economic traditions depended on the United States’ ability to prevent other 
nations––particularly authoritarian ones––from becoming overly powerful. Ironically, in 
order to protect some traditions, the United States would have to abandon others. 
The United States had to abandon its strategic non-entanglement tradition in order 
to secure the second part of its trifecta of essential interests––the cultivation of favorable 
balances of power in Eurasia. Despite its historic penchant for avoiding entanglements in 
affairs beyond its shores, the security of the United States has always depended on a 
balance of power in the Old World. A properly functioning balance in Europe and Asia 
ensured that no Eurasian power could consolidate enough military and economic resources 
to control the Old World or threaten the United States in the Western Hemisphere.156 Yet, 
though such balances have been an essential national interest for the United States since 
the earliest days of the republic, it was not required to engage in their maintenance. Given 
its detached situation, the United States enjoyed the benefits provided by the churn of Old 
World power politics without having to become a participant. Nicholas Spykman 
highlighted this favorable disposition in his 1942 treatise on geopolitics, writing that the 
“preoccupation of the European nations with the balance of power at home gave [the United 
States] the opportunity to grow [its] present position of power.”157 Such a propitious 
arrangement, however, did not survive the intense social, economic, and political changes 
left in the wake of the second world war.  
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In effect, World War II eliminated the United States’ ability to take advantage of 
other nations’ efforts to control the Eurasian balance of power. The fighting left much of 
Europe and Asia in ruins, Germany and Japan both prostrate and occupied, China divided 
by civil war, and British imperial power mortally wounded. The war not only shattered 
nations and order across the Eurasian landmass, it also highlighted for many in Washington 
the risks inherent to the United States’ traditional approach to securing favorable power 
balances beyond the Western Hemisphere. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan had very 
nearly secured vast consolidations of resources, manpower, and industrial capacity with 
which they could have threatened the United States directly. When this fact was combined 
with the emerging confrontation with the Soviet Union and the post-war power vacuums 
in Europe and Asia, many thought the United States had little choice but to reconceptualize 
its model for preventing “another totalitarian adversary gaining direct or indirect control of 
Eurasia and mobilizing its resources against the United States.”158 If a balance of power 
favorable to American interests was to be reestablished in Eurasia, then the United States 
would have to take an active role in its reconstruction and maintenance. Indeed, this is what 
the Truman administration sought to do as it went about establishing a post-war global 
order. 
The construction of a post-war global order conducive to both the health of the 
American System and the reestablishment and maintenance of a Eurasian power balance 
was the last element in the United States’ trifecta of essential interests. In a macro sense, 
the order had to be beneficial to the long-term interests of the United States but antithetical 
to those of its competitors––in this case the Soviet Union. Yet, an order favorable to 
American interests was not in and of itself sufficient to cultivate favorable balances of 
power across Eurasia. The order also had to appeal to those nations the United States 
needed to balance its potential foes in Europe and Asia. Leffler notes this requirement, 
writing that “western Europe, western Germany, and Japan would not long accept U.S. 
leadership if they did not prosper.”159 In short, the order needed to favor American allies 
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even if sometimes directly at the United States’ expense. In many cases, this entailed an 
order that purposely did not maximize the benefit for the United States. In his history of 
the post-war global economy, Herman Van Der Wee details the self-limiting aspects of the 
American-led order writing that, “discrimination against American products and against 
the dollar…[was] regarded as a permanent necessary evil” and that such practices were 
recognized as “the inevitable consequences of the Cold War.”160 These consequences were 
tolerable so long as the United States prioritized its struggle against the Soviet Union more 
than it did a perfectly reciprocal relationship with its allies. In sum, as long as the global 
order was conducive to the American system, promoted favorable balances of power in 
Eurasia, and was antithetical to the long-term interests of the Soviet Union, American 
leaders were content with a less than perfect deal.  
Continuity describes the essence of the United States’ national interests. Americans 
have always had an essential interest in the health and survival of their political and 
economic systems. Their security and prosperity have always depended on favorable 
balances of power on the Eurasian landmass. Furthermore, the realization of each of these 
has always been contingent on some sort of global order. However, continuity does not 
describe the manifestation of these essential interests during the Truman administration. 
World War II left in its wake a world dramatically changed. In turn, the United States 
confronted substantial changes in the manifestation of its essential interests. This change 
is often highlighted as a dramatic expansion of American interests when, in reality, changes 
in the scale and scope of American grand strategy––not American essential interests––
more accurately represent and explain the United States’ changed role in international 
affairs after the war. Continuous in their essence but metamorphic in their manifestation, 
these essential American national interests guided the Truman administration as it blended 
archetypal grand strategies in response to a changed geopolitical context.  
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C. COOPERATIVE SECURITY 
We have a higher duty and a greater responsibility than the attainment of our own 
national security. Our goal is collective security for all mankind.161 
—Harry Truman 
The United States has a complicated history with cooperative security as a grand 
strategy archetype. As described in the previous chapter, the United States––as a 
constitutionally based federal republic––is itself a paragon of cooperative security grand 
strategy. Yet, it is also a nation that has been skeptical of the application of cooperative 
security principles abroad. In truth, it was skeptical largely because it could afford to be. 
Prior to the twentieth century, the realization of its essential national interests did not 
necessitate an implementation of cooperative security principles beyond its own borders. 
The United States remained wedded to this arrangement even after there were indications 
of its erosion. Following World War I, the United States rejected participation in both the 
League of Nations and “entangling alliances” with the British and French. However, after 
World War II the United States abandoned its previous aversions and implemented a 
cooperative security grand strategy on an unprecedented scale. The United States’ post-
war cooperative security grand strategy was not, however, conceived of fully formed. 
Instead, it was developed incrementally and implemented gradually––often driven by what 
George Kennan and Arthur Schlesinger termed “universalist” and “spheres of influence” 
or “particularist” views of international organization and security.162 Whereas a 
universalist view entails a broad conception of cooperative security principles and 
concerned collective security on a wide scale, the spheres of influence or particularist view 
employed cooperative security principles on a more limited basis and was concerned with 
the collective defense of a distinct body or collection of states. In practice, the United States 
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blended both schemas as it implemented a cooperative security grand strategy during the 
Truman administration. 
The first element in the United States’ post-war cooperative security grand strategy 
was of the “universalist” variety and emphasized collective security. The United Nations 
was born of Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull’s vision for an international organization 
dedicated to the promotion of world peace. Though he did not expect it to resolve major 
controversies, Roosevelt believed the United Nations could serve as a useful tool to 
“establish a pattern of international collaboration that could then be used to contain the 
Soviet Union should the Kremlin prove to be a destructive force in the post-war world.”163 
Realistic with regard to its utility and eager to avoid Woodrow Wilson’s mistakes in 
securing Senate acquiescence to American participation in the League of Nations, 
Roosevelt sought the creation of an institution that delicately balanced Wilsonian idealism 
with a healthy respect for both power realities abroad and political realities at home. 
Whereas the former was accomplished by ensuring that all nations could join and 
participate in “the maintenance of international peace and security,”164 the latter two were 
secured by enshrining into the structure of the United Nations special accommodations for 
the world’s great powers. The United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and 
China were all given permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council with veto 
power over the institution’s resolutions. The veto was essential from an American 
perspective as it “improved prospects for Senate endorsement of the United Nations by 
making it clear that the world organization could not force the United States into war 
against its will.”165 In effect, the veto power insulated the United States’ integration into 
the type of international body it likely would have again eschewed had such safeguards of 
American sovereignty not been implemented. Alas, despite its enlightened design, the 
United Nations was unable to prevent a breakdown of cooperation between the United 
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States and the Soviet Union. As such, the American cooperative security grand strategy 
evolved in response to shifting geopolitical realities.  
The second element of the United States’ cooperative security grand strategy 
emphasized the “spheres of influence” or “particularist” view of international security. In 
contrast to the United Nations which was intended to manage global security, this evolution 
of the strategy focused on the collective defense of American allies. The collapse of 
cooperative relations with the Soviets led an increasing number of American leaders to 
believe that “the national interest would best be served not by trying to restructure the 
international order––the “universalistic” solution––but through the “particularist” 
approach of trying to maintain equilibrium within it, so that no one country, or group of 
countries, could dominate it.”166 This evolved American strategy developed in two 
separate geographic areas and along two primary lines of effort. The first concerns Europe, 
its economy, and the revitalization of its war-shattered societies. Formally titled the 
European Recovery Program, the American effort to jumpstart the post-war European 
economy is better known by the name of the Secretary of State who oversaw its 
implementation, George C. Marshall. The Marshall Plan was designed to inject large sums 
of American capital into European reconstruction in order to keep those countries aligned 
with the United States and prevent their move into either the communist orbit or neutrality. 
Cohen writes that “Truman and Marshall saw the plan as a means of defending American 
interests in Europe against Soviet encroachment, shoring up Western European economies 
so that the region would not be susceptible to Moscow-directed subversion.”167 A lesser 
known but equally important aspect of the Marshall Plan was that the aid also provided the 
Europeans with dollars to buy American products. The Marshall Plan, as James Patterson 
notes, abetted “American prosperity as well as European recovery.”168 
A second line of effort nested within the United States’ evolved cooperative 
security strategy in Europe stems directly from the successes and shortcomings of the first 
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line. The “particularist” elements of the United States’ cooperative security grand strategy 
were designed to promote an economic revitalization and subsequent sense of security that 
would allow the Western Europeans to act as an independent balance against Soviet power. 
Unfortunately, the Marshall plan was only partially successful in that it provided for the 
former but did very little to secure the latter. Though enjoying the positive effects of 
American economic aid, the Western Europeans were nonetheless concerned with “the 
threat from…the potential resurgence of German power, [and] from the looming Soviet 
menace to the East.”169 In essence, the Europeans desired an American military 
commitment––something the Americans had not intended––to match the economic one 
provided by the Marshall Plan. This desire led to what Richard Betts characterized as “the 
most significant and enduring innovation of the Cold War: establishment of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).”170 As a mutual defense treaty, NATO went 
beyond the United Nations charter in that it committed the United States to the defense of 
Western Europe. It was, in reality, a twentieth century manifestation of an “entangling 
alliance.” However, as was the case with its involvement in the United Nations, American 
integration into NATO was insulated. In response to the Senate’s Vandenburg Resolution, 
which approved American participation so long as the United States’ “constitutional 
process” was respected, the wording of the treaty only committed the Americans to “action 
including the use of armed force.”171 Put simply, the North Atlantic Treaty committed the 
United States to the defense of others, but left the provision and implementation of this 
defense dependent on the American political process. The obfuscating language in the 
treaty was necessary both to maintain some semblance of insulation and to secure Senate 
approval of American entry. Combined, the Marshall Plan and NATO “provided the 
institutional framework that bound the United States to its key geopolitical partners” and 
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as Hal Brands highlights, “offered the reassurance that these partners so badly craved.”172 
They did nothing, however, to promote or secure the United States’ essential national 
interests as they manifested in Asia.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the American expansion of economic and military 
security to nations in Asia was driven by much of the same logic that led the United States 
to enact the Marshall Plan and NATO in Europe. It was similar in that the strategy entailed 
economic and military lines of effort designed to establish independent centers of power to 
balance the Soviet Union and communism in Asia. As in Europe, this strategy also 
necessitated the rehabilitation of a former enemy, in this case Japan. With its latent 
industrial capacity and skilled workforce, Japan was seen as the core around which the 
United States’ cooperative security strategy would revolve in Asia. Yet, again as in Europe, 
the revitalization of this former foe sparked considerable apprehension among Japan’s 
former enemies across the Pacific. Australia and New Zealand, as Leffler notes, “would go 
along with a generous treaty [with Japan] only if the United States offered security 
guarantees.”173 The United States acquiesced to these requests for many of the same 
reasons and with analogous intent that it did so in Europe––it sought to keep these nations 
from opting for neutrality or worse, pursuing warmer relations with the Soviet Union.174 
One notable difference between the United States’ strategy in Europe and its counterpart 
in Asia was the structure of its security commitments. While its European allies were 
incorporated into a single organization under the North Atlantic Treaty, in Asia the United 
States opted for a “hub and spoke” model that favored bi-lateral treaties between it and 
individual countries.175 Though the geography of the region explains much of this multi-
pronged approach, it should also be thought of as a mechanism for insulating the American 
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integration into Asia in that it provided additional flexibility to the United States. The 
American integration was further insulated by the language of the treaties it signed with its 
Asian allies; these too included intentionally obfuscating language designed to leave the 
United States’ commitment to the treaty subject to the American political system. Though 
largely considered a theater of secondary importance when compared with Europe, the 
United States’ Asian cooperative security grand strategy would prove to be every bit as 
vital throughout the Cold War. 
Indeed, too much emphasis placed on either geographic area at the expense of the 
other would not have been prudent as the manifestation of American essential interests 
called for a cultivation of favorable balances of power across the entire Eurasian landmass. 
While the Truman administration had an early understanding of these essential interests, 
their implications, and geographical characteristics, its method for securing them evolved 
over time. In totality, the Americans blended the competing “universalist” and 
“particularist” visions of cooperative security to cultivate favorable economic and military 
balances of power in Europe and Asia. In eschewing its historical aversion to “entangling 
alliances,” the Truman administration created a post-war global order that attempted to 
balance integration and insulation in accordance with the requirements of its essential 
national interests. In its efforts, it not only projected American cooperative security 
principles around the world, it also established the institutions that would contribute to its 
eventual triumph in the Cold War.  
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D. SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT 
Our resources are not unlimited. We must apply them where they can serve the 
most effectively––to bring production, freedom, and confidence back to the world.176 
––Harry Truman 
Makers of American grand strategy have often displayed a Janus-like ability to 
envision and realize desirable futures by harnessing wisdom derived from careful study of 
the past. For instance, the founding generation famously looked to the perceived lessons of 
Greek, Roman, and British history when they crafted American grand strategy in the 
earliest years of the republic.177 Indeed, subsequent American leaders often followed this 
example when confronting the strategic challenges and political issues of their day. In this 
respect, American leaders during the Truman administration were no different. Often of 
elite pedigrees and endowed with Ivy League educations, they were intimately familiar 
with the enduring aspects of American strategic thought and practice. Yet, perhaps more 
importantly, they were also familiar with how these aspects had proven increasingly 
insufficient to the challenges faced by the United States in the twentieth century. By the 
end of World War II most recognized that the long-running American preference for 
limited engagement abroad would need to be modified in order to secure the United States’ 
essential national interests in the future. However, there was also recognition that unlimited 
engagement abroad was incompatible with the American tradition, would not be supported 
by the American people, and would risk exhausting American power. Hence, some argued 
what was required was a grand strategy of selective engagement. Selective engagement’s 
focus on relations between the great powers would act to insulate the United States’ 
expanded level of global participation by keeping its engagements restricted to those 
required to secure its essential interests. In practice, however, such neat lines of 
demarcation proved difficult to identify. 
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The United States’ post-war selective engagement strategy can be divided into two 
distinct but intimately related forms: abstract and applied. The abstract form of the 
American selective engagement grand strategy was at its most fundamental level a 
recognition that it would be imprudent, at least in the short term, for the United States to 
return to its prior habit of non-intervention. World War II demonstrated that Eurasian 
concentrations of manpower, resources, and industrial capacity could threaten the security 
of the American system in the Western Hemisphere. Given that the advancement of 
technology and industrial knowledge made such concentrations more likely in the future 
rather than less, prudence required the United States to play an active role in managing the 
global order to prevent their formation––in perpetuity. However, this permanency in 
engagement did not require universality. As resources and industrial power were not evenly 
distributed across Eurasia, some regions were inherently more important than others from 
the standpoint of American essential interests. Thus, though the Americans likely needed 
to engage on a permanent basis, they could prioritize some engagements and deemphasize 
or eschew others. Under a selective engagement grand strategy the United States was free 
to select the location, manner, form, and timing of its engagements as directed by its 
interests. Moreover, this abstract form of selective engagement was not necessarily 
dependent on the emergence of a post-World War II competitor or adversary. Instead, its 
validity was manifested by the nature of international politics, the reality of American 
power, and the manifestation of American essential interests after World War II. For 
instance, had the Cold War not developed the Americans would likely still have developed 
a grand strategy that entailed global engagement on a spectrum between the limited 
engagement of their past and some model of unlimited engagement. In a sense, the post-
World War II world required at least some form of selective engagement even if only to 
prevent the resurrection of a hostile Germany or Japan. 
When the Cold War did develop, winning it was the opus of the applied form of the 
United States’ post-war selective engagement grand strategy. Naturally, the applied form 
of the American selective engagement strategy derives from and is similar to its abstract 
form. For instance, both were concerned with the cultivation of favorable balances of 
power across Eurasia. Both were a response to the United States’ failure to implement an 
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effective engagement strategy after World War I. Both sought to balance the need for 
American global engagement with concern about strategic overextension. And lastly, both 
were necessary to secure the United States’ essential interests in a changed geopolitical 
context. Yet, there were notable differences. Whereas the abstract strategy was 
conceptually broad and concerned the United States’ general need to selectively engage in 
pursuit of its interests, the applied strategy was directly related to the United States’ goal 
of containing the Soviet Union. Put a different way, the applied strategy was implemented 
in order to prosecute the Cold War while the abstract strategy was nonspecific in its focus 
and would likely persist beyond the Cold War’s end.  
Ironically, the end of the Cold War was more or less described just as it was 
beginning in 1946. George Kennan’s famous “X Article” was particularly prescient in its 
description of how the Soviet system’s internal contradictions would eventually lead to 
“the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.”178 In Kennan’s view, the United 
States need not fight the Soviet Union militarily in order to combat communism because 
the Soviets, at least in the short term, were not likely to use force to expand their sphere of 
influence. As such, the call for the policy of containment “was based on the thesis that the 
Soviet Union had a persistent tendency to expand the boundaries of its empire wherever 
possible but would not undertake to do so at the risk of a major war.”179 Furthermore, the 
Soviet communists held views about the long-term viability of the capitalist democracies 
that were similar to those Kennan held about the communists in the Soviet Union. In short, 
they believed that the capitalist societies held within themselves the seeds of their own 
destruction. Thus, the Soviets would not try to accomplish by the sword what communist 
ideology said would inevitably be a consequence of capitalist greed and the unstoppable 
march of time. Given these assumptions about Soviet goals and intentions, initial American 
conceptions of the Soviet threat were of a political and psychological nature––not a military 
one.  
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Hence, the United States’ applied selective engagement strategy was intended to 
confront the perceived political and psychological aspects of the Soviet threat in the regions 
most vital to American essential interests. These were, of course, those areas with the 
highest levels of latent industrial potential––Europe and Asia. As this strategy was selective 
with regard to the location of its implementation, so it was also selective in the mode of its 
application. The extension of American economic aid under the Marshall Plan was 
intended to “revitalize European economies through a European initiative supported by the 
United States.”180 Similar economic efforts were also undertaken to rebuild the industrial 
capacities of Japan.181 This “strongpoint defense” version of containment was focused in 
key regions and intended to blend the need to reconstitute balances of power with the reality 
that, though immense, the United States’ resources were not unlimited.182 At this early 
stage of the Cold War many in the Truman administration did not expect the domestic 
political situation to allow large military budgets or extensive overseas commitments. 
Consequently, the administration selectively provided mutually beneficial economic aid in 
order to rehabilitate specific centers of power capable of eventually withstanding Soviet 
pressure on their own. Economic engagement was fitting not just because it helped to allay 
the political and psychological threats to the United States’ partners, but also because “it 
was easier to sell [to the American public] an unprecedented foreign-aid package as a 
program to ensure American prosperity than as a strategy for redressing the balance of 
power.”183 In this instance, selectivity in the location and application of its engagements 
resulted in positive effects for the Truman administration not just abroad but also at home.  
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Truman and his team also demonstrated the utility of selectivity in other ways. 
Though implied in name but often neglected in discussion and practice, a selective 
engagement grand strategy is every bit concerned with choosing how and where one should 
not to engage as it is with where and how one should. Post-war American leaders 
understood this dynamic and recognized that not all regions of the world had the same 
value. Some were of vital importance while others had at best tangential relevance to 
American objectives. As might be expected, engagement was prioritized to those vital 
regions and shunted away from less important ones. One notable example of this in practice 
was the Truman administration’s decision to not intervene at the end of the Chinese Civil 
War. Having previously tried to mediate a settlement between Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Nationalists and Mao Tse-tung’s Communist Party, the Americans abstained from 
involvement in the war because they saw no acceptable way to prevent a Communist 
victory. Warren Cohen describes this decision calculus in his history of American foreign 
relations, writing that “the fall of China to the Chinese Communists was undesirable and 
unfortunate, but it was not catastrophic. China was a weak country, likely to remain so for 
the foreseeable future, and more likely a burden than an asset to the Soviet Union.”184 As 
far as American essential interests were concerned, a red China could be tolerated so long 
as Japan remained in the American orbit and a balance of power was maintained in Asia. 
While the United States’ decision to concede communist rule in China would have far 
reaching implications, some of which would manifest very quickly, it was undoubtedly a 
decision borne of a recognition that it need not and should not engage indiscriminately.  
Taken together, the United States’ abstract and applied selective engagement 
strategies were designed to secure its essential interests in a manner that recognized both 
the reality of a changed world and American tradition. Derived from what were considered 
to be the lessons of the past, it sought to “undercut the appeal of communism, strengthen 
the unity of a loose American-led coalition, and serve U.S. interests.”185 The selectivity of 
American engagement ebbed and flowed even during the Truman administration as the 
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implementation of the containment policy continued to evolve. Though its engagements 
became less selective in their locations and applications over time, they remained on a 
spectrum between the limited engagement model of the United States’ past and the 
unlimited model of universal engagement. In achieving this balance, American leaders 
secured essential interests, achieved integration, retained insulation, and demonstrated that 
American strategy could remain Janus-faced in response to intense geopolitical change. 
E. PRIMACY 
Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way in which we affirm our 
values in the conduct of our national life, and in the development of our military and 
economic strength.186 
—NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security  
The United States emerged from the second world war at the zenith of global power. 
Prime among nations, it was in a class all to its own by nearly any desirable measure. The 
American economy and industrial base had powered the defeat of both Nazi Germany and 
Imperial Japan. Having been almost entirely shielded from the war’s devastation, it alone 
accounted for more than half of the world’s manufacturing capacity and produced a third 
of all global exports.187 Militarily, the United States had put more than twelve million 
Americans in uniform during the war, fielded the largest and most powerful navy, the 
largest and most capable air force, and perhaps most importantly––they alone enjoyed 
possession of the atom bomb.188 The diplomatic dominance of the United States, while 
more difficult to quantify, was also impressive and largely unrivaled. The Americans held 
together and led the Grand Alliance in its defeat of the Axis Powers and can be credited 
with conceiving, advocating, and realizing the United Nations. Given its supreme 
economic, military, and diplomatic position at the war’s conclusion, the United States was 
favorably positioned to implement and follow a primacy grand strategy. Primacy, as a 
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grand strategy archetype, places its emphasis on ensuring the continued supremacy of one’s 
nation and preventing the rise of a great power peer competitor.189 Naturally, having 
arrived at a moment when its global power soared above those of allies and foes alike, 
American leaders opted to implement a primacy grand strategy to preserve the United 
States’ status and secure its essential interests. Not unlike the grand strategy archetypes 
previously discussed, the American primacy strategy was not implemented fully 
developed. Instead, its various elements coalesced over time, often in response to demands 
made by contemporary events, to form a cohesive primacy grand strategy that has endured, 
in one form or another, even until today.  
The first element of the United States’ primacy grand strategy concerns the 
maintenance of its economic primacy. Having swum against the prevailing streams of 
global economic practices for much of its history, the United States was presented with the 
perfect opportunity to impose its economic preferences on a global scale after World War 
II.190 Dependency on American aid, both during the war and for post-war reconstruction, 
made other nations subject to extensive coercion by the United States and American leaders 
did not hesitate to use this leverage to force other nations to acquiesce to American 
preferences in the structuring of the post-war global economy. The Bretton Woods 
Agreement, first negotiated in 1944, established a system complete with institutions 
designed to regulate and manage global commerce, finance, and development. Ostensibly 
intended to eliminate the types of nationalistic economic impulses that were thought to 
have contributed to the outbreak of World War II, the agreement was in effect an American 
takeover of the global financial system. Cohen notes this underlying intention of the 
agreement, writing that “there was never any doubt, in Washington or abroad, that the 
Bretton Woods system was designed to serve the long term interests of the United 
States.”191 By forcing the gradual elimination of trade barriers and the acceptance of the 
Dollar as the global reserve currency, the United States secured an integrated international 
economic order in which it had no real competitor. American policymakers believed that 
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economic cooperation and interdependence were essential not only to American strategic 
interests, but also to the maintenance of global peace.192 Hence, while the Bretton Woods 
system enshrined American economic primacy, it was also designed to benefit all those 
who signed on to its provisions––often at the United States’ expense. Many American 
leaders, as Benn Steil notes, held the view that “the United States was a benign emerging 
superpower, and would use its power, unlike the European imperialists before it, to create 
a world based on economic cooperation and nondiscrimination.”193 This assumption that 
American primacy was good for the world has deep roots in the American psyche and 
would characterize much of the United States’ post-war primacy grand strategy. 
The United States’ strategy for ensuring its military primacy was no exception. 
After World War II’s conclusion, the Americans intended to leverage their newfound 
military supremacy to secure their essential interests and maintain the hard-won peace. As 
it related to military power, the Truman administration’s primacy strategy took two main 
forms. The first version, or what may be termed partial primacy, relied heavily on the 
United States’ unique military advantages and can be considered a corollary to Kennan’s 
“strongpoint defense” version of limited containment. Having recognized that the United 
States needed to remain globally engaged after the war, the Truman team was forced to 
reckon with the United States’ historical aversion to standing military establishments and 
their attending costs. Leffler notes Truman’s dilemma, writing that while “Americans 
wanted to bring the boys home, cut taxes, and focus on internal priorities. Truman wanted 
to achieve U.S. security objectives on the cheap.”194 The administration’s initial solution 
was to attempt both. Hence, while much of the American military underwent a robust 
demobilization after the war, the United States retained much of its most strategic military 
advantages. The Americans could still rely on their incredible industrial might, strategic 
bombing capabilities, naval power, and most importantly, their sole possession of atomic 
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weapons. American officials understood that the bomb, so long as they possessed it and 
others did not, ensured the United States’ continued military primacy. In practice, this 
partial military primacy strategy might have been sufficient to secure American essential 
interests had the United States retained its nuclear monopoly and remained committed to 
Kennan’s version of limited containment. Yet, it would do neither and this compelled the 
Truman administration to evolve its military primacy strategy. 
This evolution was necessitated by the United States’ steady drift away from the 
logic of Kennan’s politico-economic model of containment towards a second version of 
primacy that placed evermore emphasis and demands on American military power. As head 
of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, Kennan opposed the establishment of the 
American alliance system on the grounds that it would crystalize and escalate the Soviet-
American conflict. Most within the Truman administration, including Kennan, recognized 
that the threat of Soviet military action was quite low and that the real communist threat 
was largely political and inhered from the underlying economic weakness of Western 
Europe and Asia. However, events such as the Soviet blockade of Berlin exacerbated 
European diffidence and made the Truman administration “less and less comfortable with 
Kennan’s…argument that it could safely concentrate on the economic rather than the 
military instruments of containment.”195 Ultimately, the establishment of the United 
States’ alliance network opened a gap between its commitments and the means provided 
by the military capabilities inherent to its partial primacy strategy. Bringing its means in 
line with its ends would ultimately require its abandonment of partial primacy and the 
embracement of a robust primacy strategy. While many factors contributed to this 
transition from partial to robust military primacy, two events can be argued to have been 
final catalysts. The first was the Soviet detonation of its own atomic bomb in August, 1949. 
The second was the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950. While the former was 
largely responsible for the conception of what would become the United States’ robust 
military primacy strategy, the latter can claim responsibility for its actual implementation. 
The confirmation of a Soviet atomic capability ended the United States’ nuclear monopoly 
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and with it the ability of the Americans to argue, both to their allies and to themselves, that 
the United States could deter Soviet conventional military power with atomic weapons. 
While most still doubted that the Soviets sought a full-scale war, many American officials 
feared that having the bomb would embolden the communists to take more aggressive 
action in other ways. In response, Truman approved the development of the more powerful 
hydrogen bomb and ordered “a comprehensive review of the U.S. national security policy, 
the result of which was NSC-68.”196  
Crafted by Kennan’s replacement on the Policy Planning Staff, Paul H. Nitze, NSC-
68 called for robust military primacy. Though forceful in its prose and filled with 
ideological flourishes, the document did not necessarily expand the ends associated with 
the containment strategy as much as it did the means and ways. The report placed greater 
emphasis on the Soviet threat than it did on a thorough consideration of American essential 
interests, stating that “in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free 
institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.”197 Put bluntly, NSC-68 rejected a 
containment based on “strongpoint defense” and advocated for a “perimeter defense, with 
all points along the perimeter considered of equal importance.”198 Nitze strongly 
advocated for a dramatic expansion of the military means to match the United States’ 
expanded security commitments. Leffler writes that “NSC 68 laid out options and called 
for much larger military expenditures. Conventional rearmament and strategic superiority 
were now deemed indispensable for the risk-taking necessary to co-opt the industrial core 
of Eurasia, integrate it with the Third World periphery, and maintain America’s 
preponderant position in the international system.”199 Yet, the proposed militarization of 
the containment strategy would be costly. When it was reviewed by President Truman in 
April, 1950, he demurred, directing that the economic and societal effects of its 
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implementation must be ascertained before it could be approved.200 Unfortunately, the 
Korean War cut short Truman’s reservations about the pursuit of robust primacy and its 
associated costs. The North Koreans invaded South Korea on June 25th, 1950 and he 
approved the implementation of NSC-68 before the end of September.201 The communist 
invasion of South Korea seemed to, at least for some, simultaneously discredit the logic of 
an economically based containment strategy and demonstrate the need for one based on 
military strength. Those in favor of NSC-68’s provisions asserted that “if the United States 
could maintain its overwhelming lead in strategic weaponry and if it could bolster [its] 
conventional forces…the Kremlin’s atomic arsenal and land power could be neutralized. 
The United States could then move ahead to accomplish its objectives through diplomatic, 
economic, and, if necessary, military interventions in disparate localities around the 
globe.”202 Time would prove both the truth and tragedy of their assertions.  
Enjoying considerable asymmetries in terms of economic, military, and diplomatic 
power, the United States initially implemented a primacy grand strategy in order to sustain 
its position and secure its essential interests. Its partial military primacy strategy––which 
emphasized its nuclear monopoly, industrial might, air and naval power––was intended to 
meet the post-war demands to demobilize while remaining globally engaged. The 
Americans evolved and expanded their primacy strategy in response to the emerging Cold 
War by shedding their partial military primacy model for a robust primacy strategy. 
Christopher Preble writes that NSC-68 “provided the intellectual groundwork for [a] 
permanent warfare state” and “shattered any further resistance to a large and permanent 
military.”203 The robust primacy strategy implemented by the Truman administration 
crystallized the role of American military power in both American grand strategy and the 
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struggle against Soviet communism––it would remain that way for the duration of the Cold 
War and beyond. 
F. ISOLATIONISM 
The isolationist position has always had a strong psychological and emotional 
appeal for broad sections of the population. The American state was created by people 
who had turned their backs on Europe and most of the immigrants who entered during 
the nineteenth century wanted to forget the Old World.204 
––Nicolas Spykman 
Many might think it odd to say that isolationism played a significant role in the 
Truman administration’s grand strategy, but in fact it did––as a vital bogeyman. Contrary 
to what is often assumed, the administration did not forsake isolationism, it repurposed it 
to ensure the United States would never return to its historical detachment from global 
affairs. An often-overlooked aspect of grand strategy, especially in democratic countries, 
is that it concerns the domestic aspects of statesmanship as much as it does foreign policy. 
Those who study, think about, and practice grand strategy are sometimes prone to 
emphasizing the interactions of nations on the world stage at the expense of political actors 
on the domestic stage. In an American context, this is easy to do. As their nation is uniquely 
blessed by geography––ocean buffers to the east and west, friendly or weak countries to 
the north and south, with no other great power in the same hemisphere––foreign policy has 
historically been of secondary importance to domestic policy in the eyes of the American 
public. Consequently, domestic sentiments concerning the foreign policy aspects of 
American grand strategy are prone to both long running trends and sudden transitions 
caused by events that shock the collective American system. In other words, the arc of 
American foreign policy is characterized by lengthy bouts of consistency marked by 
periodic aberrancies which compel it to evolve or change. This pattern is especially clear 
when one considers the evolution of American isolationism. As “it is the oldest issue in 
foreign policy,” every generation of American leaders has had to reckon with the 
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isolationist qualities inherent to both the American geography and the American people.205 
The Truman administration was no exception. What could be considered exceptional, 
however, was that administration’s ability to suppress and overcome this innate 
isolationism to midwife into existence an era of unprecedented American internationalism. 
Much ink has been spilt about American isolationism. Considerable portions of it 
have been about the supposed isolationism of the founding generation. Another, not 
insignificant amount regards American isolationism during the interwar period between 
World War I and World War II. These eras both represent notable instances of isolationist 
grand strategy, but there are marked differences between them. In most discussions, the 
former example is generally viewed favorably and often as evidence of the prudence of 
early American statesmen while the latter is often thought of as a preventable failure of 
American global leadership, an example of short-sighted grand strategy, and a missed 
opportunity to prevent the world’s greatest tragedy. Moreover, these instances of 
isolationism also vary in the source of their origination. The isolationism that sprang from 
the founding generation and lasted for roughly a century is that associated with the logic 
of Washington’s Farewell Address. Instituted and maintained by those at the commanding 
heights of American life, this isolationism was intended to keep Americans insulated from 
the vicissitudes of the wider world. Conversely, the isolationism of the interwar period, 
though supported by some elites, can be viewed as the American peoples’ rejection of 
increasingly prevalent strands of elite internationalism. However, despite their different 
sources and varying reputations in the telling of American history, both are examples of 
Americans appealing to isolationism to restrict engagement abroad in support of what they 
considered to be the United States’ national interests. After World War II, the Truman 
administration also appealed to isolationism in support of American national interests, 
albeit, for very different purposes.  
Truman’s isolationist grand strategy was an elite-driven effort to forever discredit 
isolationist grand strategies and promote perpetual internationalism. The administration’s 
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strategy was to use isolationism as a foil to build domestic support for an increasingly 
internationalist foreign policy. In doing so, they sought to leverage common perceptions of 
previous eras of American isolationism to make their case. Most often, this entailed a 
steady highlighting of how the interwar period of isolationism had failed so dramatically. 
Many prominent Americans, both in and out of government, blamed that era of isolationism 
for contributing to the war’s outbreak. Leffler notes these views, writing that “for Truman, 
as for many of his contemporaries, isolationism had been responsible for the spread of the 
Depression, the rise of totalitarianism, the appeasement of the Axis powers, and the attack 
on Pearl Harbor.”206 While much of the angst levied against isolationism was directed at 
the perceived failings of the interwar period, others made their case against isolationism by 
appealing to the founding generation. For instance, Walter Lippman, writing in his famous 
Shield of the Republic, noted that the Founders were not mere isolationists and that they 
“did not hold the prejudice against alliances which latter-day Americans have ascribed to 
them.”207 Moreover, while Lippman used the Founders to make a positive case against 
isolationism, others characterized the Founders’ guidance as outdated or inappropriate for 
the modern world. Nicolas Spykman offered a cogent synopsis of this argument in his 
book, America’s Strategy in World Politics, writing that “historical precedent and the voice 
of the Fathers can be used as a means to gain support for a doctrine but not as proof of its 
soundness. Not conformity with the past but workability in the present is the criterion of a 
sound policy.”208 While there was not universal agreement among the American elite 
about the shortcomings of isolationism, there was a broad, if varied, understanding that the 
United States would remain globally engaged after the war. Marginalizing or discrediting 
isolationism was a central function of the Truman administration’s isolationist strategy. 
To some extent, negative sentiments regarding isolationism had already come to be 
shared in varying degrees by average Americans. Though many had been against entry into 
World War II initially, the shock of the attacks on Pearl Harbor radically altered public 
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opinion on American involvement. After the war, most Americans, though eager to restart 
normal life and enjoy the fruits of their wartime sacrifices, did not want to see their efforts 
dissipated by a mismanagement of American foreign policy.209 Yet, officials within the 
Truman administration held reservations “about the will of the citizenry to support major 
involvement of the country in overseas controversies.”210 Many officials believed that the 
making of grand strategy should pass from the amateurish manipulations of elected 
politicians to the well-educated and sophisticated hands of an un-elected “Establishment.” 
The public, and by extension their elected representatives, were susceptible to the innate 
American tendency towards isolationism. In their view, “a foreign policy run by 
knowledgeable elites who knew and trusted each other…could be protected from the 
dangerous explosions of popular opinion.”211 Further inculcating and sustaining these 
views toward isolationism and the professional management of international affairs in the 
public mind was the intent of the Truman administration’s isolationist strategy. 
Aside from the specific policies themselves, evidence that the Truman 
administration sought to permanently discredit isolationist grand strategy is manifested in 
the public messaging efforts of American officials after World War II. As most doubted 
the American public would support Truman’s foreign policies, purposeful efforts were 
taken by the administration to emphasize, some might argue inflate, the nature and extent 
of the threats to American security.212 The administration wasted few opportunities to 
make appeals for internationalism by directly rebuking isolationism. For instance, during 
his 1947 State of the Union address, Truman announced “that we will not retreat to 
isolationism…we have a higher duty and a greater responsibility than the attainment of our 
own national security. Our goal is collective security for all mankind.”213 Later that year, 
in a speech outlining what would become known as the Truman Doctrine, President 
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Truman sought to “scare the hell out of the American people” and convince them that 
American security depended on the United States’ willingness to secure freedom for 
others.214 He proclaimed that:  
We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help 
free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity 
against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian 
regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes 
imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the 
foundations of international peace, and hence the security of the United 
States…The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining 
their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of 
the world. And we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.215 
Such declarations were not limited to President Truman, however. In announcing 
the implementation of the Marshall Plan at his famous speech at Harvard University, 
Secretary of State George Marshall spoke directly about the American public’s supposed 
duty to support American internationalism: 
An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is 
an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of 
the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice 
should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our 
people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed 
upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be 
overcome.216 
The administration’s messaging efforts continued throughout its tenure. Though the 
intensity of such efforts ebbed and flowed in response to events, the essential core of the 
strategy remained the same––isolationism was out and American internationalism was here 
to stay. 
It should be noted that highlighting the Truman administration’s efforts to discredit 
isolationism does not necessarily imply a critique of the administration’s overall grand 
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strategy. There are valid reasons to believe that the administration’s efforts to actively 
promote American internationalism were necessary. One prominent reason is that the 
securing of American essential national interests after World War II likely required an 
increased global role for the United States, at least initially. Given this need for increased 
internationalism and the fact that the United States had returned to its isolationism after 
World War I, one need not struggle to understand why the Truman administration felt it 
necessary to overcome America’s innate isolationist tendencies. Moreover, the discrediting 
of isolationism was likely necessary in order to implement robust versions of other grand 
strategy archetypes. In a sense then, the Truman administration used the specter of 
isolationism to justify the implementation of expansive cooperative security, selective 
engagement, and primacy grand strategies. Later, writing in his memoirs, President Truman 
noted how he felt that his decision to abandon isolationism was consonant with the 
Founders’ reasons for promoting it. He wrote that, “Washington had advised a method 
suitable under the conditions of his day to achieve the great end of preserving the nation, 
and that although conditions and our international position had changed, the objectives of 
our policy––peace and security––were still the same.”217 An aversion to isolationism has 
remained both a feature and the object of American foreign policy through today. Given 
the American people’s propensity to avoid serious and sustained attention to foreign affairs, 
it is likely to remain so. That is, unless some aberrancy so shocks the American system and 
forces the “Establishment” to give it a modern look. 
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G. TRUMAN’S RECASTING: AMERICAN INSULATED SPHERES OF 
INTEGRATION AFTER WORLD WAR II 
We are moving on with other nations to build an even stronger structure of 
international order and justice. We shall have as our partners countries which, no longer 
solely concerned with the problem of national survival, are now working to improve the 
standards of living of all their people. We are ready to undertake new projects to 
strengthen a free world.218 
––Harry Truman 
In making the first impressions in American grand strategy, the Founders 
established a pattern of blending archetypal grand strategies to create a distinct set of 
insulated spheres of integration from which they could secure the United States’ national 
interests. This insulationist paradigm was designed to capitalize on the benefit derived from 
integration while maintaining the protection associated with insulation. Its longevity was 
due largely to the fact that it remained an effective process for securing both the 
fundamental national interests of the founding era and omnipresent essential national 
interests. Yet, the Founders’ spheres only remained effective within certain political, 
technological, and geopolitical contexts. As none of these contexts survived the global 
upheaval caused by World War II, the United States’ insulated spheres of integration were 
recast by the Truman administration to account for a changed world.  
Whereas the Founders integrated their various states to insulate the collective nation 
from a dangerous world, the Truman administration integrated the United States with 
foreign nations in order insulate the “Free World” from Soviet communism. However, if 
in their efforts the administration altered the Founders’ particular arrangement of the 
spheres, it did not abandon the logic for creating them or their basic structure. The Truman 
administration continued to blend archetypal grand strategies to maintain distinct internal 
and external insulated spheres of integration. The internal sphere still cohered around 
common interests and favored integration, but was significantly expanded to include those 
nations to which the United States extended formal security commitments. However, 
inclusion within the internal sphere did not mean all parts had equal value. The 
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administration’s internal sphere was further divided in to core and peripheral elements with 
the United States and its territories comprising the core element, whereas those nations 
external to the United States made up the peripheral element. Though common interests 
acted as an integrating justification, the administration’s cooperative security grand 
strategy functioned as the integrating mechanism within the internal sphere. It should be 
noted, however, that integration within the Truman administration’s internal sphere was 
not as robust as that of the Founders. It did not attempt to achieve total integration between 
the core and peripheral elements of the internal sphere. True to the intent of the Founders’ 
original vision, they insulated the connections, both formally and informally, within the 
internal sphere by building into them protections and buffers designed to preserve 
American sovereignty. Formally, the Americans insulated their integration with their allies 
by incorporating into their mutual defense treaties protections which left the United States’ 
commitment to it subject to the American political system. Informally, the United States’ 
insulation within its internal sphere was a function of its military and economic primacy 
over its allies. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the Truman administration maintained 
the Founders’ principle of not incorporating into the internal sphere elements over which 
it could not assert primacy. 
Substantial changes to the United States’ internal sphere were paired with similarly 
meaningful changes to its external sphere. As was the case with the Founders’ external 
sphere, all entities not included within the internal sphere fall into the external sphere. The 
Truman administration’s external sphere was also divided in two: the Soviet bloc and those 
nations who were neither aligned with the United States nor the Soviet Union.219 Though 
insulation was still favored over integration in the external sphere, the Truman 
administration substantially expanded American integration within the external sphere by 
securing its participation in and leadership of the United Nations. Generally, the non-Soviet 
bloc of the external sphere saw higher levels of integration with the United States than did 
the part under Soviet control. Whereas the United States often applied a selective 
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engagement approach to those non-aligned nations in the middle, it tried to isolate the 
Soviets and their allies. Despite its expanded external integration, the United States blended 
different grand strategy archetypes to retain insulation. For instance, though American 
participation in the United Nations was part of its overall cooperative security grand 
strategy, its veto power on the Security Council allowed the United States’ integration to 
be insulated by its selective engagement strategy.220 As its external integrations were 
reflective of American preferences or apportioned power based on strength, the United 
States was assured an insulated dominant position and a leading role in their functioning. 
The Truman administration’s recasting of the Founders’ spheres was intended to 
account for the ascendency of the United States, the shattering of the Eurasian balance of 
power, and the emergence of the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union. As has been 
described in this chapter, there legitimate reasons as to why the Truman administration 
expanded the scope of American global engagement. Yet, the sagacity of applying of the 
Founders’ model beyond the United States should be considered as there is evidence that 
Truman’s expansion of the United States’ internal sphere to foreign nations eroded, in favor 
of integration, the Founders’ original balance between integration and insulation. For 
instance, internally, the size and scope of the federal government expanded significantly, 
the United States maintained a powerful military establishment for the first time in its 
history, and the presidency and executive branch steadily accumulated more and more 
power. Moreover, entering into alliances with foreign nations reduced by default the 
external insulation the United States enjoyed for most of its history. Were these foreign 
attachments “temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies?”221 Or, would they 
become “permanent alliances” that would survive the rationale and circumstances of their 
conception? Examining these questions is the focus of the following chapter. 
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H. CONCLUSION 
When history says that my term of office saw the beginning of the cold war, it will also 
say that in those 8 years we have set the course that can win it. We have succeeded in 
carving out a new set of policies to attain peace––positive policies, policies of world 
leadership, policies that express faith in other free people. We have averted world war III 
up to now, and we may already have succeeded in establishing conditions which can keep 
that war from happening as far ahead as man can see.222 
––Harry Truman 
It is said that first impressions last. However, it is also said that nothing lasts 
forever. When considering the evolution of American grand strategy, both are true. Long 
running patterns, emerging trends, and the immediate demands of sudden events were each 
factors in the Truman administration’s overhaul of American grand strategy after World 
War II. The enduring American pattern of blending archetypal grand strategies was 
combined with the emerging trend of ascending American power to meet the immediate 
demands of intense geopolitical change caused by World War II. Forced to confront a 
radically different manifestation of its essential interests, the United States radically altered 
its relationship with the world beyond its shores. In its recasting of the United States’ 
insulated spheres of integration, the Truman administration set the United States on a 
course not only to secure its essential national interests, but also to contain, defeat, and 
discredit Soviet communism. Forged in an era of intense international change that had 
significant effects on both the United States and the world, this “second impression” in 
American grand strategy appears to be, at least today, every bit as lasting as the first. 
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IV. THE TRIUMPH OF GRAMMAR OVER LOGIC: THE 
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND AMERICAN GRAND 
STRATEGY, 1993–2001 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States occupies a unique position in world affairs today. We recognize that, 
and we welcome it. Yet, with the cold war over, I know many people ask whether the 
United States plans to retreat or remain active in the world and, if active, to what end. 
Many people are asking that in our own country as well. Let me answer that question as 
clearly and plainly as I can. The United States intends to remain engaged and to lead.223 
––William Clinton 
In the life of a nation, especially one founded to be an Empire of Liberty, first 
impressions matter. However, as was explored in the previous chapter, they are not 
impervious to the unstoppable march of time. First impressions, no matter how profound, 
are subject to interaction with an ever-changing world and their adaptation, so as to 
maintain their relevance, is sometimes necessary. Yet, while change is inevitable, 
transitions likely, and recastings sometimes required, first impressions still matter. In terms 
of American grand strategy, the first impressions made by the founding generation matter 
because they not only birthed and ordered a nation, but also guided that nation’s strategic 
affairs for generations. These first impressions established the enduring logic of American 
grand strategy, as well as a particular grammar. In other words, the Founders’ blending of 
archetypal grand strategies to achieve the internal and external balance between integration 
and insulation not only created the logic of a new type of nation dedicated to the pursuit of 
liberty, it also outlined a particular grammar of strategy intended to secure and maintain it. 
When examining how the Truman administration overhauled American grand strategy 
after World War II, it is clear that the Truman grand strategy’s “grammar…may [have 
been] its own, but not its logic.”224 Put another way, the Truman administration retained 
 
223 William Jefferson Clinton, “Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
in New York City” (Speech, New York, September 27, 1993), 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-48th-session-the-united-nations-general-
assembly-new-york-city. 
224 Clausewitz, On war, 605. 
90 
the Founders’ logic, the protection of liberty by maintaining an appropriate balance 
between integration and insulation, while, in its recasting of the nation’s insulated spheres 
of integration, it created a new grammar. While the Truman grand strategy’s notable 
expansion of foreign and domestic integration inherently reduced the insulation enjoyed 
by the United States, the expansion was only justified in that it maintained a balance 
between them largely appropriate to the exigent geopolitical demands wrought by World 
War II and the Cold War. Such an appropriate balance, however, was not maintained in 
response to the geopolitical change brought about by the Cold War’s conclusion.  
As the first president elected after the collapse of the Soviet Union, William 
Jefferson Clinton was presented with an opportunity granted to few in American history: 
to reshape the nation’s grand strategy for a new era. Yet, instead of a new strategy fully 
attuned to the lesser demands of a post-Cold War world, the Clinton grand strategy 
amounted to an elaboration of the Truman administration’s strategic grammar and a further 
distortion of the Founders’ seminal logic. This chapter will show that whereas both the 
founding generation and the Truman administration sought to secure fundamental and 
essential national interests by blending archetypal grand strategies in ways designed to 
maintain an appropriate balance between integration and insulation, the Clinton 
administration, in pursuit of ephemeral interests, employed archetypal grand strategies in 
ways that were intended to further American integration at the expense of insulation. 
Though divorced from the type of geopolitical exigencies which had ostensibly compelled 
the Truman administration to expand American integration, the Clinton grand strategy 
purposely accentuated the Truman integrative strategic grammar. This magnified grammar, 
though not entirely detached from laudable goals or even the Founders’ grammar, 
nevertheless amounted to a straining of their logic. This strained logic is the foundation for 
the geopolitical course on which the United States finds itself today––for better and worse. 
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B. THE ESSENTIALS AND AN EPHEMERAL TRIAD: AMERICAN 
NATIONAL INTERESTS AFTER THE COLD WAR 
Today, as an older order passes, the new world is more free but less stable. 
Communism’s collapse has called forth old animosities and new dangers. Clearly, 
America must continue to lead the world we did so much to make.225 
––William Clinton 
Just as the conclusion of World War II was both the end and beginning to many 
things, so to was the conclusion of the Cold War. Most notable about the conclusion of 
World War II, at least from the perspective of American grand strategy, was the extent to 
which the United States ended its long tradition of non-entanglement and began an era of 
unprecedented internationalism. Compelled by a radically altered manifestation of its 
essential national interests and the emergence of a great power adversary that threatened 
them, the Americans engaged in a decades-long, globe-spanning struggle to contain Soviet 
communism. The eventual collapse of the Soviet Union marked not just an American 
victory in the Cold War, but also an impressive realization of its essential national interests. 
In addition to its triumph over the Soviet Union, the United States could boast of having 
maintained its fundamental trinity encapsulated within the “American System,” while it 
reconstituted both favorable balances of power in Eurasia and a functioning global order. 
Given these successes, the most notable aspect of American grand strategy after the 
conclusion of the Cold War was the extent to which the United States adopted a broader 
conception of its national interests rather than a narrower one. Under the Clinton 
administration, American national interests were not limited merely to those fundamental 
or essential, but were expanded to include those ephemeral. In total, the post-Cold War 
national interests include those enduring interests discussed in previous chapters with the 
addition of an ephemeral triad. This triad consisted of: maintenance, enlargement, and 
engagement. These ephemeral interests were the guiding lights of the Clinton 
administration’s grand strategy and the aspirations on which a new era of American 
internationalism was to be built.  
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Before discussing these ephemeral national interests in detail, it should be noted 
that their ephemerality inherently condemned them to a dependency on the essential. Put 
bluntly, even after the Cold War ended, the United States’ essential national interests were 
still, as their name implies, essential. The root raison d’état of American grand strategy 
was still the survival and vitality of the “American System” based on liberty and union at 
home. Moreover, the security and viability of this system was still contingent on favorable 
balances of power across the Eurasian landmass. And finally, a global order conducive to 
both remained essential especially given the potential collapse of the stability provided by 
the Cold War. That the United States had succeeded in realizing these essential interests 
did not belie their indispensable and enduring nature. For instance, if the realization of 
these essential interests were to erode, then the United States would be required to tend to 
them before pursuing others. What their continued realization meant, however, was that 
the United States could pursue broader interests, objectives, and policies. Having been 
emancipated from the routinized and institutionalized pursuit of the essential within the 
confines of the Cold War, the United States was free to pursue the ephemeral in a world 
that was moving beyond it. 
The first element of the United States’ triad of ephemeral interests concerns the 
maintenance of post-World War II consensuses on American economic, diplomatic, and 
military affairs into the post-Cold War era. As was detailed in the previous chapter, the 
United States, in order to secure its essential interests and wage the Cold War, broke with 
its historical traditions and made significant changes to how it interacted with the world 
beyond its shores. By the Cold War’s end, these changes had crystallized into various 
relationships, patterns, and institutions for which there were considerable incentives to 
keep in place. Consider, for instance, the panoply of American initiatives implemented 
after World War II. In its adoption of a “Marshall Plan mentality,” the United States 
“pursued foreign economic policies designed to make overseas allies self-sustaining 
participants in a thriving, open international economy, even at the expense of domestic 
American economic interests.”226 Diplomatically, the Americans created the United 
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Nations, NATO, and underwrote a vast alliance and security network that spanned the 
globe. In a military sense, the United States garrisoned thousands of troops in Western 
Europe and East Asia and, as Kenneth Oye highlights, this “military dependency of 
Western Europe and Japan on the United States [had]…been internalized by American, 
Western European, and Japanese political elites.”227 In truth, one would not be overly 
presumptuous in asserting that the United States’ extensive array of Cold War-era 
economic, diplomatic, and military initiatives had been thoroughly internalized in 
Washington and in capitals across the “free world.” Accordingly, their maintenance––even 
though the impetus for their creation had disappeared and the rationale for their 
continuance was not manifestly apparent––was considered a national interest in and of 
itself. Ironically, the Clinton administration did not limit itself to just a mere maintenance 
of these Cold War consensuses––they were also to be expanded. 
The enlargement of the American-led system of interlocking political, economic, 
and military relationships and institutions was the second portion of the Clinton ephemeral 
triad. Informed by a conception of international relations derived from both democratic 
peace theory and economic interdependence theory and motivated by a need to redefine 
the United States’ strategic mission abroad, the Clinton administration set as a central 
factor and purpose of American grand strategy the “enlargement of the world’s free 
community of market democracies.”228 President Clinton, in his 1994 State of the Union 
address, proclaimed that, “the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable 
peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each 
other. They make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy.”229 In a macro sense, 
the Cold War had been a competition between democratic capitalism and authoritarian 
communism. The American-led triumph over the Soviet bloc proved for many the 
supremacy of democracy and capitalism as principles by which to organize societies. 
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Having reached this “end of history,” American leaders of both major political parties 
believed that “democracy and market-based economies were on the ascent, and the 
fundamental goal of American foreign policy should be to broaden their scope.”230 In a 
theme ever present in the American psyche, this pursuit of enlargement was justified in 
that “it protects [American] interests and security; and because it reflects values that are 
both American and universal.”231 In truth, this assertion is not without a historical 
grounding. In at least some sense, the entire story of American history is one of belief in 
universal principles and the steady enlargement of interlocking political, economic, and 
military institutions first laid out by the Founders. Yet, the Clinton notion of enlargement 
is notable not so much for its consonance with the arc of American history, but for its 
dissonance with the limits historically imposed on the crusading American spirit. The self-
imposed constraints of Washington’s Farewell Address and those inherently exacted by the 
Cold War each served to focus and restrain the United States’ seemingly natural inclination 
towards universalistic enlargement. With the Cold War over and the advice of Washington 
holding little sway among those responsible for crafting American grand strategy, there 
was little effort, desire, or incentive to place limits on the pursuit of enlargement. Limits, 
where they did exist, came from those who did not wish to be subsumed or in those areas 
where the United States, for one reason or another, did not desire enlargement.232  
These areas were largely but not exclusively the focus of the third element of the 
United States’ ephemeral triad––engagement. As a national interest, engagement was part 
signal and part function. In formally enunciating that the United States held engagement as 
a national interest and that its interaction with the world was informed by the belief that 
the United States should remain globally engaged after its Cold War triumph, the Clinton 
administration signaled abroad that the United States would act as a benevolent, yet 
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solitary, global hegemon and would not retrench back within the Western Hemisphere.233 
This signaling also made clear that American engagement would not be as constrained as 
it was during the Cold War when every potential action was refracted through the United 
States’ global struggle against the Soviet Union. By contrast, the function-oriented part of 
engagement was more tangible. This aspect of engagement had three main purposes that 
could each include diplomatic, economic, and military elements. The first purpose was to 
engage with those areas or nations where the United States desired enlargement, whether 
political, economic, or military, so as to convince, cajole, or pressure them to assent to 
American desires. Second, in those areas where enlargement was not desired or possible, 
engagement was to be largely focused on matters of human rights, humanitarian relief, 
ethnic conflict, or environmental concerns. Many of these issues had previously taken a 
backseat to Cold War considerations but would now receive far more attention from 
American political leaders and bureaucrats no longer consumed by the superpower 
competition. The third purpose of engagement was “to minimize the ability of states 
outside the circle of democracy and markets to threaten it.”234 In short, this entailed 
engaging by various means with what Clinton National Security Advisor Anthony Lake 
referred to as “backlash states…whose power is threatened by the spread of democracy and 
markets.”235 Addressing the various challenges posed by these middling rogue states 
would gradually absorb a tremendous share of the American strategic bandwidth and 
became what is perhaps the defining feature of the United States’ post-Cold War grand 
strategy.  
Having detailed and described these ephemeral interests individually, it is only 
prudent that they also be explored collectively in order to fully demonstrate how they are 
related and why the moniker “ephemeral” is an appropriate one. The Oxford Dictionary 
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defines ephemeral as an adjective to describe something “that is in existence, power, 
favour, popularity, etc., for a short time only; short-lived; transitory.”236 As such, this triad 
of maintenance, enlargement, and engagement can be considered ephemeral in three 
primary ways.  
First, they are ephemeral because they are not rooted in the fundamental. In other 
words, there is nothing intrinsically linking this triad to the maintenance of liberty and 
union in the United States. Indeed, the opposite may be true. The trappings accompanying 
a pursuit of this ephemeral triad necessarily included objects the Founders would have 
considered inherently hostile to American liberty and union in the long term. For instance, 
securing these ephemeral interests entailed the continued existence of a large peacetime 
military with all its attending costs, the solidification of “temporary alliances” into 
permanent ones, and the eternal interweaving and entangling of the United States’ destiny, 
peace, and prosperity in the toils of global “ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, [and] 
caprice.”237 Hence, as they are at best extraneous and at worst noxious to the maintenance 
of liberty and union within the United States, this triad cannot be considered truly grounded 
in its fundamental national interests.  
Second, they are not necessarily based in the essential interests of the United States 
either. As discussed previously, the United States is an inherently secure country. The 
essential elements of its security depend upon little more than a Eurasian balance of power 
and a global order amenable to the “American System.” A properly functioning balance in 
Europe and Asia ensures that no Eurasian power can consolidate enough military and 
economic resources to threaten the United States in the Western Hemisphere.238 With the 
rehabilitation of the allies, such a balance was achieved long before the end of the Cold 
War. Furthermore, the Soviet Union’s collapse eliminated the only Eurasian nation likely 
to achieve a consolidation truly threatening to the United States. In short, an American-
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managed balance of power was not necessary after the Cold War in the same way that it 
arguably might have been after the end of World War II. Instability and conflict in the 
developing world or the former Soviet-bloc, however virulent and nasty, was not threating 
to the United States’ essential national interests in a way that absolutely demanded the 
pursuit of this ephemeral triad. Hence, as they are not based in the United States’ enduring 
fundamental or essential national interests, this triad is inherently transitory and its 
longevity determined by the extent to which a domestic consensus on their pursuit could 
be sustained.  
Third, this triad is characterized as ephemeral because their vigorous 
pronouncement and pursuit as American interests can only exist within a certain 
international context, namely that of American preeminence. American policymakers, 
experiencing the apogee of American power in what Charles Krauthammer famously 
termed the “unipolar moment,” could claim such ambitious national interests and 
objectives because the geopolitical environment was, despite not being demanding of it, 
temporally amenable to their pursuit.239 Though one can, as many have, make cogent 
arguments that this triad offered the best course for a continued realization of the United 
States’ essential interests, such arguments are actually a manifestation of preference for a 
specific method rather than a result. Maintenance, enlargement, and engagement, while the 
preferred consensus in Washington after the Cold War, were not the only options available 
to the United States to ensure a continued realization of its essential interests. 
Unfortunately, this confusing of ways and means with ends was to be a reoccurring feature 
of American grand strategy after the Cold War. Yet, ephemeralness characterizes not just 
the pronouncement and pursuit of this triad, but also its conception. In other words, the 
strategic meaning and policy implications of maintenance, enlargement, and engagement 
were themselves ephemeral and would evolve over time. In contrast to the United States’ 
fundamental and essential national interests which have always been vitally important to 
its survival, American dedication to this triad, especially as declared by the Clinton 
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administration, was dependent on a confluence of domestic and international 
circumstances that are by their very nature––ephemeral.  
C. COOPERATIVE SECURITY 
In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and 
strengthen the world’s community of marketbased democracies. During the cold war we 
sought to contain a threat to the survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the 
circle of nations that live under those free institutions.240 
––William Clinton 
Considered in its entirety, the Clinton grand strategy was fundamentally one of 
cooperative security. However, the administration’s cooperative security strategy was not 
a wholly original one. Any thorough accounting of the nearly two and a half centuries of 
American grand strategy should at least include an acknowledgment of the United States’ 
impressive record of employing cooperative security grand strategies. Though 
“cooperative security” is itself a modern term, the American record of implementing such 
strategies extends back to the earliest days of the republic. In their knitting together of 
thirteen disparate colonies, the Founders creatively implemented this strategy archetype 
both in their pursuit of independence and in their crafting of the United States Constitution. 
Broad in its scope, the strategy included cooperation on not only the military elements of 
security, but also those economic and diplomatic. In its final manifestation, it integrated 
the many states into an insulated whole and created the collective relationships, patterns, 
and institutions that would protect it. Though implemented with different intentions and on 
a much wider scale, the Truman administration’s implementation of cooperative security 
grand strategies after World War II echoed the Founders’ model. To secure its essential 
national interests and contain the Soviet Union, the Truman administration created 
international military, economic, and diplomatic relationships, patterns, and institutions so 
as to integrate its foreign allies into an insulated and American-led whole.  
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Upon the Cold War’s conclusion, however, the future of this whole and with it the 
Truman cooperative security grand strategy were called into question. What exactly, now 
that the Soviet Union had collapsed, were the allies cooperating to achieve? How could the 
stationing of thousands of American troops in Europe and Asia continue to be justified 
both at home and abroad? Moreover, now that it had no peer competitor, would the United 
States remain the self-limiting guarantor of an open economic order, or would it begin to 
throw its economic weight around in ways more akin to a normal country? To answer these 
questions and others like them, the Clinton administration declared and implemented a 
cooperative security grand strategy that was designed to simultaneously reinforce, expand, 
and reimagine the Truman strategy and all its attending relationships, patterns, and 
institutions. On the other hand, the Clinton strategy was not specific in the way that the 
Truman strategy was directed against the Soviet Union. Instead, given the lack of a 
unifying threat, the strategy was general in its focus, guided by the United States’ pursuit 
of its ephemeral interests, and global in its ambition. Perhaps most importantly, the strategy 
was a representation of the Clinton administration’s belief that the United States’ future 
prosperity and security lay in greater integration abroad, rather than less.  
As alluded to previously, the Clinton cooperative security strategy was in many 
ways a new attempt at an old mission. One need only to examine the diplomatic elements 
of the administration’s strategy to understand that the ideas animating it had deep roots, 
especially when considering the United Nations. The Roosevelt administration’s original 
vision for the United Nations was for it to serve as a global collective security institution 
that would maintain peace and ensure the rights of all nations were protected. However, 
these lofty ambitions were quickly subsumed by Cold War antagonisms and the United 
Nations fast became an arena for superpower posturing and maneuvering while its original 
mission faded towards near obsolescence. With the Cold War over and the world moving 
into a new era, the Clinton administration saw an opportunity to breathe new life into its 
original vision. In a speech delivered to the United Nations shortly after taking office, 
President Clinton declared to the General Assembly that “through common effort our 
generation can take the bold steps needed to redeem the mission entrusted to the U.N. 48 
years ago. I pledge to you that my Nation remains committed to helping make the U.N.’s 
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vision a reality.”241 Though politics, both international and domestic, would complicate a 
strict adherence to this pledge, “assertive multilateralism” remained the overarching theme 
of the Clinton administration’s cooperative security grand strategy.  
This diplomatic initiative was matched in both effort and style by the military 
elements of the Clinton administration’s cooperative security grand strategy. However, 
instead of a return to a long-delayed founding vision as was the case with the United 
Nations, the Clinton strategy was primarily concerned with crafting a new vision for a vast 
array of military alliances whose founding visions had largely been fulfilled. While the 
future of American military alliances and garrisons around the world were called into 
question by the conclusion of the Cold War, the indication as to how the United States 
would answer these types of questions was provided by the Clinton administration’s 
actions as they related to NATO in Europe. The military portion of the administration’s 
cooperative security strategy was pursued along two main lines of effort––reinvention and 
expansion. Put simply, the administration’s task was to determine not only NATO’s 
purpose in a new Europe, but also its boundaries. Andrew Bacevich describes this first 
challenge, writing that “having outlived its usefulness as a defensive alliance, NATO 
needed a new purpose, ideally one based on a broader definition of security and more 
proactive in its orientation.”242 Indeed, NATO would now be viewed as a vehicle through 
which to promote and secure wider European stability and integration. Achieving these 
two conditions, however, implied that NATO would expand to those areas of Europe not 
already stable or integrated into the alliance. President Clinton, in a 1993 speech before the 
Polish parliament, stated as much, proclaiming that “bringing new members into 
NATO…is no longer a question of whether, but when and how.” 243 He elaborated this 
point further, stating that “expansion will not depend upon the appearance of a new threat 
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in Europe. It will be an instrument to advance security and stability for the entire 
region.”244  
In reinventing and expanding NATO, which officially occurred with the inclusion 
of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999, the Clinton administration secured 
victories for each of its ephemeral interests. First, the expansion of NATO into Eastern 
Europe and its reinvention from an anti-Soviet defensive alliance into a greater European 
stability institution gave this Cold War relic new life in the post-Cold War world. However, 
the overhaul of NATO served other maintenance purposes as well. For one, it maintained 
Lord Ismay’s famous but likely apocryphal charge that NATO’s true purpose was “to keep 
the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”245 This maintenance of the 
United States’ role as the provider and guarantor of European security also lent domestic 
rhetorical support to the bipartisan consensus on NATO’s maintenance and expansion. 
Secondly, the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe was a notable success in the Clinton 
administration’s efforts to secure the enlargement of democracy and markets. Providing 
for the security of the liberalizing former Soviet satellites was seen as a way to solidify 
their inclusion into a burgeoning liberal world order. Though the Clinton administration 
only reigned over NATO’s expansion to three new countries, it laid the foundation for 
further expansions which have continued even into the Trump administration. Lastly, the 
Clinton administration’s renewal and expansion efforts were undertaken alongside parallel 
ones to engage with Russia. Engagement with its former foe was seen as necessary to 
assuage its fears that the Americans were taking advantage of Russian weakness to bring 
NATO to its borders. Yet, NATO’s eastward expansion was chiefly about consolidating 
the spoils of its Cold War victory and not necessarily about threatening Russia. The 
administration sought Central and Eastern Europe’s incorporation into NATO in order to 
stabilize, democratize, and capitalize them and ensure their incorporation into the United 
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States’ emerging post-Cold War order.246 Russian fears about NATO enlargement, while 
publicly manifested by Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s declaration that it risked plunging 
Europe “into a cold peace,” were tempered by the undeniable difficulty associated with 
actually defending these new additions.247 In reality, there was little the Russians could do 
to stop NATO’s expansion and the Clinton administration’s efforts to engage with them 
were primarily intended to make the incorporation of Eastern Europe into the American 
orbit an easier pill to swallow. As it was with the Athenians and the Melians, the Americans 
would do what they could and the Russians would suffer what they must. 
The last major element of the Clinton administration’s cooperative security grand 
strategy concerned the economic aspects of security. As with the diplomatic and military 
elements, the administration’s economic strategy was reflective of its belief that “to the 
extent democracy and market economics hold sway in other nations, our own nation will 
be more secure, prosperous and influential, while the broader world will be more humane 
and peaceful.”248 To achieve this spread of markets and democracy, the Clinton team 
sought to maintain and expand the same basic economic calculus that guided American 
economic strategy during the Cold War. As detailed in the previous chapter, the United 
States assumed leadership of an economic order in which it accepted less than reciprocal 
trade relationships so as to rehabilitate its allies and former enemies. Within the context of 
the Cold War, securing allied support against the Soviet Union often trumped protecting 
American domestic industries and securing market reciprocity. In short, the Americans, as 
Alfred Eckes Jr. notes in his history of American trade policy, “redefined the national 
interest to include the health of the cosmopolitical economic system [and] placed support 
for the open system over the tangible interests of import-sensitive American producers and 
workers.”249 With economic policy no longer constrained by Cold War security 
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calculations, the Clinton administration sought to expand this economic order worldwide. 
Instead of limiting its economic might to create and sustain an anti-communist economic 
bloc, the Clinton administration would now do so in order to build a truly global system of 
integrated markets, finance, and trade.  
The economic elements of the Clinton administration’s cooperative security 
strategy manifested in two new economic institutions––one regional and one international. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was an agreement originally 
negotiated by President George H.W. Bush in 1992 between the United States, Mexico, 
and Canada that created an integrated free-market trading zone in North America.250 
Though NAFTA was originally a Republican initiative, the Clinton administration 
vigorously supported its approval in the Senate despite the opposition from American labor 
organizations and a majority of Democrats in both houses of congress.251 Functionally, 
NAFTA entailed the reduction of protective tariffs across the zone and was intended to 
ease the passage of goods and investment across borders in North America. The ultimate 
idea behind NAFTA was that the United States had the most to benefit from economic 
openness and that the liberalization and integration of trade would spur economic growth 
for all involved. In the administration’s view, the Americans would lead the world in 
leveraging the information revolution into a knowledge economy. Any economic 
dislocation caused by the outsourcing of rust belt industries would be massaged in the long 
term by lower priced imports and the gradual movement of American workers into new 
industries. Eckes highlights this thinking, writing that “accepting the inevitability of a 
global economy, instant communication, and the rapid movement of capital, goods, and 
people, leaders stressed the importance of investing in training and skills at home to 
improve the quality of the labor force. The elite exhorted ordinary workers to adapt and to 
accept the need for lifelong learning.”252 
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These particular notions also served as the basis for the Clinton administration’s 
support for American participation in the WTO. Just as it had achieved the reduction of 
trade barriers on a regional basis in North America, the administration also sought them on 
an international scale. However, the WTO was neither a wholly new institution or an 
original Clinton initiative. Indeed, as was the case with much of the Clinton 
administration’s strategy, the WTO was a Bush administration effort that the Clinton team 
carried forward. An effort that was, in reality, the post-Cold War evolution of the GATT 
framework first negotiated by the Truman administration in 1947. Over the course of its 
Cold War existence, the framework had been largely successful in reducing trade barriers 
and promoting trade. Though the GATT had been periodically amended and updated 
throughout the Cold War, its central shortcoming was that it enjoyed no mechanism with 
which to enforce its provisions. The WTO changed that. As an institution it was given the 
power to “review disputes between countries and enforce rulings by allowing sanctions 
against violators.”253 Perhaps not surprisingly, this integrative enforcement power was the 
focus of many critiques lobbied against the agreement by those members in the American 
congress who were more protectionist on trade, defensive of American sovereignty, or 
both.254 Indeed, certain aspects of the agreement, such as Article XVI, Section 4, which 
stated that “each member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations, and 
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements,” 
seemed to suggest that legal and policy dictates from Geneva would supersede those passed 
in Washington.255 Yet, despite some objection in Congress and from labor groups that also 
opposed NAFTA, the Clinton administration secured American entry into the WTO in 
1994.  
Overall, there is little doubt that the Clinton administration achieved success in 
implementing its cooperative security grand strategy. Its attempt to rejuvenate the United 
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Nations, its reinvention and expansion of NATO, and its inclusion of the United States in 
NAFTA and the WTO, were each a concrete accomplishment reflective of the 
administration’s ephemeral interests. The administration succeeded in reinforcing, 
expanding, and reimagining the United States’ Cold War relationships, patterns, and 
institutions into the post-Cold War era. Yet, while there is little debate about the 
administration’s success in implementation, one can debate as to the overall success of the 
strategy in balancing integration and insulation. Militarily, the United States became 
further integrated yet less insulated in Europe as a result of repeated and continual NATO 
expansions. Moreover, the steady eastward creep of NATO made friendly relations 
between the United States and Russia more difficult to achieve in the long run. In an 
economic sense, the Clinton administration traded already meager economic insulation to 
secure further economic integration––the effects of which were either denied or 
obfuscated, but not effectively mitigated.256 Eckes notes this reality, writing that “regional 
and multinational trade liberalization might benefit business, but it appeared to expose low-
skilled and high-wage American workers to the consequences of global wage 
harmonization.”257 In both its actions and its failure to extenuate its negative aspects, the 
Clinton economic strategy failed to match its increased integration with sufficient 
insulation.  
In sum, the Clinton cooperative security strategy was a wager that in a rapidly 
emerging new world integration was an unqualified good and insulation was an 
anachronistic relic from a world that was quickly fading away. In the administration’s view, 
the information revolution and the spread of technology were contributing to a world where 
insulation was not just no longer necessary, but increasingly impossible. While the Clinton 
administration should not be faulted for implementing a cooperative security grand 
strategy, the wisdom of implementing one that placed considerably more emphasis on 
integration than on insulation is certainly questionable. As integration inherently 
universalizes and insulation acts as a protection from the potentially harmful aspects of 
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integration, a grand strategy unbalanced in favor of integration is one fraught with risk––
just not the type the Clinton administration feared.  
D. SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT 
To be successful, a strategy of enlargement must provide distinctions and set priorities. It 
must combine our broad goals of fostering democracy and markets with our more 
traditional geostrategic interests. And it must suggest how best to expend our large but 
nonetheless limited national security resources.258 
––Anthony Lake 
For those responsible for crafting American grand strategy, the conclusion of the 
Cold War was surely both cathartic and confusing. It was probably cathartic in the sense 
that, having secured an American victory after decades of effort, these strategists and 
policymakers likely felt an amazing sense of relief at having been freed from the stresses 
of managing a potentially catastrophic superpower rivalry. This sense of freedom was 
probably accompanied by a newfound confidence born of a much-deserved sense of 
accomplishment. However, one can also imagine that the end of the Cold War was an 
extremely confusing experience as well. Once freed from the routinized and somewhat 
predictable pattern of Cold War international relations, thoughts of the future might have 
seemed thoroughly disorienting and devoid of structure. Having witnessed the ultimate 
culmination of decades of strenuous effort in service to the nation, one could easily imagine 
these patriots seized by an unsettling sense of idleness as their country turned its focus 
inward. While these speculations about the possible mental and emotional states of 
American leaders upon the United States’ triumph in the Cold War are little more than 
empathetic thought experiments, they do provide a useful way to understand the Clinton 
administration’s employment of selective engagement grand strategy. For when one 
examines how the administration employed this type of strategy, it is not hard to imagine 
it being crafted and implemented by those hypothetical American leaders described above. 
The Clinton administration’s selective engagement grand strategy was that of a 
superpower unbound but not entirely unrestrained, that of a missionary nation in search of 
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new crusades abroad but sensitive to domestic politics, and that of an idle hegemon 
attempting to make sense of a new era. Given the defeat of its superpower opponent and 
the lack of any great power challenger, the United States’ engagements abroad were largely 
unmoored from a disciplined consideration of how they influenced great power 
relationships. Yet, this did not mean the administration was unrestrained by other factors. 
Having achieved a great national victory, American leaders were in search of a new 
heading on which to direct the crusading American spirit. However, given the 
comparatively low-stakes post-Cold War environment and the president’s tenuous 
relationship with the American military, the Clinton administration was highly attuned to 
the politics of action and inaction both at home and abroad. Lastly, having emerged as the 
singular global “hyperpower” from a decades-long era of vigorous bipolar competition, the 
United States found itself confronted with no existential threats to its survival and its 
citizens increasingly skeptical of engagement abroad. In its pursuit of ephemeral interests, 
the Clinton administration’s selective engagement strategy can be seen as an effort to make 
sense of this disorienting condition.  
Built primarily around the interactions of great powers on the international stage, 
selective engagement strategies typically entail the measured application of a state’s power 
in pursuit of its national interests.259 As one might expect, American selective engagement 
strategy during the Cold War was crafted, debated, and implemented with consideration as 
to how engagements would affect the hard balance of power between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Given the nature of the superpower competition, nearly all American 
engagement abroad was directed towards its effort to contain Soviet communism. This 
necessarily meant that issues which did not directly affect this effort, such as those of 
terrorism, human rights or ethnic strife, were often deemed a lower priority and not 
warranting of concerted American engagement. However, the end of the Cold War turned 
this entire paradigm on its head. No longer constrained by Cold War calculations, 
America’s unmatched power was now available to pursue ephemeral interests. Derek 
Chollet and James Goldgeier highlight this reality, writing that “because of its sheer power 
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[the United States] enjoyed tremendous freedom of action. Although policymakers and 
pundits debated when, where, and how America could act, there was rarely much doubt 
about whether it was capable of doing so.”260 As such, issues and regions largely ignored 
during the Cold War would now be the subject of American engagement. 
In a pattern repeatedly highlighted thus far, the first example demonstrating the 
general thrust of the Clinton administration’s selective engagement strategy was actually 
an engagement it inherited from its predecessor. The Bush administration, despite the lack 
of a national interest in doing so, sent American military forces into Somalia in November 
1992, in order to address the unfolding humanitarian disaster there. Once in office, the 
Clinton team absorbed the Somalia intervention into its larger pursuit of ephemeral 
interests. The administration saw interventions such as the one in Somalia as being, both 
in substance and style, the type of engagements the United States should undertake in a 
post-Cold War world. As Chollet and Goldgeier note, the engagement “showed the United 
States could command the moral high ground and act on principle, deploying military 
power to serve humanitarian ends; it would save hundreds of thousands of innocent lives; 
and it involved working with other countries through the United Nations.”261 Yet, as was 
shortly demonstrated by its reaction to the infamous Blackhawk Down incident in October 
1993, the administration’s efforts to channel the crusading American spirit were 
undoubtedly tempered by its sensitivity to the domestic and international politics 
surrounding the United States’ engagements abroad. 
This sensitivity, while not wrong or unwarranted in its own right, certainly played 
a role in the administration’s decision-making that was likely exaggerated by the low-
stakes character of the post-Cold War international environment. An often-overlooked 
benefit of great power competition is that it provides both the positive and negative cues 
necessary for a truly effective selective engagement grand strategy. Cues that, as a 
consequence of American unipolarity, the Clinton administration did not enjoy. As such, 
its engagement strategy was largely directed by both its pursuit of ephemeral interests and 
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the pressures exerted by domestic and international politics. This was reflected in its 
decision both to embrace the Bush intervention in Somalia and to remove American troops 
from there despite not having resolved the issues they were sent to address. However, 
Somalia was not the only place where this phenomenon occurred. As a result of the 
domestic backlash against its actions in Somalia, the administration refrained from 
intervening in an analogous ethnic civil war in the African country of Rwanda. This war 
between the Rwandan Hutus and Tutsis ultimately resulted in the massacre of an estimated 
800,000 people.262 “The president and his advisors were,” as the historian Warren Cohen 
notes, “unwilling to risk American lives in a country few Americans could find on a 
map.”263  
Ironically, the backlash and guilt which stemmed from the administration’s 
decision to not intervene in Rwanda ultimately contributed to its undertaking of 
corresponding interventions elsewhere. Whereas the fear of provoking a political backlash 
prevented the administration from engaging in Rwanda, the fear of allowing another 
genocide to continue compelled it to engage in Bosnia and Kosovo. With the Europeans 
unwilling or unable to stop the fighting in the Balkans, the Clinton team, after a fair amount 
of foot-dragging, eventually intervened to stop the massacres and violence, albeit in a 
limited fashion. In Bosnia, the administration led NATO in an air war against the Serbs 
that culminated in the cessation of fighting and the signing of the Dayton Accords.264 
Later, in Kosovo, the administration repeated this model in its efforts to halt the civil war 
in Serbia and it took the threat of American ground troops and Russian diplomatic 
intervention to end the conflict.265 Interestingly, the American-led engagements in the 
Balkans were likely as much about saving “NATO’s standing as a relevant alliance” as 
they were halting the violence.266 Bacevich notes this duality, writing that “it was not 
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Kosovo that counted, but affirming the dominant position of the United States in a Europe 
that was unified, integrated, and open.”267 
The Clinton administration’s engagements abroad demonstrated both the centrality 
of American power in a world devoid of focus on great power competition and the extent 
to which American policymakers and the foreign policy establishment were uncomfortable 
with idleness. With their great foe defeated, American swords would not be beat into 
American ploughshares, but turned to new purposes. This often resulted in issues truly 
unrelated to the United States essential national interests being redefined as crucial not just 
for the security and prosperity of the United States, but also for the world. Such actions 
even led to President Clinton himself equating intervention in Kosovo with the allies 
intervening to stop Adolf Hitler.268 A number of rationales explain this penchant for 
engagement. A first concerns the interplay of domestic politics in the United States. 
Throughout the Cold War there was a perception that while the Republicans were true 
“cold warriors,” the Democrats were weak or inept on foreign policy and protecting the 
country from external threats. The end of the Cold War and the ascendance of Clinton to 
the presidency offered Democrats an opportunity to reframe this political narrative. In fact, 
during the Clinton administration, it was common for Democrats to support American 
interventions abroad, while the Republicans generally opposed. As a “New Democrat,” 
Clinton could help his party shed its reputation for weakness by “being tough on human 
rights and active in promoting democracy.”269 Another factor at play on the Clinton 
selective engagement grand strategy was the evolution of the American media and its 
ability to pressure policymakers to “do something.” In truth, overcoming this “CNN effect” 
may have been an insurmountable obstacle even if the Clinton administration was not 
predisposed towards engagement. However, this is not likely as American interventions in 
Somalia and the Balkans were largely unpopular with Americans. It is not surprising, 
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though it is incredibly ironic, that George W. Bush was subsequently elected on a 
presidential platform that decried Clinton’s interventionist engagements abroad. It is 
doubly ironic that the Clinton administration, despite its predisposal towards engagement, 
did not launch a war with Iraq, whereas President Bush, who initially campaigned on an 
end to “nation building,” eventually did.  
In total, the Clinton selective engagement strategy was influenced by a host of 
complex factors. Set free from the considerations that normally govern a selective 
engagement grand strategy, the administration enjoyed a free hand to engage and intervene, 
as its ephemeral interests, guided by domestic and international politics, so counseled. 
American policymakers, their confidence and ambition buoyed by American preeminence, 
outlined an engagement strategy that sought to harness the American spirit for a new global 
crusade to secure human rights and spread democracy. What they encountered, however, 
was an American people increasingly skeptical of engagement abroad. In the final analysis, 
the Clinton selective engagement grand strategy, much like the Clinton presidency, 
amounted to a transition between two distinct eras. The presidency, a transition from the 
Cold War to the War on Terror; the selective engagement strategy, a transition from one 
bound by superpower competition to one of unilateral universalist-interventionism. While 
the Clinton administration’s selective engagement strategy did not lead to any catastrophic 
policy errors, in defining itself as a break from the confines of the past, it laid the foundation 
for American over-reach and over-extension in the future.  
E. PRIMACY 
The train of globalization cannot be reversed, but it has more than one possible 
destination. If we want America to stay on the right track, if we want other people to be 
on that track and have the chance to enjoy peace and prosperity, we have no choice but 
to try and lead the train.270 
––William Clinton 
The Clinton administration did not have a primacy grand strategy. Yet, to say that 
the Clinton administration did not have a primacy grand strategy is not to say the United 
States did not enjoy political, economic, and military primacy during the Clinton 
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administration’s tenure. It did. In fact, under the Clinton administration the United States 
could claim the world’s largest economy, its most powerful military, and increasingly, its 
most ubiquitous culture.271 Instead, what is meant by stating that the Clinton 
administration did not have a primacy grand strategy is that the administration did not have 
a strategy that sought “to preserve U.S. supremacy by politically, economically, and 
militarily outdistancing any global challenger.”272 However, one should not take this to 
mean that the Clinton administration did not have a strategy to preserve the United States’ 
political, economic, and military preeminence. The distinction is made in the goals the 
administration sought to achieve in pursuit of its ephemeral interests. Put simply, the 
Clinton administration implemented a strategy to maintain American global dominance but 
not necessarily unrivaled American primacy; a strategy to be primus inter pares within an 
open world order, not primus solus in an international state of nature.273 Guided by its 
view that the world was moving inexorably towards greater interdependence and 
integration, the administration sought to create an open American-led global order that all 
nations, even those with the potential to become peer competitors, could participate in and 
benefit from. This open global order would be underwritten and maintained by a 
preponderance of American political, economic, and military power. Hence, the Clinton 
primacy strategy, if it indeed required a name, could be aptly characterized as a strategy of 
benevolent preponderance.  
This strategy of benevolent preponderance consisted of two primary objectives. 
The first, and arguably the most important, was the maintenance of peace and stability 
through deterrence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the main mission and the central 
function of American military power was to be a global deterrent against aggression. While 
the Clinton administration oversaw a post-Cold War drawdown of American military 
forces, it retained the force capacity to wage two simultaneous regional wars.274 The 
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United States also maintained sizable military garrisons in Western Europe, Korea, and 
Japan. Moreover, its air and naval forces still enjoyed a global network of airfields and 
ports. However, the most important military assets, at least in terms of deterrence, were the 
United States’ nuclear triad of strategic bombers, submarines, and inter-continental 
ballistic missiles.  
Though nearly all of these military tools had been developed to deter and if 
necessary, defeat the Soviet Union, they now served to deter conflict and contain potential 
rivals. In Europe, American military forces, along with their NATO allies, halted the ethnic 
conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo and acted as a military hedge against a potential resurgence 
of Russian power. In the Middle East and Africa, the Clinton administration used American 
military forces to contain Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and conduct strikes on terrorist training 
camps. In Asia, the Clinton team sent American aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Straits to 
deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan and maintained forces in South Korea as a check 
on North Korea.275 Overall, the American military served as the world’s pacifier so as to 
maintain the security conditions appropriate for the Clinton administration’s pursuit of its 
ephemeral interests. 
The second major objective of the Clinton administration’s strategy of benevolent 
preponderance was the securing and maintenance of global economic stability and 
prosperity. The Clinton administration’s endorsement and advocacy of NAFTA and the 
WTO have already been discussed above and, while part of the administration’s efforts to 
promote economic integration and prosperity, will not be rediscussed here. However, a 
different initiative pursued by the Clinton administration is perhaps more illustrative of its 
commitment to promoting an open global order based on a benevolent preponderance of 
American power rather than American primacy. This commitment is most apparent in the 
Clinton administration’s approach to the People’s Republic of China. Ever since President 
Richard Nixon went to China in 1972, the Americans had encouraged and supported the 
growth of Chinese diplomatic, economic, and military power. Originally envisioned as “a 
strategic effort to balance China and the Soviet Union against one another in hopes of 
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producing more moderate behavior by each of them,” by the Clinton administration’s 
tenure American policy towards China was based on an assumption that “conciliatory U.S. 
policies toward Beijing - such as trade, education, and cultural contacts - would in the long 
run help serve the causes of [Chinese] liberty and democracy.”276 
The Clinton administration’s goals with regard to China were commendable and 
certainly within the bounds of its strategy of benevolent preponderance. Clinton’s ultimate 
hope was that as it became more powerful China would become a responsible stakeholder 
in the global order that had enabled and supported its ascendence. This view was outlined 
in a speech he delivered to advocate for China’s admission into the WTO, he declared that:  
China’s entry into the WTO…is about more than our economic interests. It 
is clearly in our larger national interests. It represents the most significant 
opportunity that we have had to create positive change in China since the 
1970s…the path that China takes to the future is a choice China will 
make…we can work to pull China in the right direction, or we can turn our 
backs and almost certainly push it in the wrong direction…Membership in 
the WTO…will not create a free society in China overnight or guarantee 
that China will play by global rules. But over time, I believe it will move 
China faster and further in the right direction and certainly will do that more 
than rejection would.277 
While the logic of Clinton’s, indeed Washington’s, approach to China was simple 
and clear, the same could not be said for its endstate. Hardly explained or addressed 
publicly by the Clinton team was the much more likely outcome that, instead of gaining a 
responsible stakeholder in an open global order, the United States was supporting and 
encouraging the rise of a new peer competitor. That in its efforts to build a global order 
open to all nations, the United States may ultimately be responsible for the rise of a new 
superpower that brutally suppressed human rights, that blamed the West for its “century of 
humiliation,” had more than a billion citizens, and that historically viewed itself as the 
Asian hegemon or “middle kingdom.” It is possible that Clinton’s approach to China was 
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a well-conceived effort to avoid a Cold War redux. It is possible that it will eventually be 
successful and that China will become a responsible stakeholder in a globalized order. It is 
also possible that the American approach to China rested upon a series of questionable 
assumptions and amounted to a wager that China’s rise would deviate from a well-
understood and predictable historical pattern. Historians will ultimately determine the 
wisdom of the Clinton administration’s approach to China. Today, the United States and 
the world are reckoning with its consequences.  
In both words and action, the Clinton administration did not have a primacy grand 
strategy. Instead, it crafted and implemented a strategy of benevolent preponderance. The 
administration would not try to prevent the rise of peer competitors, it would merely try to 
stay ahead of them. It did so by leveraging American political, economic, and military 
power to underwrite and sustain an open order that sought to promote global integration 
and interdependence. By maintaining a global deterrence posture, it hoped to foster a global 
environment favorable to stability and economic prosperity. The United States’ unrivaled 
economic and military might were not leveraged to prevent the rise of rival nations, but to 
cement its role as primus inter pares and encourage other nations to accede to the next era 
of pax Americana.  
F. ISOLATIONISM 
Americans are basically isolationist. They understand at a gut level Henry Kissinger’s 
vital-interest argument. Right now the average American doesn’t see our interest 
threatened to the point where we should sacrifice one American life.278 
––President Bill Clinton 
Despite claims to the contrary, Americans are not basically isolationist. Even a 
cursory glance at their history will show that Americans have been involved abroad, in one 
form or another, since the landings at Plymouth. However, as a consequence of their 
detached and distant situation, one might accurately say that they are predisposed towards 
isolationism. The power and natural security afforded to them by the location, size, and 
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bountifulness of their nation instills within them a sense of “strategic immunity.”279 As 
what goes on in distant lands seems to affect life in the United States in only minor ways, 
Americans have developed a reputation for being ignorant of or disinterested in foreign 
affairs. Moreover, isolationism has deep cultural and political roots in the American body 
politic. As a nation founded to be a rejection of the Old World’s politics, avarice, and 
militarism, the Americans have long viewed themselves and their institutions as being 
distinctly separate from and superior to those left behind across the seas. On account of 
these factors, any American leader who intended to embark the United States on a great 
undertaking beyond its shores has had to reckon with and overcome the isolationist 
qualities inherent to the American people. President Wilson did this by proclaiming that 
the Americans had a duty to “make the world safe for democracy.”280 Roosevelt, in 
response to an “unprovoked and dastardly attack,” embarked the United States on a crusade 
to defeat Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany.281 Truman, however, faced a different kind 
of challenge than did Wilson and Roosevelt. As he needed a long-term solution to the 
United States’ isolationist predilection in order to wage the Cold War, he attacked 
isolationism directly rather than circumvent it. In his efforts to permanently discredit 
isolationism as a legitimate basis for American foreign policy, he implemented an 
isolationist grand strategy that was designed to discount, disparage, and dismiss not just 
isolationism, but also those politicians, academics, and citizens who may have extolled its 
virtues. In its style, methods, and intent, the Clinton administration’s isolationist grand 
strategy was nearly identical to the one implemented by the Truman administration.  
The Clinton strategy to isolate isolationism was, however, built upon a considerably 
less stable foundation. In Truman’s day, the United States had just emerged victorious from 
a global conflagration that many believed was at least partially a product of American 
isolationism after World War I, and a slow but steady appeasement of Germany and Japan. 
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Confronted with the emergence of another hostile authoritarian state in the form of the 
Soviet Union, the Truman administration did not hesitate to point to the supposed failures 
of the interwar years in making its case for a rejection of isolationism. Simply put, at the 
outset of the Cold War the specter of isolationism and the ghost of Munich, when combined 
with a faith and confidence in the American government, were very effective in frightening 
the American people into supporting an era of unprecedented internationalism. Yet, by the 
Cold War’s end much had changed. For one, as a consequence of controversies such as the 
Vietnam War and Watergate, American faith in government was considerably diminished. 
So too was the potency of invoking events such as Munich. Most importantly, however, 
the Soviet Union’s collapse left the United States as the world’s sole remaining 
superpower. As a result, the Americans enjoyed a level of security unmatched by any other 
nation on the planet. Hence, justifying a new era of American internationalism––especially 
one dedicated to the pursuit of ephemeral interests––by attacking isolationism, amounted 
to a task considerably more difficult upon the end of the Cold War than at its beginning. 
The Clinton administration’s efforts to discredit isolationism were made more 
difficult by two primary factors. The first was the obvious reality that the world had 
changed and that the United States, while still facing threats from abroad, was undeniably 
more secure than it was during the Cold War. The second factor was the reemergence and 
rise to prominence of politicians willing to point this out. While voices calling for a more 
reserved American foreign policy came from both the political left and right, the loudest 
and most effective at shaping the national narrative emerged from the right. Patrick 
Buchanan, Ross Perot, and the infamous Contract Republicans each emerged as prominent 
critics of the bi-partisan consensus on the United States’ post-Cold War internationalism. 
Buchanan, a kind of proto-Donald Trump who himself ran for president in 1992, 1996, and 
2000, called for an end to the United States’ engagements abroad and a “new nationalism, 
a new patriotism, a new foreign policy that puts America first and, not only first, but second 
and third as well.”282 Perot, who also ran for president in 1992 and 1996, also saw many 
failings in the Bush and Clinton policies. He famously quipped that NAFTA would lead to 
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a “giant sucking sound” of American jobs to Mexico and that “keeping U.S. troops on 
European soil…is akin to a parent leaving a light on in a child’s room at night to ward off 
ghosts.”283 Lastly, the Contract Republicans, who swept into congress in the 1994 midterm 
elections, largely “scoffed at the notion that America had to be engaged in the world” and 
were determined to torpedo the entire Clinton presidency any way they could.284 Yet, 
despite these loud and often cantankerous critics, the Clinton administration had one major 
advantage in its war against American isolationism––inertia.  
Though the American people may have been inherently predisposed to isolationism 
and though they might have been eager to reap the rewards of a post-Cold War “peace 
dividend,” they had become, as a consequence of the Cold War, quite accustomed to 
international activism. In a sense, the Cold War had nurtured the public to be comfortable 
with an internationalism that was not innate to their nature. Just as it took decades of elite 
prodding and two world wars to shake the Americans from their historical preference for 
non-entanglement, the effects of five decades of vigorous internationalism would not 
disappear from the American psyche quickly. The Clinton administration and the foreign 
policy establishment understood this reality and made every effort to perpetuate its 
continuance. For example, President Clinton, speaking at the United Nations, proclaimed 
that “isolationism and protectionism are still poison. We must inspire our people to look 
beyond their immediate fears toward a broader horizon.”285 Clinton’s National Security 
Advisor, Anthony Lake, disparaged those favoring a more restrained grand strategy, stating 
in a speech that “calls from the left and the right to stay at home rather than engage abroad 
are re-enforced by the rhetoric of Neo-Know-Nothings.”286 One prominent analyst 
lamented isolationism’s survival and ascribed it to “the sentiment among the poor and the 
poorly educated that, however noble our purposes, most of the things we do for the rest of 
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the world are wasteful, pointless, unappreciated, and tragic.”287 Clearly, those who 
questioned American internationalism, even in a new era of relative peace and security, 
risked being dismissed as an isolationist, a Neo-Know-Nothing, or an uneducated and 
poverty-stricken dolt.  
Ultimately, the Clinton isolationist strategy was designed to discredit both 
isolationism and those who opposed American internationalism. If the administration and 
the bi-partisan foreign policy establishment could tar and discredit those who promoted 
restraint or retrenchment as isolationists, they could maintain control of American grand 
strategy and ensure that the United States continued to pursue an internationalist agenda.288 
In this regard, the Clinton isolationist strategy was entirely successful. Yet, given that this 
success was largely built on a foundation of rhetoric and Cold War inertia, there is reason 
to believe that it may not be lasting. The inherent qualities of the American people and the 
American geography will ensure that isolationism remains a factor in American grand 
strategy. President Clinton, in one of his final speeches as president, spoke to his efforts to 
overcome American isolationism stating that “people say I’m a pretty good talker, but I 
still don’t think I’ve persuaded the American people by big majorities that you really ought 
to care a lot about foreign policy, about our relationship to the rest of the world.”289 In 
truth, it is unlikely that any American leader could do so in perpetuity––not even one as 
convincing as President Clinton. 
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G. TOWARD A SINGLE SPHERE: INSULATED SPHERES OF 
INTEGRATION AFTER THE COLD WAR 
This is the truth as I see it. We served history well during the cold war, but now history 
calls on us again to help consolidate freedom’s new gains into a larger and more lasting 
peace.290 
––William Clinton 
Likely to its delight and chagrin, the Clinton administration had to answer grand 
strategy questions not forced upon any presidential administration since that of President 
Truman after World War II. Just as Truman was the first president of the Cold War and 
was tasked with crafting and defining American grand strategy for that era, Clinton was 
the first president after the Cold War and faced a similar challenge. In some ways, Clinton’s 
task may have been more perplexing. The Truman administration faced a clear threat and 
enjoyed an American public largely prepared to confront it. By contrast, the Clinton 
administration faced no catalyzing threat and had to manage an American public intent on 
turning inward. As such, it is not surprising that the Clinton administration maintained the 
general arc of the Truman post-World War II grand strategy. In this case, inertia was a 
quality of its own. What is interesting, however, was how the Clinton administration’s 
pursuit of integration was intended to erode the distinctions between the United States’ 
insulated spheres of integration and increasingly merge them into a single sphere.  
While the Clinton grand strategy maintained certain elements of the insulated 
spheres of integration cast by the Truman administration, its pursuit of enlargement altered 
their size, composition, and boundaries. The United States’ internal sphere was expanded 
to include those nations integrated into NATO, NAFTA, and the WTO. Though some 
distinctions between an internal and external sphere were maintained, the Clinton team’s 
pursuit of ephemeral interests eroded the boundary between them. As a consequence, the 
internal sphere enjoyed considerably less insulation, both within the internal sphere and in 
its relation to the external sphere. Insulation was eroded within the internal sphere in that 
its boundaries were no longer set by the limits of the United States’ cooperative security 
 
290 William Jefferson Clinton, “Remarks to Future Leaders of Europe in Brussels” (Speech, Brussels, 
Belgium, January 9, 1994), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-future-leaders-europe-
brussels. 
121 
and primacy grand strategies as they had been under the Founders and the Truman 
administration. For example, with its incorporation into the WTO, the Clinton 
administration moved away from the principle set by the Founders and maintained by 
Truman which held that only things over which the United States could maintain primacy 
should be included within its internal sphere. As this integration into a global institution 
was not insulated with corresponding protections––such as the veto power enjoyed by the 
United States at the United Nations––this integration partially eroded the distinction 
between the United States’ internal and external spheres. While the political and military 
expansions of the internal sphere amounted to a difference in degree and were merely an 
expansion of those put in place by Truman, Clinton’s economic integration was a 
difference in kind. The overall result was insulated spheres of integration that were much 
more integrated, less protected by robust forms of insulation, and increasingly––a single 
sphere. 
However, was this such a bad thing? If the United States could create and sustain a 
single global sphere of integration that was based on shared values, common institutions, 
economic interdependence, and American military power, was that not a strategic objective 
worthy of pursuit? Furthermore, if the mechanisms of integration within this single sphere 
were akin to those implemented by the Founders, was this not at least a continuation of 
their strategic grammar, if not their logic? In other words, even if Clinton aimed to secure 
American liberty via integration instead of balance, were his efforts not at least reflective 
of the intent of the Founders’ logic, even if not a representation of it? Truthfully, it is likely 
still too early to tell. The only determination that can be made for certain is that the Clinton 
grand strategy did not seek to preserve liberty by blending archetypal grand strategies to 
achieve a balance between integration and insulation in the same way the founding 
generation and the Truman administration did. In this sense, the Clinton administration 
indeed went beyond the Founders’ logic even if the effects and wisdom of it having done 





Economic and technological forces all over the globe are compelling the world towards 
integration. These forces are fueling a welcome explosion of entrepreneurship and 
political liberalization. But they also threaten to destroy the insularity and independence 
of national economies, quickening the pace of change and making many of our people 
feel more insecure.291 
––William Clinton 
As discussed herein, the Clinton administration strained the Founders’ logic in its 
pursuit of integration. This begs the question if the Founders’ vision for the United States 
is still relevant. Is the United States still a nation that prioritizes the fundamental interests 
of its own citizens? Or, is it something more? Something with a broader mission for the 
world? There is little doubt that the United States’ pursuit of the Clinton ephemeral 
interests has largely been a long-term net positive for the world. There have been no major 
interstate wars. Global standards of living have risen, while the numbers of people who die 
from preventable causes have fallen. Global institutions, such as the WTO, have increased 
levels of international trade and commerce. Countries such as China and India, as result of 
increased trade, have lifted hundreds of millions from abject poverty. On the whole, the 
world has benefitted tremendously from the Clinton administration’s strategy of 
benevolent preponderance.292  
Yet, from an American grand strategy perspective, one should ask to what extent 
the United States has benefitted from the Clinton administration’s legacy? Is the United 
States more powerful and more prosperous today than it was in 1996? In 2000? Have the 
benefits enjoyed by the world accrued equally to the United States or to the average 
American citizen? In truth, one can find data to support an answer in the affirmative and in 
the negative. It depends on how and what one decides to measure. The data that would 
answer in the affirmative would point to steady, though anemic, rises in GDP, lower costs 
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of consumer goods, and a generalized notion of global peace.293 Those who might answer 
in the negative would likely cite soaring levels of national debt, stagnant middle-class wage 
growth, increasing income inequality, and intractable political polarization.294 Moreover, 
where positive aspects for Americans can be found, one must ask which Americans have 
benefited. There are indications that certain sectors and regions of American life have 
benefited tremendously, while others have stagnated or fallen behind. Interestingly, from 
a grand strategy perspective, is the extent to which these benefits have accrued to the 
sectors of American life that exert vastly disproportionate amounts of influence on national 
politics and the direction and course of American grand strategy. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, in his famous work Democracy in America, asserted that 
democratic nations may require their foreign affairs be managed by elites so as to separate 
them from the whims of popular opinion. He wrote that “the main vice for which 
aristocracy is reproached is that of working for itself alone and not for the whole 
community. However, in foreign policy it very seldom happens that an aristocracy has an 
interest distinct from that of the people.”295 Yet, what happens when the aristocracy, or in 
the case of the United States––a political, academic, media, military and foreign policy 
elite, view themselves in a sense broader than their national identity? Or, if this is not the 
case, what happens when a political demagogue can spuriously claim that the grand 
strategy long favored by the American elite does not benefit the common American and 
can cite legitimate data to make his or her claims believable?  
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As with many aspects of this chapter, the answer is not yet knowable. The history 
is still unfolding. Future generations may place Clinton and his administration among the 
upper echelons of strategic leaders in American history. Though they will likely never 
consider his tenure to be in the same league as a Washington, Lincoln, or Roosevelt, it is 
possible that with the passage of time, and with his personal failings and controversies 
largely forgotten, he could rank among those such as Adams, Grant, and Truman, who have 
become respected and appreciated once a clearer picture of their tenure is achieved. Yet, 
history may not be kind at all. Analysis in the future may hold that the Clinton 
administration’s efforts to embrace integration and globalization led to a significant 
straining of the insulationist paradigm and a weakening of the American republic; that in 
its elaboration of the Truman grammar on a global scale, it did not just strain the Founders’ 
strategic logic, it abandoned it. Indeed, like the famous Pericles leading his people behind 
the walls of Athens, Clinton may ultimately be remembered as a gifted politician and 
statesman whose reputation is forever tarnished by his failure to see or adequately prepare 
for the tragic, but entirely predictable, consequences of his grand strategy. Only time and 




The world being a dangerous place, they saw that a union that would aggregate strength 
against potential enemies was a necessity, but they wondered whether great size in the 
union or great power in the general government would introduce into their association 
forces that made for its disruption, or otherwise corrupted its republican principles.296 
––David C. Hendrickson 
As was noted in the first pages of this work, Liddell Hart’s assertion that “the realm 
of grand strategy is for the most part terra incognita––still awaiting exploration and 
understanding” is not entirely true.297 The former, while maybe an understandable lament 
for an Englishman witnessing the final glories of the British Empire, is certainly not 
accurate today. Grand strategy is a well-studied subject in graduate schools and think-tanks 
across the United States and explorations on the topic fill the pages of many books, 
journals, and publications. Truly, one would find it difficult to bemoan a lack of exploration 
on grand strategy in general or American grand strategy in particular. However, Hart’s 
latter lamentation still rings partially true. Though grand strategy does not suffer from a 
lack of exploration, universal understanding or agreement as to the purpose, goals, or future 
course of American grand strategy is not as robust. As is generally so in all eras but 
particularly true today, political and academic disagreements about the future arc of 
American grand strategy are legion and enjoying a particular salience on the account of 
domestic and geopolitical upheaval. As such, this thesis traced the seams of American 
grand strategy during periods of geopolitical change in the past so as to offer considerations 
for its future. Indeed, much of the history discussed herein is well-traveled ground. 
Explorations and understandings of the founding era and of the Truman administration are 
among the most extensive and diverse in American history. Moreover, the Clinton tenure, 
though not yet enjoying the full benefits of detached hindsight, will likely be subject to 
further illumination with the passage of time. The significance of this thesis, therefore, is 
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not in discovering new material but in the questions it has posed and in its new articulation 
of the fundamental problems of American grand strategy. In other words, in its exploration 
of these well-studied periods of American history, it arrives at a distinct understanding of 
how the United States has balanced integration and insulation in the crafting of its grand 
strategy and poses new questions about how it may do so in the future. 
B. AN EXPLORATION AND AN UNDERSTANDING 
Many of the friends of freedom in America congratulate themselves on their role as the 
indispensable nation and as the agent chosen by History and Providence to spread 
political freedom in the world. But few seem much troubled by the massive globe-
spanning American national security state and its implications for limited constitutional 
government, political liberty, and global security.298 
––Daniel H. Deudney 
Weaved throughout this understanding is an exploration of the insulationist 
paradigm and the relationships between two fundamental tensions in American grand 
strategy: the seemingly immortal one that exists between integration and insulation, and 
the increasingly strained one between the Founders’ first impressions and the demands put 
upon them by a constantly evolving world. While the former is a tension germane to grand 
strategy in general, the latter is unique to American grand strategy. In other words, how a 
nation defines itself, its interests, and its relationship to the world is a labor tasked to all 
nations. By contrast, the particular manner in which the Founders originally answered these 
questions is fundamental to the logic and grammar of American grand strategy. The central 
task of American grand strategists for most of the republic’s history has been to carry forth 
the Founders’ logic while creating a grammar appropriate to the peculiarities of their 
contemporary situations. Such a tension might be considered the happy burden borne by a 
nation enjoying the strategic architecture built upon enlightened foundations laid by 
uniquely brilliant men. Alternatively, it may be regarded as a perpetually frustrating and 
self-limiting cage anchored by nostalgic attachment to the glorious anachronisms of 
eighteenth-century statesmen not fitting for or appropriate to the needs of a modern state 
in an increasingly integrated world. Yet, the most considered view likely lies somewhere 
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in the equatorial range between these polar positions. Regardless of one’s judgement of it, 
the heart of this tension derives from the simple truth that the Founders’ first impressions 
contained strategic wisdom not just for their time, but for all time. 
As this work makes clear, the wisdom undergirding the Founders’ insulationist 
paradigm functions not only as blueprints for the balancing of integration and insulation, 
but also as a metric by which to judge the edifices constructed from them. Put differently, 
their first impressions illuminate a path to managing one fundamental tension of American 
grand strategy and serve as the anchor for the other. The logic of their grand strategy holds 
that liberty is maintained as a consequence of an appropriate equilibrium between 
integration and insulation contrived through the blending of archetypal grand strategies. 
Derived as it was from their understanding of history and other more immutable factors 
such as human nature and geography, the Founders’ strategic logic represents a wisdom 
that is at least durable if not eternal. In question, then, is the extent to which this durability 
corresponds to elasticity. In other words, how far can the Founders’ strategic logic be 
expanded before it reaches something akin to a Clausewitzian culminating point where to 
go beyond it “would not merely be a useless effort which could not add to success. [But] 
would in fact be a damaging one, which would lead to a reaction.”299 Put plainly, at what 
point does the United States’ sphere of integration contain a multitude of interests and 
factions too diverse to hold together? Or rather, to what extent can integration be increased 
without corresponding insulation before the vices of consolidation exert their maleficence? 
Indeed, determining the point at which the Founders’ logic exceeds its limits may be the 
principal question around which the future of American grand strategy revolves. 
This exploration suggests at least the outlines of a potential answer. In their 
blending of archetypal grand strategies and creation of distinct internal and external 
insulated spheres of integration, the Founders’ established patterns which were carried 
forward by subsequent American leaders. One such pattern embraced by the Truman 
administration in the crafting of its grand strategy but partially eschewed by the Clinton 
administration was the non-incorporation of entities into the internal sphere over which the 
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United States could not maintain primacy. Truman’s recasting of the Founders’ insulated 
spheres of integration maintained this principle despite its notable expansion of the internal 
sphere. Yet, as detailed in the previous chapter, the Clinton administration’s integration 
into the WTO likely amounted to a partial abandonment of this principle. China’s economic 
rise means that the United States risks being incorporated into a global institution in which 
it does not enjoy primacy. Moreover, as this integration was not matched with 
corresponding mechanisms of insulation, it is possible that the cooperation and benefit it 
was supposed to provide will stagnate or diminish as China’s economic star continues to 
wax. All this can be taken to suggest that the limits of the Founders’ logic and the 
insulationist paradigm may correspond with the limits of American primacy; that the 
boundaries of their wisdom cannot and should not be extended beyond the fundamental 
and essential interests of the United States as doing so may ultimately undermine its ability 
to secure them. 
However, other voices, many of them prominent and measured, have different 
views on the limits of the Founders’ strategic wisdom. It has been suggested herein that the 
Clinton administration’s drift away from the Founders’ logic might indicate that the 
Founders’ solution to the first fundamental tension of American grand strategy is not the 
one pursued today. This work’s articulation of that administration’s move towards a single 
sphere of integration at least approximates the views of those who hold that the Founders’ 
insights can be used as the basis by which to order a global zone of integration or a “global 
village.”300 If this is indeed the implied purpose and goal of American grand strategy 
today, then the question of whether the United States’ pursuit of a single sphere of 
integration is a worthy strategic objective warrants a brief consideration.  
An optimistic view of this move towards a single sphere might be that in order to 
avoid the greatest destroyer of liberty and free government––war––the United States seeks 
to replicate the Founders’ mechanisms on a global scale. For example, if the Americans 
continued to guarantee the security of the global commons and field an overwhelming 
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military deterrent, would this not dissuade lesser nations from arming themselves or acting 
in aggressive ways towards other states? Or, if under the WTO global trade could be 
managed and regulated by an overarching authority, would global commerce not 
eventually resemble something akin to that of the individual states within the United 
States? Not surprisingly, many of the arguments made for the United States’ post-Cold 
War bout of liberal internationalism are echoes of arguments made by the Federalists in 
favor of the Constitution’s ratification. Perhaps their most related contention is that 
disintegration would invariably lead to a system plagued by war and that in preparing for 
and protecting against this hobgoblin, the Americans would sacrifice not only their 
economic vitality, but would also risk their liberty. Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 6 that 
“to look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected 
sovereignties…would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at 
defiance the accumulated experience of the ages.”301 The remedy suggested for the 
amelioration of this evil, both in the founding era and today, is the incorporation of the 
many into a sphere of integration informed by republican principles. Yet, here again, this 
exploration returns to a discussion of limits. Hamilton also wrote that “excess is always 
error” and that “there is hardly any theoretic hypothesis, which, carried to a certain extreme, 
does not become practically false.”302 Where, then, does the Founders’ strategic logic 
reach the extreme at which its tenets are no longer true––in a practical sense? 
Setting aside questions concerning the limits of its practicality, one must also 
consider the prudence of applying the Founders’ wisdom globally. Is such expansion a 
natural evolution of their logic or the placement of corrosive demands upon it? Does it 
increase liberty at home? Or, in the pursuit of global integration, will it merely preserve 
some lesser form for those increasingly accustomed to or demanding of the adjuring hands 
of the state? In a manner similar to how the Federalist’s arguments for integration mirror 
those who favor the same on a larger scale today, the Anti-Federalist’s dissertations in 
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opposition to the Constitution outline some potential pitfalls of a global sphere of 
integration. First, it must be noted that the Anti-Federalists generally did not believe that a 
failure to integrate would necessarily lead to war or, if it did, that war would not necessarily 
be the liberty-consuming destructive force the Federalists described.303 Hendrickson notes 
this dichotomy of views, writing that “it was in the nature of the argument for the 
Federalists to paint the American situation in the darkest of colors, and for Anti-Federalists 
to minimize the dangers.”304 A similar dichotomy might be said to exist today. True, some 
of the Anti-Federalists believed that war as a phenomenon was not eliminable and that its 
occasional occurrence was preferable to the “despotism” that the Constitution made 
possible. Centinel wrote that “to avoid the possible and transitory evils of one extreme, [the 
Constitution] is seduced into the certain and permanent misery necessarily attendant on the 
other.”305 Today, nuclear weapons complicate this calculus both in that their existence 
makes total war between states unthinkable and that the United States’ large inventory of 
them, when combined with its detached situation, gives it favorable advantages not enjoyed 
by other nations.  
Yet, for all their diverse foibles and ostensibly short-sighted perspectives, those 
Founders who opposed the Constitution made several claims about it which time have 
proven if not exactly accurate, then at least mostly true.306 The one perhaps most relevant 
to this discussion was their fear that integration under the Constitution would over time 
relocate power and political control away from that which is essential to republican 
government––the people. In what is likely his most read essay, Brutus wrote of the 
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Constitution that it “does not go to a perfect and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so 
near it, that it must, if executed, certainly and infallibly terminate in it.”307 Herbert Storing 
wrote that “the Anti-Federalist’ defense of federalism and of the primacy of the states rested 
on their belief that there was an inherent connection between the states and the preservation 
of individual liberty, which is the end of any legitimate government.”308 Given that the 
American union has itself tended steadily towards integration and ever greater federal 
power, would not a global union, even if it did not terminate in a perfect consolidation, 
inevitably move power and political control even farther way from the people and their 
interests?  
This question brings to the fore a final consideration that, though an essential aspect 
of any measured grand strategy, is of particular relevance to this discussion and 
exploration. This is, of course, the feasibility of securing and maintaining a domestic 
consensus on the pursuit of such a globally integrative grand strategy. James Wilson 
asserted during the Constitutional Convention that “no government could long subsist 
without the confidence of the people. In a republican Government this confidence was 
peculiarly essential.”309 By a similar logic, it can be asserted that no grand strategy, at least 
not one implemented by popular government, could long subsist without the confidence of 
the people. Gaddis writes that grand strategy is “the alignment of potentially unlimited 
aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities.”310 One must consider whether it is 
possible to permanently align the extensive aspirations of global integration with what at 
least seems to be the increasingly limited capability of convincing voters to support it. The 
Brexit vote, the election of Donald Trump, and the widespread unilateralism witnessed in 
response to the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic all might indicate that popular support 
for internationalism and global cooperation is on the wane. Indeed, the most consequential 
inquiry when considering a grand strategy whose purpose and goal is a global sphere of 
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integration might not be whether it is possible, practical, or even prudent, but rather if it is 
politically sustainable.  
An observation such as this, returns this exploration to a discussion of the tensions 
present in American grand strategy. Already noted were both the eternal tension between 
integration and insulation and the fraying one between this work’s understanding of the 
Founders’ logic and the apparent goals of the current American grand strategy. Yet, another 
tension may be just as central to the future of the United States’ grand strategy as those 
explored above. Though the preceding paragraphs raise a number of questions about the 
viability of a global sphere of integration, they should not be taken to mean that such a goal 
is necessarily impossible or undesirable. Instead, they might be viewed as the building 
blocks of political and academic arguments that could be made against the United States’ 
post-Cold War grand strategy. Hence, a final tension likely to influence American grand 
strategy in increasing ways over the coming years is that which has always existed between 
those who desire more integration and those who do not; between those who see global 
integration as the natural progression of the Founders’ wisdom and those who see it as a 
straining of their logic at best and an abandonment of it at worst. In truth, more likely 
depends on how the American people intuit the effect of their nation’s grand strategy on 
their daily lives than whether would-be grand strategists see the Founders’ wisdom as 
merely the logic undergirding grand strategy intended to secure the fundamental and 
essential interests of the United States, or as something more. Yet, “whatever our nation’s 
choice,” Hendrickson notes, “it is striking that the founders’ discourse on federalism 
anticipates in crucial aspects our own discourse on nationalism, internationalism, and 
imperialism, with the structure of the argument continuing to revolve around similar 
theories, predicaments, and aspirations.”311 Indeed, if the past is any indication of what is 
to come, then further exploration of these many tensions is needed before an adequate 
understanding of the Founders’ wisdom can be achieved for the future. 
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C. AN UNDERSTANDING LOOKING FORWARD AND SUGGESTIONS 
FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION 
Malum consilium quod mutari non potest––bad is the plan that cannot change.312 
––Publius Syrus 
The significance of this thesis is its provision of new ways to understand that which 
was previously thought to be well-understood. It is not in its discovery of new facts from 
important periods of American history, nor is it in the detailing of or advocacy for a new 
American grand strategy. Notwithstanding these realities, this work does provide some 
answers to enduring questions of American grand strategy while simultaneously suggesting 
new ones. A first concerns an answer to one of the primary questions examined by this 
work, detailed in its chapters, but not yet addressed specifically. Asked at the outset of this 
thesis was a question about the extent to which different grand strategy archetypes were 
blended during previous periods of geopolitical change. The answer, though hopefully 
clear by this point, is that grand strategy archetypes have been blended in consonance with 
the Founders’ logic for much of American history. Moreover, the synthetic manner in 
which they were employed implies that the eclectic way they are often discussed in the 
literature and in policy deliberations is overly simplistic. This research suggests that the 
American motto, e plurbis unum, represents a more useful way to think about and discuss 
these grand strategy archetypes. Further research on the blending of archetypal grand 
strategies might include examinations of periods not covered by this thesis or how they 
may be blended in the future.  
Other potentially fruitful lines of inquiry about the future of American grand 
strategy entail the examination and consideration of how the United States may correct the 
imbalance in its grand strategy identified by this thesis. Three specific directions might 
include research on how each set of the insulated spheres of integration detailed in this 
work might be reconstructed, corrected, or improved. First, one might examine how to 
continue the United States’ current grand strategy of global integration while correcting for 
its straining of the Founders’ logic. Those who read this thesis and disagree with its 
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conclusions or its interpretations of the problems facing American grand strategy would 
still find it difficult to deny that the effects of that strategy are undermining the likelihood 
of its continuance. One might examine this issue of integration and insulation from the 
perspective of style, form, and terms instead of limits; not in an effort to find the limits of 
integration, but to create more efficient and sustainable manifestations of it. In his 1791 
Report on Manufactures, Hamilton noted that, while free trade in principle was conducive 
to the generation of liberty, wealth, and peace, the United States’ practice of it “could not 
but expose [it] to a state of impoverishment” because “the want of reciprocity would render 
[it] the victim of [the contemporary economic] system.”313 In other words, though the 
United States may desire free trade, it could not practice it because no other countries did 
at the time and unilaterally allowing free access to the American market would stunt or 
damage the American economy. As today the primary backlashes against globalization and 
the liberal international order are economic in nature, one might study how Hamilton’s 
reasoning in 1791 might be applied today to secure the best possible forms of integration–
–instead of trying to find its limits. In order to secure a future for liberal internationalism, 
the United States must do a better job of insulating the effects of global integration or risk 
seeing it undermined in the voting booth. Research exploring how this may be done would 
likely be of value to those who believe that the application of the Founders’ principles 
abroad is beneficial, possible, and or required. 
Though it is the configuration least likely to become the goal of American grand 
strategy in the future, research exploring a return to the Founders’ arrangement of the 
nation’s insulated spheres of integration would find a field fertile and largely unplowed. 
Despite the unlikelihood of its pursuance, a reimagining of the Founders’ spheres is not as 
impossible as some suggest or would like to believe. The political seeds are available were 
there to be a politician skilled and articulate enough to plant them. With the likely exception 
of Joseph Biden, every new president elected since the end of the Cold War has been the 
candidate promising to do less abroad. Research studying the effects of a United States 
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returned to economic relations with all and political attachment to none would do much to 
bring into sharper relief the benefits and costs of such a move. Moreover, those wishing a 
return to the United States’ historical pattern of strict non-entanglement would benefit from 
research providing a cohesive plan to do so. Roger Barrus notes that a weakness in the 
Anti-Federalist’s strategy in the debate over integration was their efforts to “counter the 
Federalists’ comprehensive proposal with a series of specific criticisms rather than with a 
comprehensive proposal of their own.” He continues, writing that “the American people 
generally had come to the conclusion that substantial changes needed to be made to the 
Articles of Confederation” and that “in this situation, to defend the existing government, 
the Anti-Federalists needed to go back to first principles and present an argument for the 
small republic as robust as the Federalists’ argument for the large one.” 314 If the American 
people of today can be characterized as at least open to drastic change in their nation’s 
grand strategy, then those who wish a return to the Founders’ spheres will likely need 
research that presents their arguments for a smaller sphere of integration as robustly as 
those who advocate for a larger one.  
Yet, given the rise of China, perhaps the best option is a return to insulated spheres 
of integration akin to those cast by the Truman administration at the outset of the Cold 
War. Though one should be cautious in comparing the burgeoning competition with China 
to the Cold War and the Soviet Union, much of the basic fundamentals is likely to be 
similar. Hence, research that looks at how the United States’ Cold War institutions can be 
retooled would likely be beneficial for those who believe that China, like the Soviet Union 
before it, can be contained or mellowed over time. Specific research on modernizing the 
American alliance system or the global economic order should be near the top of the list. 
Lastly, for those searching for big questions and seeking to avoid applied research, 
there are always the abstract theoretical questions raised by this thesis. Further research 
examining the limits of the Founders’ wisdom might consider the questions posed in the 
previous section. Those examining the practicality, prudence, and political sustainability 
of pursuing a global sphere of integration would not only add greater context to the points 
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raised in this research, but would also be useful for those seeking to solve global problems, 
such as nuclear proliferation and climate change, or manage the emergence of the “new 
global commons” of space and cyberspace.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The plan of the fathers would have no controlling authority for us if it had been proved 
by experience that that plan was narrow, inadequate, and mistaken. Are we prepared to 
vote that it has proved so?315 
––William Graham Sumner 
Both this thesis and this final chapter began with a quote from a man whose life 
spanned the twilight of British global hegemony. Liddell Hart was born into a world where 
“the sun never set” on the British Empire. He died in one where pax Britannica had been 
swept away by the unflagging and inexhaustible “winds of change.”316 Ironically, this fate 
was foreshadowed by no less than one of the American Founders. At the outset of the 
American Revolution, Thomas Paine wrote in his pamphlet, Common Sense, that “there is 
something very absurd, in supposing a continent to be perpetually governed by an 
island.”317 By a simple expansion of Paine’s logic, one could assert that it is even more 
absurd to suppose that that same island could perpetually govern a quarter of the entire 
world. Indeed, in hindsight it seems that British hegemony and the world order that 
sustained it were destined to fall by the hand of ascendant nationalism in an era dominated 
by a pair of competing superpowers. Today, however, grand strategists, politicians, and 
academics do not spend so much effort pondering the sustainability of pax Britannica in 
the twentieth century as they do the proximate sustainability of its successor in the twenty-
first. They wonder whether Paine’s expanded logic applies––as many things did that were 
passed from Greeks to Romans––to the United States’ extended Empire of Liberty in the 
same manner that it did Britain’s colonial empire of perpetual sunlight. Writing in the 
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1890s, William Graham Sumner noted that “England, as a penalty of her greatness, [found] 
herself in all parts of the world face to face with the necessity of maintaining her 
jurisdiction and of extending it in order to maintain it.”318 While this description aptly 
applies to the United States’ current situation and grand strategy, must America’s course 
mirror Britain’s just as Rome’s eventually echoed those of the Greek republics? Like pax 
Britannica before it, will pax Americana end with the rise of nationalism in an era 
dominated by new superpower competitions? Is it absurd to suppose, as Paine might have 
suggested, that the North American superpower could preside over a liberal international 
order in perpetuity? If so, is it less absurd to suppose that it could perpetually head a more 
limited sphere of integration? Or, is the only permanent dominion to be enjoyed by the 
Americans that which is subject to their constitution? This thesis does not provide these 
answers––only more questions. The American economist Herbert Stein famously said that 
“if something cannot go on forever it will stop.”319 If one accepts this work’s claim that 
the United States’ post-Cold War grand strategy of integration is the product of the 
Founders’ strategic logic strained to the point of fracture, should one not expect an 
inevitable reversion towards insulation? Moreover, should learned and alert grand 
strategists and students of history be surprised that such a move would be heralded by a 
figure such as Donald Trump? Indeed, Trump and his administration are more the products 
of the contemporary domestic and international situations than the causes of them. The 
Trump presidency, if it accomplishes nothing else lasting, may, however crudely, at least 
provide the incoming Biden administration and “the Establishment” with the shock and 
political cover they need to bring American grand strategy back into balance with the 
insulationist paradigm and the Founders’ logic. If it does, history may not see the Trump 
administration as the greatest American-bred danger to liberty and republican security to 
manifest in generations, but their ultimate savior. Of course, many different outcomes are 
just as likely. Trump may also serve as a harbinger of things yet to come. Despite the efforts 
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of strategists to pierce its depths, the future is unknowable and cloaked in uncertainty. As 
was noted previously herein, the only mechanisms that will reveal all the answers sought 
by grand strategists are those which are the only true and final judges of presidents and 
grand strategies––history and time. 
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